

For Six Month Period Ending 3/17/08
(Insert date)

I - REGISTRANT

1. (a) Name of Registrant
Neusner Communications, LLC

(b) Registration No.

5883

(c) Business Address(es) of Registrant
7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Ste 255E
Bethesda, MD 20814

2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following:

- (a) If an individual:
- | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (1) Residence address(es) | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (2) Citizenship | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (3) Occupation | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
- (b) If an organization:
- | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| (1) Name | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| (2) Ownership or control | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| (3) Branch offices | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

(c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in items (a) and (b) above.

2008 SEP 30 PM 12:42
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4 AND 5(a).

3. If you have previously filed Exhibit C¹, state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period.

Yes No

If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C? Yes No

If no, please attach the required amendment.

¹ The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)

4. (a) Have any persons ceased acting as partners, officers, directors or similar officials of the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position	Date connection ended
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(b) Have any persons become partners, officers, directors or similar officials during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
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5. (a) Has any person named in item 4(b) rendered services directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal?

Yes No

If yes, identify each such person and describe his service.

(b) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their employment or connection with the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position or connection	Date terminated
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(c) During this 6 month reporting period, has the registrant hired as employees or in any other capacity, any persons who rendered or will render services to the registrant directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal(s) in other than a clerical or secretarial, or in a related or similar capacity? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
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6. Have short form registration statements been filed by all of the persons named in Items 5(a) and 5(c) of the supplemental statement?

Yes No

If no, list names of persons who have not filed the required statement.

II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

7. Has your connection with any foreign principal ended during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal

Date of termination

8. Have you acquired any new foreign principal² during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name and address of foreign principal

Date acquired

9. In addition to those named in Items 7 and 8, if any, list foreign principals² whom you continued to represent during the 6 month reporting period.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey through DiNovo Strategies and Fleishman-Hillard

10. **EXHIBITS A AND B**

(a) Have you filed for each of the newly acquired foreign principals in Item 8 the following:

Exhibit A³ Yes No
 Exhibit B⁴ Yes No

If no, please attach the required exhibit.

(b) Have there been any changes in the Exhibits A and B previously filed for any foreign principal whom you represented during the 6 month period? Yes No

If yes, have you filed an amendment to these exhibits? Yes No

If no, please attach the required amendment.

² The term "foreign principal" includes, in addition to those defined in Section 1(b) of the Act, an individual organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a)(9).) A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 208.)

³ The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form NSD-3 (Formerly CRM-157), sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

⁴ The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form NSD-4 (Formerly CRM-155), sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

III - ACTIVITIES

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11. During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes No

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:

Regular emails and phone calls to Jewish leaders highlighting Turkey's relationship with Israel and Jewish communities around the world; the promotion and planning of events (movies, speeches, cultural exhibitions) that highlight Turkey's historic relationship to the Jewish people and Israel; outreach to Jewish leaders with regard to Turkish-related events in the Middle East; and creation of working relationships between US-based Jewish and Turkish community groups.

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12. During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity⁵ as defined below? Yes No

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates and places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.

Please see attached.

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13. In addition to the above described activities, if any, have you engaged in activity on your own behalf which benefits any or all of your foreign principals? Yes No

If yes, describe fully.

⁵ The term "political activities" means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes No

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies⁶.

Date	From whom	Purpose	Amount
11/1/07	Embassy of the Republic of Turkey	For services rendered	\$5,333.00
12/9/07	Same	Same	\$4,000.00
1/7/08	Same	Same	\$7,500.00
2/1/08	Same	Same	\$7,500.00
3/10/08	Same	Same	\$7,500.00

\$31,833.00

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign⁷, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes No

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D⁸ to your registration? Yes No

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date _____

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value⁹ other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal	Date received	Description of thing of value	Purpose
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⁶, ⁷ A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign. (See Rule 201(e).)

⁸ An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

⁹ Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

15. (a) **DISBURSEMENTS – MONIES**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you

(1) disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes No

(2) transmitted monies to any such foreign principal? Yes No

If no, explain in full detail why there were no disbursements made on behalf of any foreign principal.

Any expenses incurred were de minimis (under \$10) for things like postage or taxis.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

Date	To whom	Purpose	Amount
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Total

(b) DISBURSEMENTS – THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value¹⁰ other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date disposed	Name of person to whom given	On behalf of what foreign principal	Description of thing of value	Purpose
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(c) DISBURSEMENTS – POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value¹¹ in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Amount or thing of value	Name of political organization	Name of candidate
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^{10, 11} Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks" and the like.

V - INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS

16. During this 6 month reporting period, did you prepare, disseminate or cause to be disseminated any informational materials¹²?
Yes No

IF YES, RESPOND TO THE REMAINING ITEMS IN SECTION V.

17. Identify each such foreign principal.

18. During this 6 month reporting period, has any foreign principal established a budget or allocated a specified sum of money to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials? Yes No

If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount, and indicate for what period of time.

