

For Six Month Period Ending 08/31/2010
(Insert date)

I - REGISTRANT

1. (a) Name of Registrant: Vision Americas L.L.C.
(b) Registration No.: 5907

(c) Business Address(es) of Registrant:
1150 K Street NW, Ste. 1411 Washington, DC 20005
1901 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Ste 303 Washington, DC 20006

2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following:

- (a) If an individual:
 - (1) Residence address(es) Yes No
 - (2) Citizenship Yes No
 - (3) Occupation Yes No
- (b) If an organization:
 - (1) Name Yes No
 - (2) Ownership or control Yes No
 - (3) Branch offices Yes No
- (c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in items (a) and (b) above.

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IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4 AND 5(a).

3. If you have previously filed Exhibit C¹, state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period.
Yes No
If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C? Yes No

If no, please attach the required amendment.

¹ The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)

4. (a) Have any persons ceased acting as partners, officers, directors or similar officials of the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position	Date connection ended
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(b) Have any persons become partners, officers, directors or similar officials during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
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5. (a) Has any person named in item 4(b) rendered services directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal?

Yes No

If yes, identify each such person and describe his service.

(b) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their employment or connection with the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position or connection	Date terminated
John M. Falk	Associate	06/30/2010
Jose R. Cardenas	Associate	07/20/2009

(c) During this 6 month reporting period, has the registrant hired as employees or in any other capacity, any persons who rendered or will render services to the registrant directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal(s) in other than a clerical or secretarial, or in a related or similar capacity? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
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6. Have short form registration statements been filed by all of the persons named in Items 5(a) and 5(c) of the supplemental statement?

Yes No

If no, list names of persons who have not filed the required statement.

II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

7. Has your connection with any foreign principal ended during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal

Date of termination

8. Have you acquired any new foreign principal² during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name and address of foreign principal

Date acquired

9. In addition to those named in Items 7 and 8, if any, list foreign principals² whom you continued to represent during the 6 month reporting period.

Moroccan American Center for Policy

10. **EXHIBITS A AND B**

(a) Have you filed for each of the newly acquired foreign principals in Item 8 the following:

Exhibit A³ Yes No
 Exhibit B⁴ Yes No

If no, please attach the required exhibit.

(b) Have there been any changes in the Exhibits A and B previously filed for any foreign principal whom you represented during the 6 month period? Yes No

If yes, have you filed an amendment to these exhibits? Yes No

If no, please attach the required amendment.

² The term "foreign principal" includes, in addition to those defined in Section 1(b) of the Act, an individual organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a)(9).) A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 208.)

³ The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form NSD-3 (Formerly CRM-157), sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

⁴ The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form NSD-4 (Formerly CRM-155), sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

III - ACTIVITIES

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11. During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes No

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:

Moroccan American Center for Policy- Vision Americas contacted members of Congress and their staffers on issues related to U.S.- Morocco relations including human rights developments in the region, Morocco's role in the Middle East Peace Process and the Western Sahara issue. In addition, the registrant provided and continues to provide strategic advice on the aforementioned topics.

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12. During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity⁵ as defined below? Yes No

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates and places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.

Vision Americas communicates with various principals and staff of the Congress and Executive Branch in order to educate them on Morocco - U.S. Relationships in order to garner support for Moroccan initiatives set forth by MACP.

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13. In addition to the above described activities, if any, have you engaged in activity on your own behalf which benefits any or all of your foreign principals? Yes No

If yes, describe fully.

⁵ The term "political activities" means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS - MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes No

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies⁶.

Date	From whom	Purpose	Amount
03/01/10	MACP	Retainer+partial retainer from prior month	30,000
04/02/10	MACP	Retainer	20,000
05/04/10	MACP	Retainer	20,000
06/03/10	MACP	Retainer	20,000
07/08/10	MACP	Retainer	20,000
08/05/10	MACP	Retainer	20,000

130,000

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign⁷, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes No

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D⁸ to your registration? Yes No

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date _____

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value⁹ other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal	Date received	Description of thing of value	Purpose
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^{6, 7} A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign. (See Rule 201(e).)

⁸ An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

⁹ Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

15. (a) **DISBURSEMENTS – MONIES**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you

(1) disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes No

(2) transmitted monies to any such foreign principal? Yes No

If no, explain in full detail why there were no disbursements made on behalf of any foreign principal.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

Date	To whom	Purpose	Amount
03/04/10	John Falk	Work on behalf of MACP	3,500
05/05/10	John Falk	Work on behalf of MACP	3,500
06/21/10	John Falk	Work on behalf of MACP	3,500

10,500

Total

(b) DISBURSEMENTS – THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value¹⁰ other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date disposed	Name of person to whom given	On behalf of what foreign principal	Description of thing of value	Purpose
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(c) DISBURSEMENTS – POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value¹¹ in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Amount or thing of value	Name of political organization	Name of candidate
07/15/2010	500		Mark Kirk
08/09/2010	100		Randy Hultgren
08/03/2010	500		Ted Brennan

^{10, 11} Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks" and the like.

V - INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS

16. During this 6 month reporting period, did you prepare, disseminate or cause to be disseminated any informational materials¹²?
Yes No

IF YES, RESPOND TO THE REMAINING ITEMS IN SECTION V.

17. Identify each such foreign principal.

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18. During this 6 month reporting period, has any foreign principal established a budget or allocated a specified sum of money to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials? Yes No

If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount, and indicate for what period of time.

19. During this 6 month reporting period, did your activities in preparing, disseminating or causing the dissemination of informational materials include the use of any of the following:

- Radio or TV broadcasts
- Magazine or newspaper articles
- Motion picture films
- Letters or telegrams
- Advertising campaigns
- Press releases
- Pamphlets or other publications
- Lectures or speeches
- Internet
- Other (specify) _____

20. During this 6 month reporting period, did you disseminate or cause to be disseminated informational materials among any of the following groups:

- Public officials
- Newspapers
- Libraries
- Legislators
- Editors
- Educational institutions
- Government agencies
- Civic groups or associations
- Nationality groups
- Other (specify) _____

21. What language was used in the informational materials:

- English
- Other (specify) _____

22. Did you file with the Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice a copy of each item of such informational materials disseminated or caused to be disseminated during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

23. Did you label each item of such informational materials with the statement required by Section 4(b) of the Act?

- Yes No

12 The term informational materials includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including that published by means of advertising, books, periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise. Informational materials disseminated by an agent of a foreign principal as part of an activity in itself exempt from registration, or an activity which by itself would not require registration, need not be filed pursuant to Section 4(b) of the Act.

VI – EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1746, the undersigned swear(s) or affirm(s) under penalty of perjury that he/she has (they have) read the information set forth in this registration statement and the attached exhibits and that he/she is (they are) familiar with the contents thereof and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her (their) knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned make(s) no representation as to the truth or accuracy of the information contained in the attached Short Form Registration Statement(s), if any, insofar as such information is not within his/her (their) personal knowledge.

