

For Six Month Period Ending 08/31/14
(Insert date)

I - REGISTRANT

1. (a) Name of Registrant
Vision Americas LLC

(b) Registration No.
5907

(c) Business Address(es) of Registrant
1200 19th Street NW, Ste 300
Washington, DC 20036

1150 K Street NW, Suite 1411
Washington, DC 20005

2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following?

- (a) If an individual:
- (1) Residence address(es) Yes No
 - (2) Citizenship Yes No
 - (3) Occupation Yes No
- (b) If an organization:
- (1) Name Yes No
 - (2) Ownership or control Yes No
 - (3) Branch offices Yes No

(c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in Items (a) and (b) above.

VA offices moved from

1901 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 901
Washington, DC 20006

to 1200 19th Street NW, Ste 300
Washington, DC 20036

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4, AND 5(a).

3. If you have previously filed Exhibit C¹, state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period.

Yes No

If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C? Yes No

If no, please attach the required amendment.

¹ The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)

4. (a) Have any persons ceased acting as partners, officers, directors or similar officials of the registrant during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position	Date Connection Ended
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(b) Have any persons become partners, officers, directors or similar officials during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence Address	Citizenship	Position	Date Assumed
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5. (a) Has any person named in Item 4(b) rendered services directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal?

Yes No

If yes, identify each such person and describe the service rendered.

(b) During this six month reporting period, has the registrant hired as employees or in any other capacity, any persons who rendered or will render services to the registrant directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal(s) in other than a clerical or secretarial, or in a related or similar capacity? Yes No

Name	Residence Address	Citizenship	Position	Date Assumed
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(c) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their employment or connection with the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position or Connection	Date Terminated
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(d) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their connection with any foreign principal during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position or Connection	Foreign Principal	Date Terminated
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6. Have short form registration statements been filed by all of the persons named in Items 5(a) and 5(b) of the supplemental statement?

Yes No

If no, list names of persons who have not filed the required statement.

II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

7. Has your connection with any foreign principal ended during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Foreign Principal

Date of Termination

8. Have you acquired any new foreign principal(s)² during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name and Address of Foreign Principal(s)

Date Acquired

9. In addition to those named in Items 7 and 8, if any, list foreign principal(s)² whom you continued to represent during the 6 month reporting period.

Moroccan American Center for Policy

10. (a) Have you filed exhibits for the newly acquired foreign principal(s), if any, listed in Item 8?

Exhibit A³ Yes No

Exhibit B⁴ Yes No

If no, please attach the required exhibit.

- (b) Have there been any changes in the Exhibits A and B previously filed for any foreign principal whom you represented during this six month period? Yes No

If yes, have you filed an amendment to these exhibits? Yes No

If no, please attach the required amendment.

² The term "foreign principal" includes, in addition to those defined in Section 1(b) of the Act, an individual organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a) (9)). A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 208.)

³ The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form NSD-3, sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

⁴ The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form NSD-4, sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

III - ACTIVITIES

11. During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes No

If yes, identify each foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:

Moroccan American Center for Policy - Vision Americas contacted members of Congress and their staffers on issues related to U.S. - Morocco bilateral relations including human rights developments in the region, Morocco's role in the Middle East Peace Process and security issues in the region, and the Western Sahara issue. In addition, the registrant provided and continues to provide strategic advice on the aforementioned topics.

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12. During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity⁵ as defined below? Yes No

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates, places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.

Vision Americas communicated with various principals and staff of the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government in order to educate individuals on the U.S. - Morocco relationship in order to garner support for initiatives set forth by MACP.

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13. In addition to the above described activities, if any, have you engaged in activity on your own behalf which benefits your foreign principal(s)? Yes No

If yes, describe fully.

⁵ "Political activity," as defined in Section 1(o) of the Act, means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION**14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes No

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.⁶

Date	From Whom	Purpose	Amount
04/2014	MACP	Retainer	\$40,000
05/2014	MACP	Retainer	\$20,000
06/2014	MACP	Retainer	\$20,000
07/2014	MACP	Retainer	\$20,000
08/2014	MACP	Retainer	\$20,000
			\$120,000
			<u>Total</u>

(b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign⁷, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes No

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D⁸ to your registration? Yes No

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date _____

(c) RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value⁹ other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Foreign Principal	Date Received	Thing of Value	Purpose
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^{6, 7} A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, moneys, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fundraising campaign. (See Rule 201(e)).

⁸ An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fundraising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

⁹ Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

15. (a) DISBURSEMENTS-MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you

- (1) disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes No
- (2) transmitted monies to any such foreign principal? Yes No

If no, explain in full detail why there were no disbursements made on behalf of any foreign principal.
Employees salaries not based solely on work with foreign principal.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

Date	To Whom	Purpose	Amount
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Total

(b) DISBURSEMENTS-THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value¹⁰ other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Recipient	Foreign Principal	Thing of Value	Purpose
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(c) DISBURSEMENTS-POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value¹¹ in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Amount or Thing of Value	Political Organization or Candidate	Location of Event
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^{10, 11} Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

V - INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS

16. (a) During this 6 month reporting period, did you prepare, disseminate or cause to be disseminated any informational materials?¹²

Yes No

If Yes, go to Item 17.

(b) If you answered No to Item 16(a), do you disseminate any material in connection with your registration?

Yes No

If Yes, please forward the materials disseminated during the six month period to the Registration Unit for review.

17. Identify each such foreign principal.

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18. During this 6 month reporting period, has any foreign principal established a budget or allocated a specified sum of money to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials? Yes No

If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount, and indicate for what period of time.