19. During this 6 month reporting period, did your activities in preparing, disseminating or causing the dissemination of informational materials include the use of any of the following:

- Radio or TV broadcasts
- Magazine or newspaper articles
- Motion picture films
- Letters or telegrams
- Advertising campaigns
- Press releases
- Pamphlets or other publications
- Lectures or speeches
- Internet
- Other (specify) _____

20. During this 6 month reporting period, did you disseminate or cause to be disseminated informational materials among any of the following groups:

- Public officials
- Newspapers
- Libraries
- Legislators
- Editors
- Educational institutions
- Government agencies
- Civic groups or associations
- Nationality groups
- Other (specify) Jewish Leaders

21. What language was used in the informational materials:

- English
- Other (specify) _____

22. Did you file with the Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice a copy of each item of such informational materials disseminated or caused to be disseminated during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

23. Did you label each item of such informational materials with the statement required by Section 4(b) of the Act? Yes No

¹² The term informational materials includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including that published by means of advertising, books, periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise. Informational materials disseminated by an agent of a foreign principal as part of an activity in itself exempt from registration, or an activity which by itself would not require registration, need not be filed pursuant to Section 4(b) of the Act.

VI – EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1746, the undersigned swear(s) or affirm(s) under penalty of perjury that he/she has (they have) read the information set forth in this registration statement and the attached exhibits and that he/she is (they are) familiar with the contents thereof and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her (their) knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned make(s) no representation as to the truth or accuracy of the information contained in the attached Short Form Registration Statement(s), if any, insofar as such information is not within his/her (their) personal knowledge.

(Date of signature)

(Type or print name under each signature¹³)

9-25-2008


NORM NEUSNER

¹³ This statement shall be signed by the individual agent, if the registrant is an individual, or by a majority of those partners, officers, directors or persons performing similar functions, if the registrant is an organization, except that the organization can, by power of attorney, authorize one or more individuals to execute this statement on its behalf.

Question 12

Name of Registered Individual: Noam Neusner

Name of Foreign Principal: Embassy of Turkey; Kivilcim Kilic

Contact	Type	Topic	Date
Jon Missner, AIPAC	Phone Call	HR 106	9/17/2007
Howard Kohr, AIPAC	Phone Call	HR 106	9/18/2007
Tom Neumann, JINSA	Phone Call	HR 106	9/18/2007
Neil Goldstein, AJCongress	Phone call	HR 106	9/18/2007
Jess Hordes, ADL	Phone call	HR 106	9/20/2007
Howard Kohr, AIPAC	Phone Call	HR 106	9/24/2007
Tom Neumann, JINSA	Phone call	HR 106	9/25/2007
Dan Mariaschin, B'nai B'rith	Phone call	HR 106	10/1/2007
Jon Missner, AIPAC	Phone call	HR 106	10/2/2007
Tom Neumann, JINSA	Phone call	HR 106	10/2/2007
Howard Kohr, AIPAC	Phone call	HR 106	10/11/2007
Tom Neumann, JINSA	Phone call	HR 106	10/11/2007
Dan Mariaschin, B'nai B'rith	Phone call	HR 106	10/11/2007
Jon Missner, AIPAC	Phone call	HR 106	10/15/2007
Malcolm Hoenlein, Conference of Presidents	Phone call	HR 106	10/15/2007
Hadar Susskind, JCPA	Phone Call	HR 106	10/15/2007
Tom Neumann, JINSA	Phone Call	HR 106	10/16/2007
Malcolm Hoenlein, Conference of Presidents	Emails	HR 106	10/17/2007
Jon Missner, Howard Kohr, AIPAC	Email, phone call	HR 106	10/17/2007
Malcolm Hoenlein, Conference of Presidents	Phone call	HR 106	10/17/2007
Hadar Susskind, JCPA	Email	HR 106	10/17/2007
Tom Neumann, JINSA	Phone Call	HR 106	10/18/2007
Jon Missner, Rob Bassin, AIPAC	Phone call	HR 106	10/21/2007
Tom Neumann, JINSA	Phone Call	PKK/Iraq	10/23/2007
Neil Goldstein, AJ Congress	Phone call, email	PKK/Iraq	10/24/2007
Tom Neumann, JINSA	Phone Call	PKK/Iraq	10/24/2007
Jon Missner, AIPAC	Phone call	PKK/Iraq	10/24/2007
Jon Missner, AIPAC	Email, phone call	Turkey sponsorship of Neighboring	10/29/2007

Question 12**Name of Registered Individual: Noam Neusner****Name of Foreign Principal: Embassy of Turkey; Kivilcim Kilic**