(Date of signature)

(Type or print name under each signature¹³)

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¹³ This statement shall be signed by the individual agent, if the registrant is an individual, or by a majority of those partners, officers, directors or persons performing similar functions, if the registrant is an organization, except that the organization can, by power of attorney, authorize one or more individuals to execute this statement on its behalf.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FARA REGISTRATION UNIT
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOTICE

Please answer the following questions and return this sheet in triplicate with your Supplemental Statement:

1. Is your answer to Item 16 of Section V (Informational Materials – page 8 of Form NSD-2, formerly Form CRM-154 Supplemental Statement):

YES _____ or NO _____

(If your answer to question 1 is “yes” do not answer question 2 of this form.)

2. Do you disseminate any material in connection with your registration:

YES _____ or NO _____

(If your answer to question 2 is “yes” please forward for our review copies of all material including: films, film catalogs, posters, brochures, press releases, etc. which you have disseminated during the past six months.)



Signature

9/30/10

Date

Roger Noriega

Please type or print name of
Signatory on the line above

Managing Director

Title

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U.S. Department of Justice
National Security Division

Washington, DC 20530

THIS FORM IS TO BE AN OFFICIAL ATTACHMENT TO YOUR CURRENT SUPPLEMENTAL
STATEMENT - PLEASE EXECUTE IN TRIPLICATE

SHORT-FORM REGISTRATION INFORMATION SHEET

SECTION A

The Department records list active short-form registration statements for the following persons of your organization filed on the date indicated by each name. If a person is not still functioning in the same capacity directly on behalf of the foreign principal, please show the date of termination.

Short Form List for Registrant: Vision Americas, LLC

Last Name	First Name and Other Names	Registration Date	Termination Date	Role
Noriega	Roger F.	05/08/2009		
Cardenas	Jose R.	05/08/2009	— 07/20/2009	
Falk	John M.	05/08/2009	— 06/30/2010	

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U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

Washington, DC 20530

SECTION B

In addition to those persons listed in Section A, list below all current employees rendering services directly on behalf of the foreign principals(s) who have not filed short-form registration statements. (Do not list clerks, secretaries, typists or employees in a similar or related capacity). If there is some question as to whether an employee has an obligation to file a short-form, please address a letter to the Registration Unit describing the activities and connection with the foreign principal.

Name	Function	Date Hired
N/A		

Signature: [Handwritten Signature]
Title: Managing Director

Date: 9-30-10

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Date	Name	Activity	Method	Notes
03/03/10	Roger F. Noriega	Tim Morrison w/Senator Kyl	Email	N/A
03/04/10	Roger F. Noriega	Sherri Hupart & Steven Schrage w/Senator Scott Brown	Email/Fax	Western Sahara Letter & 2010 Updated Packet
03/04/10	Roger F. Noriega	Various calls see Report and add to FARA		
03/05/10	Roger F. Noriega	Victor Cervino w/Senator Lemieux	Email	N/A
03/08/10	Roger F. Noriega	Devon Gallagher w/ Senator Brownback	Email	N/A
03/09/10	John M. Falk	Flip McConaughey w/Senator Enzi	Phone call	N/A
03/10/10	Roger F. Noriega	Libby Quint w/Senator Roberts	Email	Western Sahara Letter & 2010 Updated Packet
03/10/10	Roger F. Noriega	Jackie Cottrell w/ Senator Roberts	Email	Western Sahara Letter & 2010 Updated Packet
03/10/10	Roger F. Noriega	Ariel Wolf w/Senator Brownback	Email	N/A
03/10/10	Roger F. Noriega	Victor Cervino w/Senator Lemieux	Email	N/A
03/10/10	Roger F. Noriega	Kerry Feehery w/Senator Lemieux	Meeting	Western Sahara Letter & 2010 Updated Packet
03/10/10	Roger F. Noriega	Kerry Feehery w/Senator Lemieux	Email	N/A

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03/10/10	Roger F. Noriega	Kerry Feehery w/Senator Lemieux	Email	N/A
03/10/10	Roger F. Noriega	Reb Brownell w/Senator McConnell	Email	Western Sahara Letter & 2010 Updated Packet
03/11/10	Roger F. Noriega	Flip McConnaughey w/Senator Enzi	Email	Western Sahara Letter & 2010 Updated Packet
03/11/10	Roger F. Noriega	Reb Brownell w/Senator McConnell	Email	N/A
03/11/10	Roger F. Noriega	Flip McConnaughey w/Senator Enzi	Email	N/A
03/12/10	Roger F. Noriega	Ariel Wolf w/Senator Brownback	Email	Followed up on questions she had regarding the Western Sahara letter. Sent her text of the Feinstein-Bond letter, AJC Letter, Feinstein-Bond Letter.
03/15/10	Roger F. Noriega	Tim Morrison w/Senator Kyl	Meeting	Met with staffer to discuss Western Sahara Letter
04/07/10	Roger F. Noriega	Victor Cervino w/Senator Lemieux	Email	Email to see if the Senator would be interested in taking a meeting with Moroccan delegation.
04/12/10	Roger F. Noriega	Victor Cervino w/Senator Lemieux	Email	Exchange regarding the delegation.


The History of the Western Sahara

A Timeline

2010 Updated Packet

The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Polisario Front, a separatist group based in southern Algeria. Morocco reasserted its sovereignty over the territory after Spain withdrew its colonial interests from the area in 1975. The Polisario Front has challenged Morocco's control over the Western Sahara.

The Moroccan Government has undertaken a sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara to provide economic, political and social infrastructure for the region's residents. Today, international efforts are underway to encourage a political settlement between Morocco, the Polisario Front, and Algeria that would resolve sovereignty over the Western Sahara through autonomy.

<p>1578 to 1727 Moroccan Kings rule over the territory currently known as the Western Sahara</p>	<p>"[Morocco's compromise autonomy initiative] originated in the Clinton Administration. It was reaffirmed in the Bush Administration and it remains the policy of the United States in the Obama Administration. [...] And I don't want anyone in the region or elsewhere to have any doubt about our policy, which remains the same." -U.S. Sec. of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, November 3, 2009</p>	<p>1991 Cease-fire declared in the disputed Western Sahara region</p>
<p>1884 Spanish colonization begins</p>		<p>1997 Former US Sec. of State James Baker III appointed as UN Special Envoy in the Sahara region</p>
<p>1956 Morocco claims independence from France Morocco reclaims the Western Sahara at the UN for the first time</p>		<p>Houston Accord is signed between Morocco and Polisario establishing the implementation of a referendum to decide the future of the Western Sahara</p>
<p>1958 King Mohammed V formally lays claim to the Sahara</p>		<p>2000 UN Sec. Gen. Kofi Annan presents the Security Council with four options to break the impasse in the Western Sahara: referendum, autonomy, partition, or complete withdrawal</p>
<p>1963 The UN includes the Western Sahara on the list of non self-governing territories</p>		<p>2004 UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1541, urging the parties to the Western Sahara conflict to "to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution."</p>
<p>1965 The UN General Assembly adopts its first resolution calling on Spain to decolonize the Sahara</p>		<p>2005 Dutch ambassador Peter Van Walsum is confirmed as the new UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy to the Western Sahara</p>
<p>1973 The Polisario Front is founded and stages its first attack</p>		<p>2007 Morocco releases autonomy under sovereignty plan for the Western Sahara which is endorsed by the United States, Spain and France</p>
<p>1974 Algeria begins to oppose Moroccan policy on the Sahara and trains Polisario guerrillas</p>		<p>Morocco and the Polisario Front conduct first two rounds of negotiations</p>
<p>1975 The Green March takes place in which 350,000 unarmed Moroccans march South into the desert to reassert the sovereignty of the Sahara from the Spanish Morocco signs Madrid Agreement which seeks to transfer control of the Sahara to a three party administration divided between Morocco, Spain and Mauritania</p>		<p>The Polisario Front threatens a return to armed conflict with Morocco</p>
<p>Spain officially terminates its administration of the Sahara</p>	<p>"[T]he Kingdom [of Morocco] has proposed a serious and credible autonomy plan as a basis of negotiation [...] and it constitutes a new proposal element after years of stalemate." -French President Nicolas Sarkozy, October 23, 2007</p>	<p>Third round of negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front takes place in January; a fourth round resumes in March</p>
<p>1976 The Polisario declares the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and raises the flag of "Western Sahara"</p>		<p>2008 UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy Van Walsum calls for realism and deems independence an unattainable option. Parties to the negotiations agree to a fifth round of negotiations to take place at a later date.</p>
<p>1977 Spanish-Moroccan fishing agreement is signed; the Polisario begins attacks on Spanish fishing vessels</p>	<p>"My conclusion that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process." -UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara Peter Van Walsum, April 21, 2008</p>	<p>2009 UN Sec. Gen. appoints seasoned US Diplomat Christopher Ross as the new Special Envoy for the Western Sahara.</p>
<p>1990 Morocco and the Polisario accept a UN peace plan, in which a referendum will be held.</p>		<p>U.S. Sec. of State Hillary Rodham Clinton reaffirms U.S. policy in support of Morocco's autonomy initiative.</p>
<p>1991 UN Security Council approves the establishment of Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara (MINURSO)</p>		