19. During this 6 month reporting period, did your activities in preparing, disseminating or causing the dissemination of informational materials include the use of any of the following:

- Radio or TV broadcasts Magazine or newspaper Motion picture films Letters or telegrams
 Advertising campaigns Press releases Pamphlets or other publications Lectures or speeches
 Other (*specify*) _____

Electronic Communications

Email

Website URL(s): _____

Social media websites URL(s): _____

Other (*specify*) _____

20. During this 6 month reporting period, did you disseminate or cause to be disseminated informational materials among any of the following groups:

- Public officials Newspapers Libraries
 Legislators Editors Educational institutions
 Government agencies Civic groups or associations Nationality groups
 Other (*specify*) _____

21. What language was used in the informational materials:

- English Other (*specify*) _____

22. Did you file with the Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice a copy of each item of such informational materials disseminated or caused to be disseminated during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

23. Did you label each item of such informational materials with the statement required by Section 4(b) of the Act?

Yes No

12 The term informational materials includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including that published by means of advertising, books, periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise. Informational materials disseminated by an agent of a foreign principal as part of an activity in itself exempt from registration, or an activity which by itself would not require registration, need not be filed pursuant to Section 4(b) of the Act.


VI - EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, the undersigned swear(s) or affirm(s) under penalty of perjury that he/she has (they have) read the information set forth in this registration statement and the attached exhibits and that he/she is (they are) familiar with the contents thereof and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her (their) knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned make(s) no representation as to truth or accuracy of the information contained in the attached Short Form Registration Statement(s), if any, insofar as such information is not within his/her (their) personal knowledge.

(Date of signature)

(Print or type name under each signature or provide electronic signature¹³)

09/14/15



Four horizontal lines for date entry.

Four horizontal lines for signature entry.

13 This statement shall be signed by the individual named in the registration if the registrant is an individual or by a majority of those persons, officers, directors or persons performing similar functions, if the registrant is an organization, except that the organization can, by power of attorney, authorize one or more individuals to execute this statement on its behalf.

Date	VA Name	Name of principal or staff contacted	Form of contact (phone, email, meeting)	Handouts/Attachments
03/10/14	Roger Noriega	Ansley Rhyne	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/11/14	Roger Noriega	Staffer Susan Adams	Email about latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	
03/12/14	Roger Noriega	Vernon Robinson	Phone call about latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/18/14	Roger Noriega	Robert Boland	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/18/14	Roger Noriega	Dylan Frost	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/18/14	Roger Noriega	Meredith Gourash	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/19/14	Roger Noriega	Mac McKinney	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/19/14	Roger Noriega	Eric Landis	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/19/14	Roger Noriega	Joe Eannello	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/19/14	Roger Noriega	Raeed Hadaad	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/19/14	Roger Noriega	Adam Harbison	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/20/14	Roger Noriega	Katie Doherty	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/20/14	Roger Noriega	Anna Fronzaglia	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/20/14	Roger Noriega	Frank Santana	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/20/14	Roger Noriega	Miguel Franco	Meeting aboutl latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	Potomac Institute's Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2013: Global Reach & Implications
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Paul Berkowitz	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco	
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Andy Taylor	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco	
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Lorissa Bounds	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco	
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Patrick Newton	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco	

Registrant Vision Americas (5907) on behalf of Foreign Principal Moroccan American Center for Policy

03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Michael Essington	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Elaine Wilson	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Tim Itnyre	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Kris Denzel	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Chara McMichael	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	George O'Connor	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Art Harman	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Vernon Robinson	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Molly Newell	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/25/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	James Walsh	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/26/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega/Cardenas	Sarah Majzoub	Email regarding meeting request for a Special visitor from Morocco
03/28/14	Jose Cardenas	Chara McMichael	Follow up email thanking staffer for time meeting with visitor from Morocco
03/28/14	Jose Cardenas	Ansley Rhyne	Follow up email thanking staffer for time meeting with visitor from Morocco
03/28/14	Jose Cardenas	Andy Taylor	Follow up email thanking staffer for time meeting with visitor from Morocco
03/28/14	Jose Cardenas	Elaine Wilson	Follow up email thanking staffer for time meeting with visitor from Morocco
03/28/14	Jose Cardenas	George Oconnor	Follow up email thanking staffer for time meeting with visitor from Morocco
03/28/14	Jose Cardenas	Molly Newell	Follow up email thanking staffer for time meeting with visitor from Morocco
03/28/14	Jose Cardenas	Lorissa Bounds	Follow up email thanking staffer for time meeting with visitor from Morocco
04/02/14	Roger Noriega	Susan Adams	Email to arrange meeting with senior visitor from Morocco, Nizar Baraka, to discuss possible U.S. aid in Western Sahara
04/10/14	Roger Noriega	Various Majority/Minority staffers House Appropriations Committee, Meeting at HT-2 at 3:00 PM	Meeting with senior visitor from Morocco, Nizar Baraka, to discuss possible U.S. aid in Western Sahara

Registrant Vision Americas (5907) on behalf of Foreign Principal Moroccan American Center for Policy