		Countries Conference	
Neil Goldstein, AJ Congress	Email	PKK/Iraq; AJC'm'tee action on Iran/Armenia	10/31/2007
Peter Spiegel, LA Times	Email	Returned msg/no discussion	11/1/2007
Rob Bassin, Jon Missner, AIPAC	Email	Lunch w/D. Mercer	11/1/2007
Jess Hordes, ADL	Email	ADL action on HR 106	11/5/2007
Jon Missner, Rob Bassin	Meeting	HR 106, Israel-Turkey security	11/29/2007
Assorted Jewish leaders and organization representatives	Email	Invitation to lecture by Andrew Seager at Embassy	12/3/2007
William Daroff, UJC	Meeting	General outreach programs	12/11/2007
Tom Neumann, JINSA	Meeting	General outreach program	12/12/2007
David Harris, Barry Jacobs, AJ Committee; Howard Kohr, AIPAC; Abe Foxman, ADL; Tom Neumann, JINSA; Rabbi Eric Yoffie, URJ; Nathan Diament, OU; Rabbi Jerome Epstein, USCJ; Malcolm Hoenlein, Conf of Presidents; Steve Gutow, JCPA; Neil Goldstein AJCongress; Rabbi David Zweibel, Agudath Israel; Morlie Levin, Hadassah; Dan Mariaschin, B'nai B'rith (and related officials from those organizations)	Email	Meeting invitation & followup; meeting with President Gul	1/3/2008-1/10/2008
Jon Missner, AIPAC	Email	Embassy events w/AIPAC	1/11/2008
1/10/2008 Meeting participants	Email	Followup on Turkish record during WWII	1/11/2008
June Walker, Hadassah	Email, mail package	Copy of 'Desperate Hours'	1/11/2008
Francie Harris, UJC	Phone	UJC meetings at Embassy	1/25/2008
Various Jewish Leaders	Email	NYT Article on	2/10/2008

Question 12**Name of Registered Individual: Noam Neusner****Name of Foreign Principal: Embassy of Turkey; Kivilcim Kilic**

		Turkish-Kurdish relations	
Various Jewish Leaders	Email	Jerusalem Post Article on Israeli military shipments to Turkey	2/11/2008
Varoius Jewish Laders	Email	Newsweek profile of PM Erdogan	2/15/2008
Various Jewish leaders	Email	Transcript of White House briefing on Turkey/PKK conflict	2/22/2008
Jewish leaders, Cleveland: Richard Arnstine Mitchell Balk Oren Baratz Susan Block John Dunn David Fleshler Francine Harris J. David Heller Susan Hurwitz Amy R. Kaplan Joyce Garver Keller Keith Libman Michael Perlmutter James Ratner Susan Ratner Lauren Rock Erika Rudin-Luria James Samuels	Meeting	Turkey embassy;	3/6/2008

Laurenza, Melissa

Subject: FW: "Turkish-Kurdish economic, political and military cooperation -- starting with joint operations against the terrorist Kurdish group, the PKK -- could lead to genuine friendship."

From: Noam Neusner
Sent: Sunday, February 10, 2008 1:17 PM
To: Noam Neusner
Cc: Rabin, Yuval; Jay Footlik (jfootlik@dinovo.biz)
Subject: "Turkish-Kurdish economic, political and military cooperation -- starting with joint operations against the terrorist Kurdish group, the PKK -- could lead to genuine friendship."

2008 SEP 30 PM 12: 42
@M/ISSREGISTRATION UNIT

Friends, following up on your visit with President Gul last month, I thought you'd appreciate the following column, which touches on Kurdish-Turkish relations. The column ran in the Washington Post yesterday. I recommend it highly.

Noam

Time for Kurdish Realism

By Michael O'Hanlon and Omer Taspinar
Washington Post, Saturday, February 9, 2008; A15

Increasingly, Iraq's Kurds appear to be interfering with efforts to foster political accommodation among their country's major sectarian groups. Since Iraq's future hinges on establishing such a spirit of compromise, this trend has potentially grave implications for Iraq, its neighbors and the United States.

Two key issues stand out. First, Kurds are beginning to develop oil fields on their territory with foreign investors but with no role for Baghdad, claiming cover under Iraq's 2005 constitution. But the relevant sections of the Iraqi constitution (articles 109 through 112, among others) state that future oil wells will be developed by Iraq's provinces and regions in conjunction with the central government.

Second, Kurds want to reclaim the city of Kirkuk and its surrounding oil fields, which may hold about 15 percent of Iraq's total reserves. Kurds claim, with considerable justification, that many properties in the city were taken from them under Saddam Hussein's "Arabization" programs. Kurds want the homes back. More broadly, they want to control the politics of Kirkuk and environs, up to and including the possibility of Kirkuk and its oil joining the region of Iraqi Kurdistan (which many Kurds hope will ultimately become independent). Because of these ambitions, it has been difficult to hold a referendum on Kirkuk's future; a referendum was supposed to have taken place by the end of 2007.

The Kurds are making a major mistake. They should rethink their approach both out of fairness to the United States, which has given them a chance to help build a post-Hussein Iraq, and in the interests of the Kurds and their neighbors. Baghdad needs a role in developing future oil fields and sharing revenue; Kirkuk needs to remain where it is in Iraq's political system, or perhaps attain a special status. It should not be muscled away into Kurdistan.

It is hard to be sure, but the Kurds seem to believe that if Iraq fails, they will be okay. Under this theory, even if the country splits apart, the United States will stand by its Kurdish friends, establish military bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, and ultimately ease the way toward its independence. Several prominent Americans give occasional endorsement to this dream, further convincing Kurds that it could become reality.