This information has been produced by the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP). MACP is a registered agent of the Government of Morocco. Additional information is available at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C.



Interview With Fouad Arif of Al-Aoula Television (Excerpt)

Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

Marrakech, Morocco

November 3, 2009

QUESTION: Yesterday, Madame Secretary, you reaffirmed that there is no change in the Obama Administration's position as far as the Moroccan autonomy plan in the Sahara is concerned. Would you like please to elaborate some more?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, this is a plan, as you know, that originated in the Clinton Administration. It was reaffirmed in the Bush Administration and it remains the policy of the United States in the Obama Administration. Now, we are supporting the United Nations process because we think that if there can be a peaceful resolution to the difficulties that exist with your neighbors, both to the east and to the south and the west, that is in everyone's interest.

But because of our long relationship, we are very aware of how challenging the circumstances are. And I don't want anyone in the region or elsewhere to have any doubt about our policy, which remains the same.

White House Press Office On-the-record Statement

by Dana Perino, *White House Press Secretary*

June 23, 2008

"Yes, the President sent a letter to King Mohammed. It reiterated the U.S. position, first announced in the UN Security Council, that autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution for the Western Sahara dispute and our support for substantive negotiations on this matter within the U.N.-led framework.

The letter also called on Morocco to continue its efforts to better relations with Algeria and to improve conditions in the Western Sahara."

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Security Council

Sixty-third year

Provisional

5884th meeting

Wednesday, 30 April 2008, 10.25 p.m.

New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Kumalo	(South Africa)
<i>Members:</i>	Belgium	Mr. Verbeke
	Burkina Faso	Mr. Kafando
	China	Mr. Liu Zhenmin
	Costa Rica	Mr. Urbina
	Croatia	Mr. Vilović
	France	Mr. Ripert
	Indonesia	Mr. Kleib
	Italy	Mr. Spatafora
	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Mr. Dabbashi
	Panama	Mr. Suescum
	Russian Federation	Mr. Safronkov
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Quarrey
	United States of America	Mr. Wolff
	Viet Nam	Mr. Hoang Chi Trung

Agenda

The situation concerning Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara
(S/2008/251)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.



in favour of the resolution in the hope that through the negotiating process and with the support of MINURSO the people of Western Sahara can one day achieve their right to self-determination.

I now resume my function as President of the Council.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Belgium, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Italy, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Panama, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1813 (2008).

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Wolff (United States of America): I had intended to focus my remarks on the issue before us, and will do so. But that does not mean we agree with either the interpretation of the process that led to this resolution or the representation of the arguments presented by Council members on the specific issues raised by both Ambassador Urbina and Ambassador Kumalo reflecting the substance of the issue. But let me focus on the issue as we see it before us.

The Western Sahara conflict has gone on too long, provoking tensions, causing human suffering and preventing progress towards regional integration in North Africa. I am sure that all of us around this table yearn for a mutually agreed political solution to this conflict. Four rounds of discussions in the framework of the latest settlement initiative have, however, confirmed the difficulty of arriving at such a solution, despite the seriousness, dedication and sincerity of the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Peter van Walsum.

In the absence of a settlement, my Government judges the mission of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara to be vital and is pleased that the Council has renewed its mandate for a full year; we appreciate the fact that it was done consensually.

It is our hope that this will permit the parties to engage in the search for a solution in a sustained, intensive and creative manner. To encourage them to do so, we intend to broaden our own engagement with them over the coming weeks and months. For our part, we agree with Mr. van Walsum's assessment that an independent Sahrawi State is not a realistic option for resolving the conflict and that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. In our view, the focus of future negotiation rounds should therefore be on designing a mutually acceptable autonomy regime that is consistent with the aspirations of the people of the Western Sahara.

In that regard, Morocco has already produced a proposal that the Security Council has qualified as serious and credible, and we urge the POLISARIO to engage Morocco in negotiation of its details — or to submit a comprehensive autonomy proposal of its own.

Mr. Ripert (France) (*spoke in French*): With the adoption of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), the international community unanimously welcomed the end of the stalemate on Western Sahara, with the commencement of negotiations without preconditions and in good faith. The lack of progress in the Manhasset negotiations undermines the search for a mutually acceptable, just and lasting political solution negotiated under United Nations auspices, allowing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. The continuation of the status quo in Western Sahara is an obstacle to building an integrated, prosperous Maghreb and poses a threat to the stability of the entire region.

By resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), the Security Council unanimously welcomed the serious and credible Moroccan efforts to produce an autonomy plan for Western Sahara. That, of course, is not a *sine qua non*: the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco forms the basis for serious and constructive negotiation aimed at a negotiated settlement between the parties, with respect for the principle of self-determination, to which we are committed.

We have taken note with interest of the assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, which supplements the information set out in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2008/251). We pay tribute once again to Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy for their efforts to resolve the question of Western Sahara.

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

2010 Updated Packet

April 3, 2009

The Honorable Barack Obama
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Vital U.S. interests in North Africa are increasingly challenged by growing regional instability. Terrorist incidents in the Maghreb have increased by more than 400 percent since September 11, 2001, and the emergence of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has led to a spike in terror attacks against both symbols of national government and institutions reflecting cooperation between the Arab world and the West. The single greatest obstacle impeding the security cooperation necessary to combat this transnational threat is the unresolved territorial dispute over the Western Sahara.

In addition to bringing peace to the people of Morocco and to the Saharawi, and shrinking the space for global terrorist elements to recruit and operate, resolving the conflict in the Western Sahara would have considerable economic benefits and improve the lives of millions of Africans. The entire Maghreb would finally be free to pursue serious economic integration, attract increased foreign investment, and realize the potential for regional trade and cooperation. All of these important goals are currently blocked by the continued conflict and the tension it creates between states in the region.