04/14/14	Roger Noriega	Anne Patterson	Email regarding language in appropriations bill	
04/14/14	Roger Noriega	Susan Adams	Email follow-up from Meeting with Nizar Baraka regarding possible U.S. aid in Western Sahara	
04/14/14	Roger Noriega	Steve Marchese	Email follow-up from Meeting with Nizar Baraka regarding possible U.S. aid in Western Sahara	
04/14/14	Roger Noriega	Susan Adams	Email regarding Title III and Morocco	
05/22/14	Roger Noriega	Susan Adams	Follow up email regarding a question, clarification on EU Money	Forwarded article, "MEPs approve renewed EU-Morocco Fisheries agreement" http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/content/20131206IPR30021/html/MEPs-approve-renewed-EU-Morocco-Fisheries-agreement
06/03/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega	John Dutton	Email to set up a meeting regarding U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Relations	
06/03/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega	Dan Sadlosky	Email to set up a meeting regarding U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Relations	
06/03/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega	Meyer Seligman	Email to set up a meeting regarding U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Relations	
06/05/14	Roger Noriega	John Dutton	Meeting about the latest developments regarding U.S.- Morocco Bilateral Relations	
06/10/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega	Gordon Larsen	Email to set up a meeting regarding U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Relations	
06/10/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega	Adrielle Churchill	Email to set up a meeting regarding U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Relations	
06/10/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega	Meg Gazzini	Email to set up a meeting regarding U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Relations	
06/10/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega	Nathaniel Johnson	Email to set up a meeting regarding U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Relations	
06/10/14	Alana McWilliams on behalf of Noriega	Terassa Wren	Email to set up a meeting regarding U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Relations	
06/23/14	Roger Noriega	Susan Adams	Email regarding FY15 State Foreign Operations bill and U.S. aid in Western Sahara	
07/16/14	Roger Noriega, Jose Cardenas	Gretchan Blum	Meeting regarding latest developments in U.S. - Morocco Relations and language related to Morocco in ForeignOps bill	
07/25/14	Roger Noriega	Gretchan Blum	Follow up email thanking staffer for meeting with regarding Morocco. Attachments	Morocco MACP_WSaharaTimeline, Morocco MACP FS_USPolicy, Morocco MACP FactSheet

Registrant Vision Americas (5907) on behalf of Foreign Principal Moroccan American Center for Policy

Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications

Yonah Alexander



INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER
FOR
TERRORISM
STUDIES

FEBRUARY 2013



Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications

Yonah Alexander

*Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, and
Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies*

February 2013

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
INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES
Potomac Institute For Policy Studies
901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington, VA 22203
E-mail: ICTS@potomac institute.org Tel. 703-525-0770
yalexander@potomac institute.org www.potomac institute.org

Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications

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NEW TERRORISM HOT SPOT: N. MALI & AFRICA'S SAHEL



Active Al-Qaida affiliate, ally, and/or among Top 40 Failed-Fragile States	
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Sahel - Agence France Presse & Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative	

ICTS – International Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies – January 2013

SOURCES:

- 1) "Country Reports on Terrorism 2009," US State Department, August 2010; and "Country Reports on Terrorism 2010," US State Department, August 2011
- 2) "Failed States Index 2010," Foreign Policy and The Fund for Peace, June 2010;
- 3) "Al-Qaida casts Shadow over Sahel region" (map), Agence France Press (AFP), Oct. 27, 2010; and "Al-Qaida activity in West African desert" (map), AFP, June 26, 2011;
- 4) "Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI)/Pan Sahel Initiative, Intrinsic Forces" (map), Global Security.org, May 7, 2011;
- 5) "Maghreb & Sahel Terrorism: Rising Threat from Al-Qaida, other Terrorists in North, West/Central Africa," International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS), Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, January 2010;
- 6) 2011 ICTS Report Update: "The Consequences of Terrorism—An Update on Al-Qaida and other Terrorist Threats in The Sahel & Maghreb," ICTS, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, January 2011;
- 7) "Decades Later, Refugees Return to a Land Still Divided," Washington Post, Dec. 5, 2010; "Parties to W. Sahara conflict end UN-convened informal talks in New York," UN News Centre, Dec. 19, 2010;
- 8) "Desert Land in Limbo is Torn Apart," The New York Times, Dec. 9, 2010; and "Rifts curb North Africa's war on Al-Qaida," UPI, Nov. 17, 2010;
- 9) "Key Members of Sahara drug ring captured are from Polisario," Middle East Online, Dec. 21, 2010; "Morocco says Dismantled International Drug Ring Trafficking linked to Terrorists," VOA, Oct. 18, 2010;
- 10) "N. Africa's Sahel: Next Terrorism Hot Spot?," TIME, Sep. 12, 2011; "Mali forces hunt desert drug traffickers," AFP, Sep. 14, 2011; "Post-Qaddafi W./C. Africa a powder keg," CBS News/GlobalPost, Sep. 12, 2011.
- 11) "Al-Qaida & the African Arc of Instability," December 2012; "Security Challenges in Libya & the Sahel," CNA Strategic Studies, December 2012.


PREFACE

Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications

By Yonah Alexander

One cannot fully understand the impact of rising terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel without looking back to warning signs from previous years that exploded with deadly results in January 2013 in Mali and Algeria. Among those December anniversary dates related to North, West, and Central Africa that offer historical lessons on the regional and global strategic implications are the following:

On December 21, 1988, the mid-air explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, perpetrated by a Libyan state-sponsored operation, resulted in the death of 270 passengers, mostly Americans. Although Muammar Gaddafi's 42 years of dictatorship were replaced by a new Tripoli regime in 2011, Libyan terrorism is alive and well. This brutal reality was graphically illustrated by the killing of four US government personnel, including Ambassador John Christopher Stevens, in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. In fact, several days after this attack, a Libyan preacher during a Friday sermon called on the faithful to “detonate our wrath upon them” and “stab them in their main artery”.¹



¹ Libya Al-Hurra TV, September 14, 2012

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Subsequently in September, other violent assaults on American embassies in Cairo, Tunis, Sana'a, and Khartoum, as well as mob protests directed at other US diplomatic missions, occurred.