We strongly doubt it. Kurdistan is an inland, mountainous region within the broader Middle East. Its neighbors are Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Two of the four are nemeses of the United States; all have their issues with Iraq's Kurds; none will be eager to tolerate the kind of American military overflights that would be needed to sustain bases in Kurdistan if Iraq was breaking apart. Nor would they necessarily let Iraq's Kurds export oil through their territories and

ports.

Why would the United States even want bases in Kurdistan? If it ever goes to war against Iran, numerous other countries are better positioned, being adjacent to international waterways and airspace. Those countries may not all be as pro-American as Iraq's Kurds, but if the threat posed by Iran grows, some will probably make common cause with the United States.

To be sure, many Americans admire the democratic, prosperous, resilient Kurds. Americans also feel a moral debt after allowing Hussein to oppress the Kurds so many times in the past. But after protecting the Kurds since 1991 and spending hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of American lives in Iraq over the past five years, that moral debt has been partially repaid. If the Kurds will not now help the United States in stabilizing Iraq, is there really a sense of common purpose, and a set of shared interests, between the two peoples?

Instead of pursuing a maximalist agenda in Kirkuk and a dream of independence, the Kurds should opt for realism. This means recognizing that if Iraq falls apart, they will be on their own. It also means recognizing that Turkey, with its 15 million Kurds, is very nervous about Kurdish independence. Yet the Kurds of Iraq should also know that a Turkish-Kurdish war is not destiny. In fact, with visionary leadership in Ankara and Irbil, Turkish-Kurdish economic, political and military cooperation -- starting with joint operations against the terrorist Kurdish group, the PKK -- could lead to genuine friendship. After all, Turkey is the most democratic, secular and pro-Western of Iraq's neighbors, attributes that Iraqi Kurdistan shares.

Iraq's Kurds have a remarkable future almost within their grasp. But they face a crucial choice: They can attain that future by compromising with their fellow Iraqis, forming a partnership with Turkey and strengthening their bond with the United States. Or they can continue to pursue their own agenda in a way that ultimately shatters their country and destabilizes the broader region.

Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Omer Taspinar is a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings and a professor at the National War College. The views expressed here are their own.

Noam Neusner
Neusner Communications LLC

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7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 255
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

v 202 903 2463
c 202 674 0738
f 202 403 3003
www.neusner.com

Laurenza, Melissa

Subject: FW: Barak to Visit Turkey This Week; Promoting Israeli Satellite Sales to Turkey

From: Noam Neusner
Sent: Monday, February 11, 2008 11:29 AM
To: Noam Neusner
Cc: yrabin@dinovo.biz; Jay Footlik (jfootlik@dinovo.biz)
Subject: Barak to Visit Turkey This Week; Promoting Israeli Satellite Sales to Turkey

Friends,

This news item may be of unique interest to you.

NN

Barak to promote Israeli satellite sale to Turkey

Mon Feb 11, 2008 5:03am EST

By Dan Williams

JERUSALEM, Feb 11 (Reuters) - Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak will promote the sale of a spy satellite to Turkey and other military deals during a visit to Ankara this week, Israeli security sources said on Monday.

Muslim but secular Turkey is the Jewish state's most important regional ally, though relations were strained last year by an Israeli air strike in neighbouring Syria.

Ankara has offered to mediate in peace talks between Israel and Damascus or the Palestinians.

Barak, who begins a two-day visit to the Turkish capital on Tuesday, will urge his hosts to buy state-run Israel Aerospace Industries' (IAI) Ofek satellite for an estimated \$300 million.

"This deal has been under discussion for years, but Barak's visit may help clinch it," an Israeli security source said, adding that past talks had been held up by counter-bidding from a French aerospace firm.

In Ankara, Turkish diplomatic sources described ties between the two countries as "very good" and confirmed Turkey's interest in intelligence-sharing projects including satellites.

The sources also said Turkey would raise the situation in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip with Barak. Israel imposed a blockade on the impoverished Palestinian territory following cross-border rocket and mortar attacks by Hamas and other militant factions.

Barak has ordered the development of an Israeli anti-rocket system that would be deployed outside Gaza. But Israel is also interested in American alternatives such as Lockheed Martin Corp's Skyshield 35 Air Defence System.

Germany is currently testing a version of Skyshield in Turkey, Lockheed Martin vice president Joshua Shani said.

9/24/2008

Shlomo Dror, spokesman for the Israeli Defence Ministry, declined to comment specifically on any sales to Ankara but confirmed that Barak's visit "aims to bolster our long-standing strategic ties and bilateral deals".

Barak will hold talks with Turkey's Defence Minister Vecdi Gonul and the head of the powerful military General Staff, General Yasar Buyukanit. He is also due to meet President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan.

Turkey is currently taking delivery of around 10 Heron surveillance drones purchased from IAI for \$200 million, the Israeli security source said, and has voiced a "preliminary interest" in Israel's Arrow II ballistic anti-missile system.

Israel is the only Middle Eastern country to have built and deployed its own satellites. The first in the Ofek ("Horizon") series was launched in 1988. Ofek-7, billed as Israel's eye on arch-foe Iran, went into orbit last year.