In 2007, at the urging of the United States and the United Nations, Morocco, our oldest ally and partner for peace in the Middle East, initiated a ground-breaking autonomy plan to resolve the more than 30 year-old conflict within the framework of self-determination for the Western Sahara. The Moroccan compromise plan received widespread support from the international community as a critical breakthrough for achieving peace and led to four rounds of UN mediated negotiations.



The UN Security Council, in resolution 1813 (2008), described Morocco's compromise efforts as "serious and credible." In pressing for adoption of the resolution the United States reaffirmed the policy initiated under President Clinton, and continued under President Bush, that, "Genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution."

After the four rounds of negotiations did not produce any real progress, the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, Mr. Peter van Walsum, issued an assessment to the Security Council in April 2008. He said, "My conclusion is that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal that is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process," and he urged that future rounds of talks be held only on the subject of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

Unfortunately, following this bold statement the negotiations process stalled. Mr. van Walsum has been replaced by Ambassador Christopher Ross as the new UN Personal Envoy. We are hopeful that Ambassador Ross's appointment will result in the continuation of the talks based on Mr. van Walsum's assessment.

We remain convinced that the U.S. position, favoring autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. We urge you to both sustain this longstanding policy, and to make clear, in both words and actions, that the United States will work to ensure that the UN process continues to support this framework as the only realistic compromise that can bring this unfortunate and longstanding conflict to an end. We look forward to working with you towards the success of this policy.

Sincerely,



List of 2009 Morocco Letter Signers (Alphabetical)

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Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 26, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


The Kingdom of Morocco, one of our oldest and closest allies, recently submitted a proposal to resolve the three decade long struggle over the Western Sahara. This historic initiative grants profound local autonomy to the Western Sahara while recognizing Morocco's territorial integrity. This compromise is a breakthrough opportunity to find an enduring political solution, and U.S. support is critical to its successful implementation.

As you know, the conflict in the Western Sahara has gone on for too long at great humanitarian cost. Since the 1991 UN imposed cease-fire, all efforts to provide a realistic and durable solution to the conflict have failed. The new Moroccan proposal provides a realistic framework for a negotiated political solution, which is the best way to ensure a lasting peace for all parties.


The United States has a major national security interest in the stability and economic prosperity of North Africa. With al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups expanding their presence into North Africa, we are concerned that the failure to resolve this conflict of more than 30 years poses a danger to U.S. and regional security, while simultaneously preventing the economic integration of the Arab Maghreb Union.

The Moroccan autonomy proposal constitutes an historic opportunity for the United States to help end this problem and provide a better future for the entire region. We urge you to embrace this promising Moroccan initiative so that it receives the consideration necessary to achieve international acceptance.

Sincerely,



Tom Lantos



George W. Bush

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Tom Allen (ME)
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Bill Shuster (PA)
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Ray LaHood (IL)
Brian Bilbray (CA)
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Buck McKeon (CA)
Jim Saxton (NJ)

Assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

1. During my visit to the region, I told each of my hosts that I stood by the conclusions I had drawn in my first briefing to the Security Council on 18 January 2006. As the Council had made it clear from the outset that it could only contemplate a consensual solution to the question of Western Sahara and, more specifically, had not reacted in 2004 when Morocco decided that it could not consent to any referendum in which independence was an option, I had concluded that there was no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim of sovereignty over the Territory and, therefore, that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition. I felt it necessary to reiterate this conclusion, because it might have become obscured by the fact that both the Moroccan proposal and that of the Frente Polisario were on the agenda of the Manhasset negotiations.
2. My interlocutors in Tindouf and Algiers did not contest my analysis, but disagreed strongly with my conclusion; first, because international legality had to prevail, and second, because the circumstances I described as 'reality' might change.
3. My conclusion that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process. In my briefing to the Security Council in January 2006, I observed that once the Council recognized that Morocco would not be made to give up its claim to Western Sahara, it would realize that there were only two options: indefinite prolongation of the deadlock or direct negotiations between the parties.
4. On this basis, Secretary-General Annan recommended, first in April and again in October 2006, that the Security Council call on the two parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions. The Security Council did not act on these recommendations. In the second week of April 2007, both parties introduced their respective proposals for the solution of the question of Western Sahara. In his report to the Security Council of 13 April 2007 (S/2007/202), the Secretary-General acknowledged receipt of both proposals and repeated the recommendation to call on the two parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions. Subsequently, in its resolution 1754 (2007) of 30 April 2007, the Security Council took note of both proposals and followed the Secretary-General's recommendation, presumably due to the impact of the Moroccan proposal to negotiate an autonomy statute for the region. And finally, during the first round of the negotiations, on 18 June 2007, I explained to the parties that I had drawn the conclusion that both proposals were on the agenda.
5. Although this procedure cannot be faulted, its outcome is paradoxical. While Morocco's rejection of a referendum with independence as an option had triggered the Council's recourse to recommending negotiations without preconditions, one of the two proposals that are now on the table in these negotiations demands precisely the holding of a referendum with independence as an option. This contradiction may explain why the negotiation process is not leading anywhere: the fundamental positions of the two parties are mutually exclusive. What is an absolute necessity for one is absolutely unacceptable

for the other. For the Frente Polisario, a referendum with independence as an option is indispensable for the achievement of self-determination, whereas Morocco is unable to accept such a referendum, but believes self-determination can be achieved through other forms of popular consultation.

6. As a result, an even more unyielding impasse has established itself right in the heart of the process that was meant to show a way out of the impasse brought about by Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan (Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara) in 2004 (S/2004/325). A month after the end of my latest tour of the region from 5-15 February 2008, the parties and neighbouring countries met again in Manhasset, from 16-18 March 2008, for the fourth round of their talks. As had been the case in the first three rounds, from 18-19 June and 10-11 August 2007 and 7-9 January 2008, there was hardly any exchange that could be characterized as negotiations. Since April 2007, the equal treatment the Secretary-General had allotted to the two proposals had been progressively modified by the Security Council through the addition of certain references to the Moroccan proposal. First, in resolution 1754 (2007), the Council had inserted the words "welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution" (fifth preambular paragraph) and called upon the parties to take into account "the developments of the last months" (paragraph 2), and later, in resolution 1783 (2007), it had expanded the latter phrase to: "taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and developments of the last months." In Manhasset, I reminded the delegations that these insertions were integral parts of the two Security Council resolutions, as was the Council's "taking note" of both proposals.

7. Both parties repeatedly commented on the exact meaning of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), and, it goes without saying, they attached paramount importance to very different elements. For the Frente Polisario, all that matters is that both proposals are on the table, while according to Morocco the Council has established a clear order between the two. This exercise in textual explanation may be intellectually challenging, but it does not yield the kind of authoritative interpretation that induces the parties to reconsider their positions and to negotiate a compromise solution. What is needed is clearer guidance from the Council itself. I am, of course, aware of the constraints under which Security Council resolutions come into being; but the answer to the vital question of whether one proposal has priority over the other cannot be left to the inevitably controversial interpretation of a number of indistinct phrases. If the Council cannot make a choice, the parties cannot either.