The second December anniversary date is the foiled 2009 Christmas Day bombing of Northwest Flight 253, carrying 278 civilians and crew from Amsterdam to Detroit. The arrested perpetrator Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (a Nigerian terrorist trained by the Al-Qaida branch in Yemen) failed to fully ignite an explosive device strapped to his body and blow-up the American aircraft as it prepared to land. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which traces its origin to the merger in 2009 of Saudi and Yemeni Al-Qaida core associates, followed up this failure with another when bombs embedded in printer cartridges were intercepted in October 2010.

In January 2013 — Al-Qaida-linked extremists and their associates in northern Mali tried to seize the country's capital, Bamako, spurring a timely French military intervention that gained international support, and in turn sparked a deadly response and hostage showdown at an Algerian natural gas facility in the Sahara that took the lives of 37 foreigners, including four Americans. In just a matter of weeks, the terrorism threat level that had been rising in North Africa and the Sahel since September 11, 2001 soared, and what many considered only a regional problem, metastasized into a crisis of global implications.

These real and potential tragedies take on even greater concern when seen against the backdrop of the global terrorism threat of Al-Qaida and its local affiliates and associates in Africa and other regions. Three major terrorist groups are particularly significant: Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram. Alarmingly, AQIM published a communiqué on September 18, 2012, in which it urged Muslims in North Africa to emulate the Benghazi assault and to attack US diplomatic targets in their countries.

There is a growing security concern that these regional movements have expanded their reach and recruiting to other militants and groups across the Maghreb, Sahel, and elsewhere, including southern Algeria, northeastern Mali, Niger, northern Nigeria, and Somalia.

In December 2012, the respected CNA Strategic Studies reported that “There is evidence that AQIM has infiltrated the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, as well as indications that Sahrawi from the camps have joined terrorist groups based in Mali.”

In northern Mali, Al-Qaida along with Ansar Dine, AQIM, and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) seized control of “an enormous territory larger than France or Texas — almost exactly the size of Afghanistan” — and worked for much of the year to consolidate a virtual terrorist enclave, attracting new jihadist recruits from Sudan and other countries across the region, including the Polisario-run Tindouf camps in Algeria, and from Western countries.

They applied strict Sharia law to three population centers — Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal — which was only curtailed in late January of 2013 by the French military intervention that liberated the three cities. But the Al-Qaida-linked militants simply retreated without much of a fight to desert and mountain hideouts from where they still infiltrate much of northern Mali and terrorist-trafficking network connections that reach across the Sahel.

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More specifically, the threats of Al-Qaida's new regional hub in northern Mali and from its associates constitute both tactical and strategic challenges. For instance, primary sources of financing of their activities include kidnappings (in some cases kidnapping is outsourced to criminals); piracy; and illicit trafficking of drugs, humans, vehicles, and other contraband goods (at times originating from Latin America onward to Africa and Europe). Intelligence reports and arrests have confirmed that AQIM has established links with Latin cartels for 'drugs-for-arms' smuggling into Europe through terrorist-trafficking networks in the Sahel that include members of the Polisario Front.

Also, the increased flow of economic migrants, combatants, and weapons through the vast unguarded porous and national borders in the region emboldens the various terrorist movements to increase their new attacks and carry out their criminal actions with impunity.

Clearly, these terrorist threats have contributed to the uncertainties of the unprecedented Arab uprisings, known as the Arab Spring, which marked its second anniversary in December. This revolutionary process began in Tunisia, continued in Egypt, exploded in Libya, and then spread to other countries, including Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere. The key question then is to what extent are Al-Qaida and other Salafi jihadist groups in the Maghreb, Sahel, and neighboring African countries already attempting to take advantage of recent events by destabilizing the region even further. Indeed, in the closing days of 2012, the Al-Malahem Foundation, media outlet of AQAP, offered \$160,000 for murdering the US Ambassador in Sana'a and \$23,000 for killing any American soldiers in Yemen.²

For experts and observers around the world, it is clear that an "Arc of Instability" is emerging across Africa's Sahel which has opened a path for Al-Qaida to shift its center of gravity from Afghanistan and Pakistan to a new sanctuary and has created a potential launching pad much closer to US and European shores.

Thus, this 2013 report on terrorism updates five earlier studies. The first publication, "Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, and Options for Effective Engagement in North Africa" (March 2009) was co-sponsored by the Conflict Management Program of Johns Hopkins University with the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. This report was supported by a bipartisan panel of foreign policy experts, including former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, General (ret.) Wesley Clark, Amb. (ret.) Stuart Eizenstat, Professor I. William Zartman, and other distinguished former government officials and academics.

The panel's report recommended that the new US administration "look around the corner," as President Barack Obama has advocated, and engage the region more effectively to prevent the brewing security crisis from erupting globally. Additionally, the report outlined options for the United States to promote peace and prosperity, and to prevent a growing peril in North Africa. Perhaps if there had been a greater collective effort to perceive likely targets of jihadist opportunity, then the situation in Mali might have been mitigated early on. The nations of the Maghreb have long been at the crossroads of history and currently hold great potential as a bridge between the Islamic world and the West.

² "Al-Qaida's branch in Yemen offers bounty for killing US Ambassador, troops," *Washington Post*, December 30, 2012

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Moreover, the region could benefit greatly from increased regional economic integration that would make it an appealing market for Europe and the United States.