Noam Neusner
Neusner Communications LLC

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Laurenza, Melissa

Subject: FW: Turkey and the EU -- an interesting piece

From: Noam Neusner
Sent: Friday, February 15, 2008 3:33 PM
To: Noam Neusner
Cc: Rabin, Yuval; Jay Footlik (jfootlik@dinovo.biz)
Subject: Turkey and the EU -- an interesting piece

Friends,

The piece attached below is a particularly interesting one – it captures the essence of Turkey Prime Minister Erdogan's effort to win EU membership for Turkey.

Shabbat shalom,

Noam

The True Turkish Believer

By Owen Matthews and Sami Kohen, NEWSWEEK

Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan just won't take no for an answer. In 2002 he and his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power promising to get Turkey into the European Union. Under the banner of the EU's "Copenhagen criteria" for new members, the AKP made an impressive start: it abolished the death penalty, curbed the backroom political power of the military and eased restrictions on Kurdish language and culture. But instead of recognizing just how far Turkey had come, European leaders recoiled, rebuffing Erdogan and his country at virtually every turn. French President Nicolas Sarkozy says he opposes Turkish membership in the EU because it's "an Asian country," suggesting instead that maybe one day it could be part of a proposed Mediterranean Union. German Chancellor Angela Merkel warns that "Turkey's membership is going to constrain the EU." She offers "privileged partnership" instead of full membership.

Erdogan is undeterred. Instead of slowing down the pace of change, the AKP has announced its biggest and boldest reform package yet. Emboldened by a resounding victory in snap elections last summer, the party has embarked on a wholesale overhaul of the hard-wiring of the country's political system. Central to the new order is a redrawing of Turkey's 1981 Constitution designed to give more power to the people—including direct presidential elections—as well as introducing more freedom of speech and religion. In doing so, the AKP hopes to create a society that Europe simply cannot refuse—one that is moving ahead with a long-term strategy that looks calmly past the current crop of anti-Turkish European leaders. "Whatever they say, we will continue on our path," promises Foreign Minister Ali Babacan. "For us the important thing is that the negotiation process with Europe remains on track."

What is driving this? One top European diplomat who has worked closely with Erdogan during Turkey's negotiations with the EU says Turkey's prime minister "has a deep and personal commitment to bringing his country into Europe. He feels that that is his country's destiny." During his years in power Erdogan has developed a powerful narrative for Turkey as a "bridge between cultures," with both his country and himself playing key roles in "bringing religions and culture closer together to avoid a global clash of civilizations." It is a philosophy he expounded eloquently upon at a recent Madrid conference on the "Alliance of Civilizations," which he co-hosted with Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, and it is based on the assumption that Turkey cannot stand alone in glorious isolation.

There is also a more pragmatic rationale for looking to Europe. Turkey's growing harmonization with western business practices and regulations has brought a deluge of foreign investment—\$20 billion last year—which has helped fuel GDP growth of close to 6 percent for the past five years and helped modernize Turkey's once creaky manufacturing and textile industries.

Still, if taken at face value, Erdogan's enthusiasm for Europe comes as a surprise: for most of their careers, Erdogan and his close ally Abdullah Gul, now president, shared with most Turkish Islamists a deep suspicion of Europe and Western values in general. Their political mentor, Necmettin Erbakan, frequently railed against the West for being ruled by "racist imperialism and Zionism."

9/24/2008

Erdogan himself, while mayor of Istanbul in the mid-1990s, sparked controversy when he compared democracy to a streetcar: "When you come to your stop, you get off."

But then reality intervened. In 1999 he was convicted of sedition after reciting an allegedly subversive Islamic poem at a political rally. He spent four months in jail, and by his own account, his spell in prison helped convince him that political Islam needed modernizing just as much as the Turkish state. The two, he came to understand, were locked in a vicious cycle. On one side, an ultraconservative military was using police-state methods to enforce a rigid secularism, which was at odds with the reality of Turkish society; on the other side were old-guard Islamists like Erbakan, whose blend of nationalism, religion and anti-Westernism was out of step with a modern, globalized world.

Adding to this political awakening was an economic crisis in 2000 and 2001. The Turkish lira had lost two thirds of its value after the collapse of a series of corrupt banks and the flight of foreign capital. Erdogan, and the newly formed AKP, blamed the economic difficulties on rampant political cronyism, runaway populist spending and government incompetence.

The simplest way of fixing it was by integrating Turkey into Europe—a widely popular goal at the time, with 80 percent approval. It quickly became a catchall for bold reforms the AKP could never have dared attempt without the support of Brussels, such as reducing the power of the military-dominated National Security Council. "Europe is the instrument which can help us put our own house in order," Erdogan told NEWSWEEK before coming to power in November 2002. "Our central goal is to put Turkey on the road to Europe."