8. There is no conceivable compromise between the parties' views on the role of a referendum with independence as an option. However, I had hoped that the parties, who at the conclusion of the second round of talks agreed that the current *status quo* was unacceptable, would sooner or later show some willingness to explore the implications of possible movement on the basis of the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed;" but in four rounds of talks, no sign of such willingness has been detected. Therefore, the process is at a standstill, despite the agreement to meet for a fifth round at a date still to be determined.

9. Much will now depend on the interaction between the Security Council's adoption of a new resolution before the end of April, and that fifth round of the negotiation process. If the Council simply extends the process begun by resolution 1754 (2007) and continued by resolution 1783 (2007), there is no doubt that the fifth round will be no different from the first four, and the process will be rightly regarded as deadlocked. Yet, this seems the most likely outcome because in the wider international community the feeling that the *status quo* in Western Sahara is unacceptable is far less prevalent than the feeling that, on balance and all alternatives considered, it may be the least disadvantageous option. Numerous countries consider the *status quo* quite tolerable because it relieves them from the necessity of making painful choices, such as taking sides between Algeria and Morocco. Consolidation of the *status quo* may well be the natural outcome – so to speak, the *default mode* – of the negotiation process.

10. Apart from what the Security Council may or may not be able to do, countries that have close ties with either party might make a greater effort at counteracting that party's tendency to overestimate the strength of its position. Both parties are quick to interpret positive comments from third countries as support for their cause. I have the impression that the prevalence of this phenomenon is responsible for a large number of misconceptions that weaken the political will to search for compromise solutions. In the international community, there is a widespread view that legally the Frente Polisario has the stronger case, but that it is not incumbent on the Security Council to pressure Morocco to pull out of Western Sahara thirty-three years after its taking possession of the Territory. It is as if the Frente Polisario hears only the first part of this sentence, and Morocco only the second. By far the greatest misconception in this category must be the belief that once the current negotiations have foundered, the Security Council will realize that the question of Western Sahara can only be solved by means of a referendum with independence as an option and take action accordingly.

11. If the negotiations end in stalemate again, the continuation of the *status quo* seems unavoidable. It is highly unlikely that in such a situation the Security Council would unanimously lend its full support to one of the two proposals. Yet, the stalemate would have been caused by the fact that the process was launched with two proposals on the table, one that requires a referendum with independence as an option, and the other that rules that out. A way out of this dilemma might be a tentative and temporary change of focus.

12. To initiate this, the Security Council might ask the parties:

- to reconfirm their acceptance of the principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”;
- to temporarily (e.g. for six to nine months) remove both proposals from the agenda of the talks;
- to negotiate, this time really without preconditions but on the temporary assumption that there will not be a referendum with independence as an option and that, therefore, the outcome will necessarily fall short of full independence.

In addition, the Council might announce its intention to evaluate the process at the end of the trial period. If at that time it perceives the contours of a possible political solution, it may decide to extend the trial period; if it does not, the *status quo* – with the existing incompatible positions of the parties – will resume of itself.

13. I am aware that the removal of the two proposals from the table would be largely symbolic. Still, as the negotiations are hindered by the fact that two irreconcilable proposals are on the table, the right solution might be to remove both of them. Of course, they would not cease to exist; but their status would be clear: they would just be the parties' goals, to be negotiated between them on the basis of two realities:

- (for the Frente Polisario:) that the Security Council will not make Morocco accept a referendum with independence as an option;

- (for Morocco:) that the United Nations does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over any part of Western Sahara.

It is important to be as explicit about the latter as about the former because, in the context of the current negotiation process, Morocco so consistently refers to its sovereignty over Western Sahara that it would seem advisable to clarify that this can only express a Moroccan claim, so that in case of an unexpected breakdown of the negotiations there will be absolute clarity about the status of Western Sahara as disputed territory.

14. From the outset, I have emphasised the need to respect political reality alongside international legality. Morocco's physical possession of Western Sahara is political reality, but so is the reality that no country has so far recognized its sovereignty over the Territory. This fact is linked to international legality; the two concepts do not exist in separation. What matters is how political reality and international legality interact to enable us to take the best decisions in real life. I do not accept the view that taking political reality into account is a concession or a surrender, and that it is wrong ever to settle for less than pure legality. The choices to be made are not limited to the dilemma between international legality and political reality. There is also a moral dilemma that comes to light when the virtue of international legality is weighed against the consequences of its pursuit for the people of Western Sahara in real life. The main reason why I find the *status quo* intolerable is that it is too readily accepted, not only by uncommitted onlookers in distant lands, but also by deeply involved supporters of the Frente Polisario, who do not live in the camps themselves but are convinced that those who do would rather stay there indefinitely than settle for any negotiated solution that falls short of full independence.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2008

Resolution 1813 (2008)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5884th meeting, on
30 April 2008**

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007),

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

Reiterating its call upon the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations and with each other to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,

Taking note of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-General and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Polisario Front proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary-General,

Taking note of the four rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of the Secretary-General; *welcoming* the progress made by the parties to enter into direct negotiations,

Welcoming the agreement of the parties expressed in the Communiqué of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara of 18 March 2008 to explore the establishment of family visits by land, which would be in addition to the existing program by air, and *encouraging* them to do so in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

Welcoming the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through United Nations sponsored talks,

Noting the Secretary-General's view that the consolidation of the status quo is not an acceptable outcome of the current process of negotiations, and *noting further*



that progress in the negotiations will have a positive impact on the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251),

1. *Reaffirms* the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire;
2. *Endorses* the report's recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to maintain the momentum of the process of negotiations;
3. *Calls upon* the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 and 1783 and the success of negotiations; and *affirms* its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context;
4. *Calls upon* the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;
5. *Invites* Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on a regular basis on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices, and expresses its intention to meet to receive and discuss his report;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;
8. *Urges* Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund Confidence Building Measures that allow for increased contact between separated family members, especially family visits, as well as for other confidence building measures that may be agreed between the parties;
9. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2009;
10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in MINURSO with the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including pre-deployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;
11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

June 6, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. President:

We applaud the support of your Administration for the adoption of Resolution 1754 by the United Nations Security Council on April 30, 2007, which incorporates the historic initiative by Morocco to end the conflict in the Western Sahara through direct negotiations. This new direction for solving the crisis is in large part the result of your efforts and encouragement.


As the first country to officially recognize the United States in 1777, Morocco has been an historic and reliable ally to our great nation, and we encourage you to continue this cooperation in the challenging months ahead as the negotiations are inaugurated.

Recent terrorist attacks in Morocco and Algeria show that we cannot afford to continue to ignore the problems of this region. Failure to resolve this conflict jeopardizes international stability, our fight against terrorism, and economic integration efforts in the region.


By giving the people of the Western Sahara a true voice in their future through the full benefits of autonomy as presented by Morocco, a credible political solution can be achieved. Morocco's commitment merits the support of the international community and we must ensure that its neighbors assume their responsibility for contributing to the success of these negotiations, as called for in UNSC Resolution 1754.

Mr. President, we know that with your encouragement and support Morocco has courageously shown its leadership with this initiative. Your commitment can make possible a solution to this lingering issue and reaffirm our bipartisan support to a realistic and lasting peace in North Africa.