It also faces serious challenges: a firm toehold by Al-Qaida in the Sahara, inconsistent economic growth, a growing, restive young population, and regional disputes that impede economic and security cooperation, in particular the long-running dispute over the Western Sahara and the closed border between Morocco and Algeria.

Settling the Western Sahara dispute, it has been noted, will provide momentum for greater regional integration in North Africa, which would facilitate increased links between the Maghreb and the Sahel.

In fact, one could argue that had Mali followed Morocco's lead and offered an autonomy plan as a serious basis of negotiations with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLNA), the current crisis could have been avoided or at least reduced to a conflict over terms of settlement.

Two subsequent reports were published by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (administered by both the Potomac Institute and the International Law Institute). In January 2010, a study on "Maghreb and Sahel Terrorism: Addressing the Rising Threats from Al-Qaida and other Terrorists in North, West, and Central Africa" was published, followed a year later by a report on "The Consequences of Terrorism: Al-Qaida and other Terrorist Threats in the Sahel and Maghreb." These works presented overviews of terrorism during these years and dealt with the broad security challenges in their region and their strategic implications.

In light of the expanding violence triggered by the Arab Spring in the greater Middle East region, two additional reports were published. In January 2012, a study on "Terrorism in North, West, and Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring" focused on the events in 2011 and provided an analysis of the security status in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Chad; and in March 2012, a more comprehensive report on the "Arab Spring: A Year Later and Beyond" updated developments not only in the traditional Maghreb and Sahel, but also in fifteen additional countries ranging from Bahrain to Yemen.

In sum, the purpose of the "Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications" is to focus on the security environment during the year, particularly in North, West, and Central Africa, with the hope that further research in this critical strategic region will be undertaken.

As in the past, a rigorous methodology regarding the collection of "terrorist incidents" has been used and is detailed in the beginning of the chronology.

Selected Recommendations

Since this report focuses on the national, regional, and global implications of the threats emanating from North, West, and Central Africa, these recommendations cover the same concerns and are intended for US policy makers as well as the international community. Bilateral programs may be helpful but are insufficient to meet the challenges in the region.

As noted, Mali presents the most immediate threat, particularly given the military efforts by France and others to block the infiltration by jihadists into the southern half of the country. This raises the threshold for violent recriminations by jihadists throughout the region and Europe. As the controversy at the United Nations over what can/will be done and who will participate illustrates, there are no “silver bullets.” Suffice it to say, these recommendations cover security, economic development, and political steps that need to be taken to bring greater stability to the region by reducing the presence and impact of terrorist and criminal groups and organizations. It is not fully inclusive but hopefully provides a useful framework for continued discussion and action.

1. Regarding Mali, the consensus that is emerging, given Algeria’s limited appetite for military intervention in support of French and possibly UN efforts , includes:
 - a. Organizing international support for a responsible and respected government in Bamako and developing its military, security, and administrative capacities.
 - b. Promoting negotiations with non-jihadist forces, particularly the Tuareg leadership (despite the unclear results of Algeria’s 2012 initiative in this regard), to achieve an agreement on autonomy for the region and its actual implementation.
 - c. Building a capable regional military force to sustain the current military action and to ensure the stability and reintegration of northern Mali.
 - d. Providing levels of international assistance over the longer term required to support reconciliation and reunification.
2. Invest in security by accelerating national and regional economic development through:
 - a. Reducing barriers and providing incentives to foreign and domestic private investment.
 - b. Undertaking structural reforms that promote economic growth, including: an independent judiciary, neutral regulatory regimes, transparency and fairness in the implementation of business regulations, reducing the role of government entities in the private sector, a minimum and equitable social safety net, educational reform linked to market needs, effective integration of women into the workforce, and decreased reliance on foreign assistance as a growth engine.
 - c. Promoting regional trade and investment by expanding the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement provisions to broadly include products from North, West, and Central Africa.
 - d. Streamlining and coordinating foreign assistance programs in the region by better integrating support from donor countries.
 - e. Supporting the principles of the Deauville Partnership that link economic, social, and political development.
 - f. Eliminating politically motivated trade barriers and other artificial restrictions on the movement of goods and services among the target countries.

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- g. Investing in national and regional workforce development programs that balance skills and leadership training objectives to encourage long-term capacity-building in labor markets within and across borders.
 - h. Expanding US foreign assistance programs through USAID and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and enabling projects such as Partners for a New Beginning (PNB) and the North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity (NAPEO) to build platforms for developing young leaders in the public and private sectors.
3. Strengthen US intelligence assets in the region by broadening cooperation through AFRICOM and inter-agency linkages with all countries in the region to more effectively utilize equipment, training, and monitoring resources.
- a. Continue to expand US counterterrorism technical assistance to internal security forces and police agencies.
 - b. Seek to more effectively coordinate security initiatives through greater intelligence sharing, particularly to interdict terrorist and criminal networks and supply lines.
 - c. Work to resolve the Western Sahara crisis and other regional political disputes that inhibit both security and economic cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel.
 - d. Reduce the flow of recruits to criminal and terrorist groups, and take a closer look at the refugee camps run by the Polisario near Tindouf, Algeria with the purpose of developing long term solutions that would reduce the attraction of criminal and terrorist recruiting. Cooperate with regional and international agencies to eliminate humanitarian crises, particularly those that affect refugees in the Polisario camps and the border areas of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and the neighboring states.