Ever since, Erdogan has tried to steer an extraordinarily narrow path between the EU, his party's own conservative, religious roots, and the small but powerful ultrasecularists in the military, judiciary and bureaucracy. For instance, Erdogan has tackled some of the most repressive aspects of Turkey's police state head-on, allowing Kurds some cultural rights, scrapping a few (but by no means all) of the laws restricting free speech, and cutting the powers of the military-dominated National Security Council. Through it all, Erdogan has been dogged by accusations that his Islamist-rooted AKP's real goal is to foist a more conservative Islamic rule over the secular state of Turkey. In his critics' view, the most important thing for Erdogan and his allies is not to join Europe but to use the prospect of joining as a convenient front to push a religious agenda. As evidence, they say, Erdogan's first move in the constitutional overhaul was not to scrap the anti-free-speech laws—such as the infamous Article 301, which punishes "insulting Turkishness"—as Brussels has repeatedly demanded, but to call for an end to the longstanding ban on the wearing of Islamic headscarves in universities.

Erdogan presented it as a liberal move, a step on the path to the EU and a victory for human rights. "Why," he asked, "should wearing the headscarf be a crime?" But by focusing on the issue, he touched one of the rawest nerves in Turkey's ongoing culture wars. For many of Turkey's elite, keepers of the ultra-secular traditions of the nation's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, allowing headscarves at university is the thin edge of a dangerous wedge. Akdeniz University rector Mustafa Akaydin fears that the AKP's ultimate goal is to "destroy Ataturk's reforms" and that soon "Turkey will resemble an Arab country or Iran." He warns there could be "confrontation and chaos" on university campuses as a result. Indeed while the repeal of the ban is enormously popular—the latest polls show voters favor scrapping it by 64 percent to 27 percent—more than 120,000 people marched last week in Ankara to protest the decision and demonstrate their commitment to secularism.

Erdogan's critics note that the EU considers the headscarf to be an internal issue—and certainly not part of the Copenhagen criteria. Moreover, several European countries—including France—restrict the wearing of religious symbols in public schools. "Erdogan and his government are more interested in Islamicizing Turkey than democratizing it," says Cengiz Aktar, a specialist on EU affairs at Bahcesehir University. A true liberal, critics say, would have used his vast political capital on more-pressing human-rights concerns, which could turn out to be far more damaging to Turkey's EU bid than repealing a ban on headscarves. There is, for instance, no civilian alternative to compulsory military service, as there is in other countries. Conscientious objectors are regularly jailed. At the same time, speech remains far from free. Last month a newspaper editor was given a three-year suspended sentence for the crime of "insulting Ataturk." Moreover, a report by Human Rights Watch last year cites a rise in reports of police brutality and an increase in the number of people prosecuted and convicted for violations of speech laws. They say the state's intolerance of dissent "has created an environment in which there have been instances of violence against minority groups." In January 2007, Hrant Dink, the editor of a Turkish-Armenian newspaper was assassinated by a teenage gunman.

Clearly, in the face of a hostile secular military and its overheated rhetoric, and an EU that is ambivalent about Turkey at best, Erdogan will have to continue to prove his Western bona fides. There are a number of benchmarks that could determine whether Erdogan is still serious about the EU. Most important, Brussels urgently wants the AKP to scrap Article 301. Second, Europe will want Erdogan to show that he cares about the religious freedoms of non-Muslims, too—for instance by liberalizing the laws on non-Muslim charitable foundations and by reopening the world-renowned Orthodox seminary on the island of Helybeliada, near Istanbul. It has been closed since 1971.

Whether Erdogan will follow through with his plans is still an open question. Almost no ruler in modern Turkish history has been better placed to push reform as he is, here and now. Last year, using a canny mix of brinkmanship and diplomacy, he got the United States to back limited Turkish airstrikes and commando raids against PKK bases inside northern Iraq. That won him huge

support not just from voters—including ultranationalist voters—but also from Turkey's politically powerful generals. "The government stands side by side with our soldiers," Erdogan told parliamentarians when asking them to authorize the use of force outside Turkey's borders last year. That message went some way toward defusing the military's longstanding enmity toward Erdogan and the AKP.

But the danger is that further reforms will be swamped in the fallout from the headscarf ban. Deniz Baykal, leader of the opposition Republican People's Party or CHP, warned that Turkey faces "a counterrevolution," and vowed to fight to reinstate the headscarf ban through the avowedly secularist Constitutional Court. That will mean months of political messiness and upheaval. On the AKP side, the pressure is on from the grass roots to go further still. Once headscarves are allowed in universities, some AKP members will wonder why it is still banned in hospitals, courts and municipal buildings. "The lifting of such bans in other public services will come to the agenda gradually, *inshallah*," says Husnu Tuna, an AKP member of Parliament's Constitutional Committee.

That, too, could be considered a liberal move—more akin to much of the West's freedom of religion than Ataturk's ideal of *laïcité*, or freedom *from* religion. Now Erdogan faces an enormous balancing act. The test of his commitment to European ideals will come as he chooses in the months ahead which reforms to pursue next—EU reforms, or those advocated by his grass-roots supporters. Poll numbers suggest waning support among Turks for entry to the EU, largely because of European rebuffs and the perception that Europe has failed to keep its promises on Turkish-dominated Northern Cyprus. Yet it seems increasingly unlikely that Erdogan and the AKP would ever hop off that old European streetcar. Since his firebrand days, Erdogan has realized that straight political Islam has a limited appeal to all but a tiny minority of Turkish voters. The same goes for isolationist nationalism. So he is likely to take a more pragmatic path, if for no other reason than that Turkey's continued economic growth is tightly linked to its embrace of Western business standards. Indeed Turkey is going to keep driving that streetcar west—no matter what the EU or Erdogan's opponents have to say about it.