Sincerely,



Madeleine K. Albright
Former United States Secretary of State




Frank Charles Carlucci III
Former United States Secretary of Defense




Mickey Kantor
Former United States Secretary of Commerce and
Former United States Trade Representative




Hazel R. O'Leary
Former United States Secretary of Energy




Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander




Ben Gilman
Former Member, United States House of Representatives and
Chairman, House Committee on International Relations



Thomas Daschle
Former United States Senator and Senate Majority Leader



Thomas R. Pickering
Former United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and
Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Russia, India,
Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan



Martin Indyk
Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs and Former United States Ambassador to Israel



Edward S. Walker Jr.
Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs and Former United States Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the
United Arab Emirates




Thomas Nassif
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and
South and Central Asian Affairs



Michael Ussery
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central
Asian Affairs




Frederick Vreeland
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and
South and Central Asian Affairs



Dov Zakheim
Former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and
Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense



Peter W. Rodman
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs



Leon Fuerth
Former National Security Advisor to Vice President Albert A. Gore Jr.



American Jewish Committee

Office of Government and International Affairs

1156 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005 www.ajc.org 202-785-4200 Fax 202-785-4115 E-mail ogia@ajc.org

Jason F. Isaacson
DIRECTOR

April 19, 2007

Dear Representative:

The American Jewish Committee, an organization that advances inter-religious and inter-ethnic understanding and is dedicated to the success of moderation and pluralism in the Arab and Muslim world, urges your endorsement of a letter circulated by Representatives Ackerman and Diaz-Balart supporting a just-released proposal for autonomy in the disputed Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty.

The Ackerman/Diaz-Balart letter asks President Bush to support the Moroccan plan – and seek international acceptance of it – as a sound basis to resolve the Western Sahara conflict, a source of regional instability and human suffering for more than 30 years.

Cognizant of the historic links between – and the broad common interests of – the United States and Morocco, and as an institutional partner of the Moroccan Jewish community, the American Jewish Committee strongly supports efforts by our Government and the Kingdom to enhance cooperation in many spheres, from the struggle against terrorism and extremism, to expanded economic opportunity in the Maghreb, cultural and educational exchange, and political reform. It was our faith in this vital relationship that underlay AJC's support for the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement of 2004, and is the foundation of our ongoing dialogue with Moroccan officials and civil society on pressing issues of regional peace, security and human rights.

Reinforced by the recent assertion of Under Secretary Burns that the Moroccan proposal is "serious and credible" and would "provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara," we view U.S. advocacy of this approach as critical to the further enhancement of ties between our nation and the Kingdom, the continued advance of political and economic progress in Morocco, and effective pursuit of cooperative strategies to counter regional instability and international terrorism. We urge your signature on the Ackerman/Diaz-Balart letter to President Bush.


With appreciation for your consideration of AJC's views on this matter, I remain,

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jason F. Isaacson", is written over a horizontal line.

Jason F. Isaacson

American Jewish Committee
A Century of Leadership



Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, and Options for Effective American Engagement in North Africa

MARCH 31, 2009

"The US needs a policy to promote American interests in the area by treating the five North African states as a region and working to strengthen the economic and security ties among them – and with the US and Europe – and by taking the lead in promoting a resolution to the Western Sahara conflict based on the proposal of autonomy within Moroccan sovereignty now on the table at the United Nations (UN) and supported by a bipartisan consensus in the US Congress."

"The single greatest obstacle to this integration [greater regional economic integration and Atlantic cooperation] is the Western Sahara conflict. Ongoing negotiations at the UN have brought no discernable progress. This stalemate must be brought to an end if the larger issues of integration are to be addressed."

"Removing the single largest issue in the way of security cooperation by resolving the Western Sahara conflict would allow Morocco and Algeria to turn coordinated attention to the security problem to their south, permit them to reduce their forces level and halt their arms race, and free them to devote more of their budgets to civilian needs."

"Finally, the US can help broker resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, which is the major obstacle to regional integration and the central impediment to effective coordination of efforts to combat terrorism, illegal immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking, and to promote economic cooperation and other regional initiatives. If regional integration is the goal, then a solution to the Western Sahara conflict will remove the primary barrier to cooperation."

"Successive US administrations have declared that the only feasible solution is to be found in the autonomy compromise. In this regard, the United States needs to begin immediately to treat the Western Sahara in a manner consistent with the declared policy--and encourage its allies to do the same."

"Regional integration in North Africa will support a range of US interests that are central to the strategic pursuit of region's stability, security, and economic goals. But regional integration cannot be realized without resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Given the current position of the US government – that broad autonomy for the Sahrawi people under Moroccan sovereignty is the only realistic solution – the platform is in place to move proactively and successfully to bring an end to that conflict, to increase counterterrorism cooperation, and effectively to encourage regional economic integration that will bring greater prosperity and opportunity to the peoples of the Maghreb and greater security for US interests.

Panel Members for the North Africa Policy Paper Project

The following foreign policy experts are members of the blue-ribbon panel that reviewed and approved the report:

Secretary Madeleine Albright

Fmr US Sec. of State, Principal Albright Group LLC

Professor Yonah Alexander

Dir. Int'l Center, Terrorism Studies, Potomac Inst.

General Wesley Clark

Ret. 4-star US Gen, NATO Sup. Allied Commander

President Lorne Craner

President, International Republican Inst.

Professor Chester Crocker

Prof. Strategic Studies, Georgetown U.

Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat

Covington & Burling, Fmr White House Policy Adviser

Professor John Entelis

Dir. Middle East Studies, Fordham U.

Ambassador Lucia Guerrato

Former Ambassador, European Union

Ambassador Robert Pelletreau

Fmr Assist. Sec. of State, Near Eastern

Affairs

Ambassador Robin Raphel

Former US Ambassador to Tunisia

Ambassador Ed Walker

Former US Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, & UAE

Ambassador David Welch

Former Assist. Sec. of State, Near Eastern

Affairs and Former Ambassador to Egypt

Professor I William Zartman

Jacob Blaustein Professor Emeritus, SAIS

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 DSO/CES/REGISTRATION UNIT





The Moroccan Initiative in the Western Sahara

Background:

The Moroccan initiative comes in response to repeated requests of the United Nations Security Council and several of its key members, including the United States, that Morocco propose a solution to this longstanding problem that could facilitate the opening of negotiations for a "just, durable and peaceful" political solution.

After nearly a decade of trying to bring the Polisario and Morocco to agreement to conduct a referendum to determine the territories future, Kofi Annan, then Secretary General, and James Baker, then Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, reported to the Security Council that it was not possible to achieve agreement between the Polisario and Morocco on the central issue of who should be permitted to vote in a referendum. Consequently, Annan and Baker recommended that the Security Council encourage Morocco and the Polisario to enter into direct negotiations to find a compromise political solution. The Security Council accepted the assessment of Annan and Baker that a referendum would not be possible, and began a process carried through several years of UNSC resolutions calling for direct negotiations.

James Baker proposed two such compromise political solutions based on the underlying assumption that the proposals would allow Morocco to remain sovereign in the Western Sahara, but that the territory would benefit from a substantial autonomy that would allow it to become self-governing. Morocco accepted the first Baker proposal as the basis for direct negotiations, but the Polisario refused. The Polisario accepted the second Baker proposal, but Morocco refused since it did not allow for direct negotiations between the parties on the terms of the arrangement.