As these recommendations highlight, a consistent and well-defined US security posture in the region is essential for developing effective security coordination among our friends there and elsewhere. Unfortunately, the core recommendations are the same as those in the 2011 report: “constructive and sustained engagement is vital, employing both ‘hard’ (security, military, intelligence cooperation) and ‘soft’ elements (economic and social development creating employment opportunities, education that equips students/trainees for jobs, and reduction of religious radicalism). Otherwise, the US, the EU, and our friends in the region will remain hostages to, and targets of the ideological, theological, and political terrorists for the remainder of the 21st century.” Lessons learned in hindsight can be very costly, and the Mali conflict may portend even more severe security disruptions in the region and beyond.

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Regional & National Assessments

The Maghreb—**Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia**—as well as adjacent parts of the Sahel—**Chad, Mali, and Niger**—and for the past several years also **Nigeria**, have emerged as some of the most worrying strategic challenges to the international community.

Consider, for instance, the data generated since September 11, 2001. The attacks in the region perpetrated by AQIM, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and other extremist groups such as Ansar Al-Sharia, MUJAO, and Polisario militants increased by more than 500 percent, reaching a high point in 2009 and remaining at dangerous levels despite modest declines in two of the last three years.

However, this escalating security challenge should be measured not only on the basis of the numbers of attacks, but must also be assessed by the grave tactical and strategic impact on the concerned countries, across a broad geopolitical “Arc of Instability” covering, to a larger or smaller extent, states in North, Central, and West Africa and beyond.

Undoubtedly the emerging vulnerable “underbelly” of the vast territories ultimately threatens the security interests of the greater Middle East as well as the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. More specifically, this evolving and worrisome strategic map is nourished by Al-Qaida’s radical theology of jihad seeking local, regional, and global objectives and sustained by loose and at times more structured networks, based on organizational and operational collaboration.

The latest sober minded reminder of this “Grand Design” was communicated by a spokesman of an Australian branch of the extremist movement Hizb-ut-Tahrir, in a comment posted on the Internet on December 24, 2012: “... the duty of the caliphate- [is] to implement Islam internally and carry the light of Islam to the rest of the world. How? Not with flowers. It was the army of the Muslims, which started from Al-Madina, and they went to China, India, and Al-Maghreb. That is Jihad.”

The most significant strategic phase in advancing the foregoing vision in 2012 is the disturbing and evolving reality that AQIM and its affiliates have already carved out in northern Mali a new brand of “Afghanistan in the Sahara” by providing a safe-haven and establishing a breeding ground for jihadists in Africa, intensifying operations from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Thus, the terrorist challenge assumes even greater regional and inter-regional implications.

The following overview presents brief assessments of Mali, Algeria, and Nigeria (countries constituting major strategic concerns), followed by other regional states: Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Chad, and Niger.

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Mali



In the exposed Sahel, a new failed state the size of Texas, with ominous strategic implications, has emerged in Mali.

The current strategic threat was created initially in early 2012 when the secular Tuareg rebels, who fought alongside Gaddafi in Libya, returned home and joined indigenous forces to establish the MNLA. Exploiting a March political coup in the capital of Bamako and capturing important towns in the north, including the historic city of Timbuktu, the Tuareg fighters, together with Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Ansar Dine, declared their independent Azawan State. This development sparked security concerns and outrage from neighboring countries, particularly Algeria and Niger, and international bodies including the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the United Nations.

Two specific threats are particularly significant. First, there is a potential for the rebellion to spill over and galvanize Tuareg populations in neighboring countries to mount their own insurgency campaigns. Second, it is likely that terrorist groups inspired by Al-Qaida's vision and supported by regional affiliates will expand their operations across Africa and beyond. These dangers have become even more alarming in view of the fact that by summer 2012, northern Mali had fallen under the control of various Salafi jihadist organizations including AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida's El Moulethemine Brigade, and most recently the Libyan extremists of Ansar al-Sharia. It has been reported that AQIM has provided training, financial assistance, and weapons to its affiliates and has attracted an influx of recruits from the region as well as from Western countries.

In the short term, terrorism "from above," that is, harshly applying Sharia law in the jihadist-controlled north, was expanding prior to the French intervention. Civilians have been publicly punished for their "crimes," such as smoking or playing music. Also, thieves' hands and feet have been amputated and extrajudicial executions have been undertaken. By early 2013, seven of Timbuktu's 16 ancient cultural mausoleums had been smashed and destroyed, following the Taliban tradition in Afghanistan.

The full extent of violence and acts of terrorism being committed against the people of northern Mali is difficult to ascertain, as accurate reporting from inside the country since last spring has been an extremely hazardous undertaking. This may account for the relatively small increase in reliably reported terrorist incidents in Mali in 2012. It may also represent a temporary lull before the storm, as Al-Qaida-linked extremists focus on consolidating their position in northern Mali before exporting violence to neighboring countries or, as we have seen, attempted to take over all of Mali.

Certainly, the political, social, and economic dislocations in Mali have already resulted in a serious humanitarian crisis, including some 200,000 displaced people and 150,000 refugees, most of whom have moved to Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and other African countries.

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In the face of these “wake-up calls,” the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in collaboration with the United States, Europe, the African Union, and other like-minded parties, unanimously approved on December 20, 2012 a resolution aiming to restore Mali’s territorial integrity by confronting terrorism and disrupting criminal networks in the region. The resolution authorized the creation of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), consisting of a 3,300-strong force, to be deployed by fall 2013. In light of this global strategy, AQIM has already accused France, a key mission partner, of endangering the lives of six of its citizens who were kidnapped separately in Niger (2010) and in Mali (2011), rather than negotiating for their release. Additionally, MUJAO abducted a seventh French national in Mali; and in Nigeria, the terrorist offshoot Ansaru kidnapped an eighth Frenchman.