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Laurenza, Melissa

Subject: FW: White House on Today's Operation by Turkey: "The U.S. Agrees with Turkey, that the PKK is a terrorist organization, and...an enemy of Turkey, Iraq, and the United States."

From: Noam Neusner

Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 3:09 PM

To: Aaron Etra; Amb. Peter Rosenblatt; Amos Kamil; Barry Jacobs (jacobsb@ajc.org); dzwiebel@agudathisrael.org; ehrenber@ou.org; epstein@uscj.org; Eric Fusfield; execthw@ou.org; foxma@adl.org; Glen Lewy; Harold Tanner; Harrisd@ajc.org; Harry Paul (hpaul321@gmail.com); Harry Wall; Jay Footlik (jfootlik@dinovo.biz); Jay L. Kriegel (jkriegel@related.com); Joel Sprayregen; jwalker@hadassah.org; malcolm@conferenceofpresidents.org; Mark@jfunders.org; Michael Salberg; Mike Sachs; Mindy Rubin; mlevin@ncsj.org; Morlie Hammer Levin (mlevin@hadassah.org); Nancy Falchuk; Nate Kornfeld; ngoldstein@ajcongress.org; Rabbi David Saperstein (rac@uahc.org); Salem Shuchman

Cc: y rabin

Subject: White House on Today's Operation by Turkey: "The U.S. Agrees with Turkey, that the PKK is a terrorist organization, and...an enemy of Turkey, Iraq, and the United States."

Friends,

In light of today's operation by Turkey's military forces, I thought you'd be interested in this reaction, by the White House. Please see the transcript of this morning's press gaggle.

Shabbat shalom,

Noam

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room
9:34 A.M. EST

Q Do you have any reaction to the ground operation into Iraq, launched by Turkey for Kurdish rebels -- against Turkey?

MR. STANZEL: Well, as you know, there's an ongoing dialogue between Iraqis and leaders in Turkey about how to best confront the threat of the PKK. We've worked cooperatively with both of our allies on these issues, and worked to make sure that there's regular coordination about how to best confront this threat. So this is something that we were aware of in advance. And as you know, the U.S. agrees with Turkey, that the PKK is a terrorist organization, and it is an enemy of Turkey, Iraq, and the United States. And we have demanded that the PKK end their attacks on Turkish soldiers and civilians.

Q So this is something we don't object to, this operation?

MR. STANZEL: Well, we have been in regular coordination with the Turks and with the Iraqis. The Iraqis and Turks have been in communication about this issue, as well. I think those conversations will continue.

Q Does that mean that the U.S. helped coordinate details of this?

MR. STANZEL: We were notified in advance, and as you know, as a NATO ally, we have a longstanding intelligence sharing relationship with Turkey. That was intensified with respect to the PKK, as indicated during the meetings between Prime Minister Erdogan and President Bush.

Q Follow?

MR. STANZEL: Yes, Ann.

Q Does your word, "coordination," mean that the United States could ask them not to take any military action if given advance warning, or are you simply --

MR. STANZEL: We were notified, and we urged the Turkish government to limit their operations to precise targeting of the PKK; to limit the scope and duration of their operations. And we urge them to work directly also with the Iraqis, including Kurdish

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government officials, in determining how best to address the threat that the PKK --

Q So they were --

MR. STANZEL: I understand that Turkish authorities had notified Iraqi authorities simultaneously.

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Laurenza, Melissa

Subject: FW: Turkey Gives Aid to Kurdish Region

From: Noam Neusner
Sent: Friday, March 14, 2008 12:55 PM
To: Noam Neusner
Subject: Turkey Gives Aid to Kurdish Region

Friends,

I thought you would be interested in the following recent items from the New York Times. One is a story on a \$12 billion economic aid package for Kurdish regions in Turkey; the second is an editorial by the Times on the aid package.

Turkey has long held that it can and will support its Kurdish citizens while at the same time fighting PKK terror (which is often directed at the region where most Kurds live in Turkey). These latest news items show the seriousness of Turkey's efforts.

Turkey Set to Invest in Better Relations With Kurds
 By Sabrina Tavernise

ANKARA, Turkey — Turkey's government is planning a broad series of investments worth as much as \$12 billion in the country's largely Kurdish southeast, in a new economic effort intended to create jobs and draw young men away from militancy, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said.

The program is intended to drain support for the militant Kurdish group, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, by improving the lives of Turkey's impoverished Kurdish minority, Mr. Erdogan said in an interview with The New York Times on Tuesday.

As part of the push, the government will dedicate a state television channel to Kurdish language broadcasting, a measure that Kurds in Turkey have sought for years. The Turkish state has imposed severe restrictions on the use of Kurdish, arguing that allowing that freedom would strengthen the Kurds' desire to form a separate state.