The Moroccan proposal is the first and only proposal to come from one of the Parties to the conflict in response to the Security Council encouragements. In various forms, the Polisario has continued to insist that the referendum be held, and threatens a renewal of hostilities and the eviction of the United Nations peacekeeping force from the territory under its control, despite the fact that the Security Council repeatedly has made clear that this solution is no longer viable.

Summary of the Moroccan Initiative:

The initiative is the product of a year long internal and foreign Moroccan consultation process. All sectors of the Sahrawi population were included in the consultations and the views of foreign governments and expert international authorities were sought before the plan was finalized for presentation to the United Nations.

The plan itself represents an outline for a political solution that traces what Morocco considers to be the broad scope of an autonomy arrangement for the Western Sahara. It does not go into extensive detail on its various aspects on the assumption that such specific arrangements should be the result of direct negotiations rather than the imposition of only one of the parties to the dispute.

The plan provides for a local elected legislature that would subsequently elect an executive authority. It also would establish a separate judiciary for the autonomous region with competence to render justice on matters specific to the autonomous status of the region. The legislature would elect a chief executive.

The formula proposed by Morocco would ensure majority representation in the legislature for Sahrawi inhabitants of the autonomous region, while also ensuring credible legislative representation for non-Sahrawis who have been long-time residents in the territory. Residents of the autonomous region would also continue to elect representatives to the national legislature.

The government of the autonomous region would have exclusive authorities on some issues, shared authority with the central government of Morocco on others and consultative rights on authorities that remain reserved to the central government and that effect the region.

The autonomous government would control local administration, local police, education, cultural development, economic development, regional planning, tourism, investment, trade, public works and transportation, housing, health, sports and social welfare. It would have taxing authorities to support these functions and would continue to receive funding from the central budget as well. It would be able to establish foreign regional trade relations offices and would have consultative rights on other sovereign foreign agreements affecting the region.

The central government would retain exclusive jurisdiction over the normal elements of sovereign authority: national defense, currency, postal, and foreign affairs and religion, over which the Monarchy has a special status in Morocco.

The chief executive of the autonomous region would be elected by the legislature, but would be invested by and serve in the name of the Monarchy.

The initiative also envisages transitional bodies to guide the central government and the autonomous authority through the initial stages of implementation of the plan.

All individual rights guaranteed under the Moroccan Constitution would continue to apply to all residents of the autonomous region.

MOROCCAN INITIATIVE FOR NEGOTIATING AN AUTONOMY STATUTE FOR THE SAHARA REGION

I. Morocco's commitment to a final political solution

1. Since 2004, the Security Council has been regularly calling upon *"the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution."*
2. Responding to this call by the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco set a positive, constructive and dynamic process in motion, and pledged to submit an autonomy proposal for the Sahara, within the framework of the Kingdom's sovereignty and national unity.
3. This initiative is part of the endeavors made to build a modern, democratic society, based on the rule of law, collective and individual freedoms, and economic and social development. As such, it brings hope for a better future for the region's populations, puts an end to separation and exile, and promotes reconciliation.
4. Through this initiative, the Kingdom of Morocco guarantees to all Sahrawis, inside as well as outside the territory, that they will hold a privileged position and play a leading role in the bodies and institutions of the region, without discrimination or exclusion.
5. Thus, the Sahara populations will themselves run their affairs democratically, through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive powers. They will have the financial resources needed for the region's development in all fields, and will take an active part in the nation's economic, social and cultural life.
6. The State will keep its powers in the royal domains, especially with respect to defense, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of His Majesty the King.
7. The Moroccan initiative, which is made in an open spirit, aims to set the stage for dialogue and a negotiation process that would lead to a mutually acceptable political solution.
8. As the outcome of negotiations, the autonomy statute shall be submitted to the populations concerned for a referendum, in keeping with the principle of self-determination and with the provisions of the UN Charter.
9. To this end, Morocco calls on the other parties to avail the opportunity to write a new chapter in the region's history. Morocco is ready to take part in serious, constructive negotiations in the spirit of this initiative, and to contribute to promoting a climate of trust.
10. To achieve this objective, the Kingdom of Morocco remains willing to cooperate fully with the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.

II. Basic elements of the Moroccan proposal

11. The Moroccan autonomy project draws inspiration from the relevant proposals of the United Nations Organization, and from the constitutional provisions in force in countries that are geographically and culturally close to Morocco. It is based on internationally recognized norms and standards.

A. Powers of the Sahara autonomous Region

12. In keeping with democratic principles and procedures, and acting through legislative, executive and judicial bodies, the populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall exercise powers, within the Region's territorial boundaries, mainly over the following:

- Region's local administration, local police force and jurisdictions;
- in the economic sector: economic development, regional planning, promotion of investment, trade, industry, tourism and agriculture;
- Region's budget and taxation;
- infrastructure: water, hydraulic facilities, electricity, public works and transportation;
- in the social sector: housing, education, health, employment, sports, social welfare and social security;
- cultural affairs, including promotion of the Saharan Hassani cultural heritage;
- environment.

13. The Sahara autonomous Region will have the financial resources required for its development in all areas. Resources will come, in particular, from:

- taxes, duties and regional levies enacted by the Region's competent authorities;
- proceeds from the development of natural resources allocated to the Region;
- the share of proceeds collected by the State from the development of natural resources located in the Region;
- the necessary funds allocated in keeping with the principle of national solidarity;
- proceeds from the Region's assets.

14. The State shall keep exclusive jurisdiction over the following in particular:

- the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency;
- the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual and collective freedoms;
- national security, external defense and defense of territorial integrity;
- external relations;
- the Kingdom's juridical order.

15. State responsibilities with respect to external relations shall be exercised in consultation with the Sahara autonomous Region for those matters which have a direct bearing on the prerogatives of the Region. The Sahara autonomous Region may, in consultation with the Government, establish cooperation relations with foreign Regions to foster inter-regional dialogue and cooperation.
16. The powers of the State in the Sahara autonomous Region, as stipulated in paragraph 13 above, shall be exercised by a Representative of the Government.
17. Moreover, powers which are not specifically entrusted to a given party shall be exercised by common agreement, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.
18. The populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be represented in Parliament and in the other national institutions. They shall take part in all national elections.

B. Bodies of the Region

19. The Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be made up of members elected by the various Sahrawi tribes, and of members elected by direct universal suffrage, by the Region's population. There shall be adequate representation of women in the Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region.
20. Executive authority in the Sahara autonomous Region shall lie with a Head of Government, to be elected by the regional Parliament. He shall be invested by the King.

The Head of Government shall be the Representative of the State in the Region.
21. The Head of Government of the Sahara autonomous Region shall form the Region's Cabinet and appoint the administrators needed to exercise the powers devolving upon him, under the present autonomy Statute. He shall be answerable to the Region's Parliament.
22. Courts may be set up by the regional Parliament to give rulings on disputes arising from enforcement of norms enacted by the competent bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region. These courts shall give their rulings with complete independence, in the name of the King.
23. As the highest jurisdiction of the Sahara autonomous Region, the high regional court shall give final decisions regarding the interpretation of the Region's legislation, without prejudice to the powers of the Kingdom's Supreme Court or Constitutional Council.
24. Laws, regulations and court rulings issued by the bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be consistent with the Region's autonomy Statute and with the Kingdom's Constitution.
25. The Region's populations shall enjoy all the guarantees afforded by the Moroccan Constitution in the area of human rights as they are universally recognized.
26. An Economic and Social Council shall be set up in the Sahara autonomous Region. It shall comprise representatives from economic, social, professional and community groups, as well as highly qualified figures.