As this report goes to press, the security situation in Mali is deteriorating even further. In January 2013 Islamic forces advanced southward from their northern base and captured the key strategic city of Konna, dealing a major setback to the central government. Mali’s interim president, Dioncounda Traore therefore declared a state of emergency and appealed to France for military support. An Ansar Dine spokesman immediately condemned the request and declared: “... while Dioncounda asked for help from France, we ask for guidance from Allah and from other Muslims in our sub-region because this war has become a war against the crusader,” according to a UPI report (January 11, 2013).

In light of this development, President François Hollande of France gravely warned that the “[terrorists] are seeking to deal a fatal blow to the very existence of Mali. France, as is the case with the African partners and all the international community cannot accept this.” As the former colonial power in Mali, and concerned over the safety of some 6,000 of its citizens in the country, France immediately intervened militarily, which included launching airstrikes against the jihadist forces occupying the north. The UN, the US, UK, Nigeria, and Senegal, among others, have also pledged their support, and some 400 European officers have arrived in the country to train the Malian army for a fall redeployment in the north. It should also be mentioned that ECOWAS authorized deployment of a force to defend the “territorial integrity” of Mali; additionally, a group within the MNLA, the secular Tuareg separatist group, offered to fight the Islamist rebels alongside the French and Malian forces. This offer was apparently motivated, at least partially by a fear of reprisals against Tuaregs for their role in the 2012 uprising.

In the interim, two major developments have unfolded on the ground. First, associates of AQIM launched the bloody attack on the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria, reportedly in retaliation for Algeria allowing France to use its airspace for airstrikes in Mali. Second, French and Malian forces recaptured Diabaly (some 250 miles from Bamako), Gao (Northern Mali’s most populous city), and more significantly Timbuktu, the UNESCO world heritage site (where the Islamists forces destroyed several hundred ancient manuscripts before fleeing the city). French troops also took control of Kidal, the Islamists’ last urban stronghold in the North. As local Malians observed, however, extremist militants avoided a fight with the French and remain very much a presence in nearby villages, and in their desert and mountain hideouts.

By the end of January 2013, an international donor conference on Mali pledged over \$450 million to help cover expenses of the Africa-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and to begin development projects in the country. Interim President Traore ruled out any negotiations with the Islamists, although he did indicate a willingness to hold talks with secular Tuareg rebels, and several Jihadists online messages warned France: “those capable of targeting the US, UK, and Spain can also target Paris (the Muslim Ummah has a thousand Merahs).”

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Algeria

During 2012, AQIM, which had its roots in the country's civil war in the 1990s and formally linked-up with Al-Qaida central in 2006, perpetrated some 125 attacks in Algeria directed against officials, police, the military, civilians, and foreigners, thus undermining the country's political, social, and economic stability. For example, the governor of the Illizi region was kidnapped and brought to a hideout on the Algerian border with Libya. Similarly, three Spanish aid workers from a Polisario-run refugee camp in Algeria were abducted, reportedly with inside assistance from sympathizers in the camp. Organized criminals and regional terrorists have also been engaged in arms smuggling along Algeria's borders with Tunisia and Mali. And in northwestern Mali, MUJAO operatives attacked the Algerian consulate and kidnapped the consul and six staff members.

Concerned with perpetual threats at home and potential confrontations with terrorists in Mali armed with Libyan smuggled weapons including surface-to-air missiles, Algeria is currently preparing for "guerrilla warfare" scenarios and is deploying troops along its vulnerable borders in the region. As recently as December 2012, Algeria formally agreed with Libya and Tunisia to implement much stricter common border controls. Two security concerns are noteworthy. First, Algeria arrested numerous terrorists last year on its southern border with Mali and Libya. Algeria asserted that as a consequence of the military operations undertaken in northern Mali, many militants and AQIM elements have escaped into their country and escalated violence locally. The other security concern is related to the efforts of the MUJAO to recruit unemployed youth from southern Algerian provinces in exchange for financial support for their poor families. Of particular concern are the Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf in southwestern Algeria, which are rapidly becoming fertile recruiting grounds for terrorists and traffickers in the region.

The most dramatic terrorist attack in Algeria in recent years began on January 16, 2013, at the gas field of Tengtourine in In Amenas, a region close to the Libyan border, located some 1,300 km from Algiers. The Islamic Katiba (militia), the "Al-Mouthalimin," led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who split from AQIM in 2012 and consisting of some 32 assailants of different nationalities (e.g. Algerian, Tunisian, Malian, Nigerian, Egyptian, and Canadian), took over areas of the large facility operated by companies from Algeria, France, Japan, Norway, and the U.K. The terrorists, who reportedly trained for two months in Mali and were heavily armed, held some 700 Algerians and 134 foreign nationals hostage. The attackers demanded, *inter alia*, the withdrawal of French forces from Mali and offered to free US captives in exchange for the release of the Egyptian leader Omar Abdel-Rahman and Iraq's top scientist Aafia Siddiqui.

Algeria ruled out negotiating with the terrorists and launched a military rescue mission on the day following the start of the siege. After some 50 hours of fierce fighting, Algeria announced that 685 Algerians and 101 foreigners had been freed by the operation but the death toll was costly – 11 Algerians and 37 foreign nationals (including three Americans, three Britons, and ten Japanese). Clearly, the strategic and tactical implications of the extraordinary international hostage crisis will be fully assessed by all concerned countries against the background of the unfolding security concerns in the region and beyond.