Turkey, a vibrant Muslim democracy and a strong American ally, has for years fought the militant group, known as the P.K.K., which hides in Turkey and Iraq and seeks greater autonomy for Kurds in Turkey.

That fight has put it at odds with the United States, whose strongest allies in the war in Iraq are Kurds. But after an ambush of Turkish troops last fall, and subsequent lobbying by Mr. Erdogan and the Turkish military, the Bush administration agreed to let Turkey strike at the group inside Iraq, opening up airspace there and even offering intelligence.

"Turkey is not a guest," said Mr. Erdogan, 54, sitting in a cream-colored high-backed chair in his official residence in Ankara, Turkey's capital. "Everyone who has entered Iraq until now will stay for a while and go away, but we will stay."

"We are the most important door for northern Iraq to open up to the world," he added. "We are the healthiest door."

Last month, Turkey conducted an eight-day ground offensive into Iraq, and Mr. Erdogan said that the United States had been fully behind it.

"I can openly and freely say that this short process has been done with the total understanding of Turkey, the United States and the central government of Iraq," he said.

"But the fight against terrorism is not only this," he added. "It also has a socioeconomic part, a psychological part, a cultural part."

Mr. Erdogan was the first public figure to speak openly about Turkey's troubles with its Kurdish population in a speech several years ago that won him a measure of respect among Turkey's approximately 12 million Kurds, about a sixth of its population. Kurds voted in large numbers for his political party in a national election last July. Since then, many say his efforts have stalled, replaced by frequent military operations just over the border.

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Mr. Erdogan sought to allay Kurds' fears Tuesday, emphasizing Turkey's efforts to engage them on both sides of the border. Turkey has chosen not to negotiate directly with the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, led by Massoud Barzani, despite the fact that many of the militants it is chasing hide in that territory. Mr. Erdogan added, however, that informal contacts had been made with the area's representatives.

"We have relatives in northern Iraq," he said. "And people living there have relatives in our southeastern region. With whom will we have good relations other than with ourselves?"

Efforts to improve relations with Iraq include plans to open a consulate in the southern city of Basra, Mr. Erdogan said. Turkey has an embassy in Baghdad and a consulate in Mosul, a major city in the north.

Mr. Erdogan is still identifying funds for the economic effort, which was started years ago by a previous administration but languished. The state will invest between \$11 billion and \$12 billion over five years to build two large dams and a system of water canals, complete paved roads and remove land mines from the fields along the Syrian border, he said.

Plans for the project will be completed within two months, he said, at which point construction on the two dams will begin. He said he had dedicated one of his deputy prime ministers to visit cities across the largely Kurdish southeast to work on it.

"Everything we can see in the western part of the country we can see in the east," he said.

The television channel will also include Persian and Arabic, Mr. Erdogan said, and should be running in several months. "This will be the most important step providing cultural rights to the region," he said.

Turkey, a member of NATO, has ambitions to join the European Union, though Mr. Erdogan has recently come under criticism for allowing the required democratic and economic retooling needed for membership to drop from the agenda.

"There is no stalling or slowing down," he said. "We are determined."

A social security law required to meet European standards will be submitted to Parliament in the next two to three weeks, he said, and a long-awaited revision of a law that limits freedom of speech is nearly ready. At every weekly cabinet meeting, one of the topics is Turkey's European bid, and each ministry is working on it.

"There is no alternative for us other than full membership," Mr. Erdogan said.

THE BOARD

Turkey and the Kurds: Some Positive Signs

By The Editorial Board

The Turkish government's decision to invest as much as \$12 billion in the country's largely Kurdish southeast region is a wise move that could enhance ties with a vital minority population and undermine the appeal of separatist rebels.

We have been alarmed at Turkey's recent eight-day air and ground offensive into northern Iraq, which was aimed at militants of the Kurdistan Workers' Party — known as P.K.K. — who wage war against Ankara from the mountainous border region.

Turkey's anger at the cross-border attacks is understandable. But invading Iraq risks wider regional chaos. And it doesn't address the broader problem — how to improve the life of ordinary Turkish Kurds so they don't align with militants and don't seek to declare an independent state.

As reported in yesterday's New York Times, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan seems to understand that defeating the P.K.K. requires more than arms. He wants to use the \$12 billion to create jobs in Turkey's Kurdish region and draw men away from militancy. The projects include building two large dams and a system of water canals.

The government also plans to dedicate a state television channel to Kurdish language broadcasting, something that Kurds in Turkey have long sought.

Mr. Erdogan, leader of a vibrant Muslim democracy, seems to have realized the importance of improving ties with Iraq and plans to open a consulate in the southern city of Basra to supplement an existing embassy in Baghdad and a consulate in the northern city of Mosul.

We'd like to see him also engage in direct talks with leaders of the semi-autonomous Kurdish enclave of northern Iraq. NATO ally Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish enclave — both friends of the United States — are heavily dependent on each other for trade and they are far more likely to avert political and military miscalculations if they are in regular contact.

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