III. Approval and implementation procedure for the autonomy statute

27. The Region's autonomy statute shall be the subject of negotiations and shall be submitted to the populations concerned in a free referendum. This referendum will constitute a free exercise, by these populations, of their right to self-determination, as per the provisions of international legality, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.
28. To this end, the parties pledge to work jointly and in good faith to foster this political solution and secure its approval by the Sahara populations.
29. Moreover, the Moroccan Constitution shall be amended and the autonomy Statute incorporated into it, in order to guarantee its sustainability and reflect its special place in the country's national juridical architecture.
30. The Kingdom of Morocco shall take all the necessary steps to ensure full integration, into the nation's fabric, of persons to be repatriated. This will be done in a manner which preserves their dignity and guarantees their security and the protection of their property.
31. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco shall, in particular, declare a blanket amnesty, precluding any legal proceedings, arrest, detention, imprisonment or intimidation of any kind, based on facts covered by this amnesty.
32. Once the parties have agreed on the proposed autonomy, a Transitional Council composed of their representatives shall assist with repatriation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed elements who are outside the territory, as well as with any other action aimed at securing the approval and implementation of the present Statute, including elections.
33. Just like the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco firmly believes today that the solution to the Sahara dispute can only come from negotiations. Accordingly, the proposal it is submitting to the United Nations constitutes a real opportunity for initiating negotiations with a view to reaching a final solution to this dispute, in keeping with international legality, and on the basis of arrangements which are consistent with the goals and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
34. In this respect, Morocco pledges to negotiate in good faith and in a constructive, open spirit to reach a final, mutually acceptable political solution to the dispute plaguing the region. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco is prepared to make a positive contribution to creating an environment of trust which would contribute to the successful outcome of this initiative.
35. The Kingdom of Morocco hopes the other parties will appreciate the significance and scope of this proposal, realize its merit, and make a positive and constructive contribution to it. The Kingdom of Morocco is of the view that the momentum created by this initiative offers a historic chance to resolve this issue once and for all.



White House Press Office On-the-record Statement

by Dana Perino, *White House Press Secretary*
June 23, 2008

“Yes, the President sent a letter to King Mohammed. It reiterated the U.S. position, first announced in the UN Security Council, that autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution for the Western Sahara dispute and our support for substantive negotiations on this matter within the U.N.-led framework.

The letter also called on Morocco to continue its efforts to better relations with Algeria and to improve conditions in the Western Sahara.”



Remarks With Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi-Fihri

(Excerpt)
Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Secretary of State*
Marrakech, Morocco
November 2, 2009

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, change of subject, if I may. During the past few years, the United States, just like other members of the Security Council, have characterized the Moroccan initiative for autonomy in the Sahara as being serious and credible. My question is: Does the Obama Administration stand by that position? Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes. Our policy has not changed, and I thank you for asking the question because I think it's important for me to reaffirm here in the Morocco that there has been no change in policy.

Interview With Fouad Arif of Al-Aoula Television

(Excerpt)
Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Secretary of State*
Marrakech, Morocco
November 3, 2009

QUESTION: Yesterday, Madame Secretary, you reaffirmed that there is no change in the Obama Administration's position as far as the Moroccan autonomy plan in the Sahara is concerned. Would you like please to elaborate some more?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, this is a plan, as you know, that originated in the Clinton Administration. It was reaffirmed in the Bush Administration and it remains the policy of the United States in the Obama Administration. Now, we are supporting the United Nations process because we think that if there can be a peaceful resolution to the difficulties that exist with your neighbors, both to the east and to the south and the west, that is in everyone's interest. But because of our long relationship, we are very aware of how challenging the circumstances are. And I don't want anyone in the region or elsewhere to have any doubt about our policy, which remains the same.



Jason F. Isaacson
Director of Government
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March 10, 2010

Dear Senator:

The American Jewish Committee, an organization that advances inter-religious and inter-ethnic understanding and is dedicated to the success of moderation and pluralism in the Arab and Muslim world, urges your endorsement of a letter circulated by Senators Feinstein and Bond supporting U.S. leadership to resolve the longstanding dispute over the Western Sahara, in the interest of easing regional tensions and increasing cooperation against terrorism.

Directed to Secretary Clinton, the Feinstein-Bond letter recognizes the history of bipartisan U.S. support, across three administrations, for a resolution of the Western Sahara issue. In April 2007, Morocco put forward a proposal that would offer the disputed territory – roughly the size of Colorado and with a population of some 400,000 – broad local autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. Ongoing negotiations under United Nations auspices between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front have yet to yield results; firm U.S. leadership to assure international support for a just and practical negotiated resolution would advance regional stability and security.

Cognizant of the historic links between – and the broad common interests of – the United States and Morocco, and as an institutional partner of the Moroccan Jewish community, the American Jewish Committee strongly supports efforts by our Government and the Kingdom to enhance cooperation in many spheres, from the struggle against terrorism and extremism, to expanded economic opportunity in the Maghreb, cultural and educational exchange, and political reform. It was our faith in this vital relationship that underlay AJC's support for the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement of 2004, and is the foundation of our ongoing dialogue with Moroccan officials and civil society on pressing issues of regional peace, security and human rights.

AJC views reinforced U.S. advocacy of Morocco's autonomy proposal for Western Sahara as critical to the further enhancement of ties between our nation and the Kingdom, the continued advance of political and economic progress in Morocco, and effective pursuit of cooperative strategies to counter regional instability and international terrorism. We urge your signature on the Feinstein-Bond letter to Secretary Clinton.

With appreciation for your consideration of AJC's views on this matter, I remain,

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Jason Isaacson', is written over a horizontal line.

Jason F. Isaacson

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

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MSD/CES/REGISTRATION UNIT

Dear Secretary Clinton:

We are writing to urge you to make the resolution of the Western Sahara stalemate a U.S. foreign policy priority for North Africa.

We are very concerned about the mounting evidence of growing instability in North Africa. Terrorist activities are increasing and countries in the region are under substantial pressure from a growing and restless youth population and a precarious economic base. United States leadership in close cooperation with our allies in Europe and the region can help stabilize the situation and reverse these worrisome trends. We should begin with a more sustained American attention to one of the region's most pressing political issues, the Western Sahara.

Indeed, a report released on March 31, 2009 by a panel that included former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark, and former Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, argued that “the U.S. must work diligently with its friends to resolve the stalemate over the Western Sahara.”

We agree with you that the proposal introduced by Morocco in 2007 – based on broad autonomy for the Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty – is serious and credible. As you acknowledged in your remarks in Morocco last November, it has been the policy of the United States to support a resolution of this conflict based on this formula since the Administration of President Clinton. We support this bipartisan U.S. policy and the efforts of the United Nations to bring all parties together to resolve this matter peacefully at the negotiating table.

The challenges in North Africa for the United States and its allies are clear, and our leadership can make a significant difference for the better in promoting greater coordination to diminish and eliminate terrorist threats, in encouraging regional integration that will facilitate economic growth and prosperity, and in resolving the Western Sahara to remove the major obstacle to stability in the region.

We look forward to working with you towards the success of this policy.

Sincerely,

NSD/CES/REGISTRATION UNIT
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