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Nigeria



Nigeria is a critical geopolitical state in Africa and the continent's most populous nation. In 2012 it became even more significant because of the rapid developments in the Mahgreb, Sahel, and elsewhere in connection with the Arab Spring, which impacted and escalated challenges from terrorists, criminals, and extremists.

As context, it must be recalled that years of instability in Nigeria have been characterized by a weak central government, severe poverty, internal conflicts surrounding shared oil revenues, and pervasive corruption. Religious intolerance and occasional violence between the twelve northern provinces, which are governed by some sort of Sharia Law and also the southern areas, mostly Christian and ruled by civil law, are also major contributing factors to political, social, and economic instability. In fact, it is estimated that over 10,000 people have died in factional clashes since democracy was re-established in Nigeria in 1999.

As it was indicated earlier in this report, the major active terrorist group in Nigeria with regional links is Boko Haram (meaning "Western Education is sacrilege" in the Hausa language). The movement seeks *inter alia* to impose strict Islamic law throughout the country. Traditionally, Boko Haram has targeted police stations, army bases, government installations, airports, financial and commercial bodies, and religious and educational institutions. The group came increasingly to international attention after it mounted a suicide attack on August 23, 2011 on the UN headquarters in the capital, Abuja, killing 23 and wounding more than 80 others.

Last year, this modus operandi was reported more frequently. For instance, on January 24, 2012, Boko Haram attacked eight security-related sites in Kano, the largest city in Nigeria's Muslim North, killing over 185 people. Elsewhere in the country, the group stormed a prison and freed 200 inmates, many of whom were former militants; others kidnapped the mother of the Nigerian finance minister and several foreign workers, including French and South Korean nationals, in addition to killing Christian worshippers at Christmas Day church services.

These and numerous other acts of violence within the country prompted Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan to gravely warn that Boko Haram sympathizers had penetrated the government's executive arm, parliament, and judiciary. Reports in 2012 also indicate that Boko Haram fighters have been involved in the Mali uprising and are also cooperating with AQIM and Al-Shaabab. Moreover, its members have received terrorist training abroad. This trend of moving from local issues into a wider network of violence both regionally, and ultimately even inter-regionally, fits the model of the internationalization of terrorist movements elsewhere, such as Al-Qaida in Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and other indigenous Asian groups, including the Taliban.

It is against this troubling backdrop that the United States added Boko Haram to its terrorist list in an effort to target the organization's upper command and its resources. And as recently as January 2013, France warned its nationals to leave Northern Nigeria due to threats from Al-Qaida associates over its intervention in Mali.

Tunisia



Two years after the “Jasmine Revolution” overthrew the autocratic regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and went on to inspire other countries to rise up in the Arab Spring, Tunisia is still vulnerable to both domestic and foreign terrorist threats.

Although the security situation in the country has been marked by the absence of the large-scale violence seen in Libya and Syria, the widespread dissatisfaction with social and economic opportunities is potentially explosive. For example, on July 26, 2012, protestors attacked provincial government headquarters in Sidi Bouzid, causing police to fire warning shots and tear gas at the crowd.

Moreover, since Tunisia shares an extensive border with Libya, it has been reported that some of the Libyan arms and militants who fought against Gaddafi’s regime have been imported to Tunisia to prepare for the next battle. The propaganda effort is already taking place.

Thus, since Tunisian Salafis declared via the internet on May 20, “Obama, we are all Osama,” it is not surprising that some members of the Uqba Ibn Nafi battalion, linked with AQIM, have already been arrested by security forces. The aim of this cross-national infrastructure is to recruit young Tunisians, indoctrinate them under the banner of jihad, and then send them to camps in Libya and Algeria for further military training in preparation for carrying out attacks in both Algeria and Tunisia.

Additionally, it is of particular concern that some Tunisian nationals are increasingly joining jihadist battles abroad. The latest example is a report posted on a militant Facebook page on October 1, 2012, stating that Abu Qasura al Tunisi, a Tunisian fighter who fought with Jabhat al-Nursa, had been killed in Syria’s civil war.

Finally, in the wake of the unfolding events in Mali and the Algerian hostage crisis, Tunisia and its neighbors agreed in January 2013 to new border patrol measures as part of a larger effort to stop arms smuggling and expanded activities by organized crime and terrorists. Moreover, Tunisia and Portugal signed an agreement to update their military cooperation.

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Libya



In 2012, the new Libyan government began to consolidate power and introduced democratic reforms to the constitution. The transition has been difficult, and several powerful militias have risen in the power vacuum to contest the government's influence.

There is also a serious security concern of retrieving sophisticated weapons, such as portable surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, which were looted from Gaddafi's armories during the rebellion. These weapons pose a potential threat to the Sahel. As weapons proliferate throughout the region, terrorist networks could use them in major attacks as they are reported to have been used already in Mali.

There were numerous demonstrations of lawlessness and violence in Libya in 2012. For instance, on May 9 armed men attacked the Tripoli headquarters of Libya's interim prime minister. Seven Iranian aid workers from the Red Crescent relief mission were abducted on August 1; and on the anniversary of 9/11, the American Ambassador and three State Department officials were brutally murdered by terrorists (Ahmed Boukhtala, the leading suspect in the Benghazi attack, still remains at large).

Internally, the country is afflicted by ideological religious, ethnic, and tribal fragmentation and violence. This makes Libya a fertile ground for AQIM and other extremists intent on continuing their recruitment and terrorist activities.

Externally, Libya is concerned by its vulnerable borders. Some of these areas were declared by the government "restricted military zones" and its forces carried out airstrikes against "suspected smugglers" near the borders with Chad and the Sudan.

By January 2013 two security issues were underscored. First, continued kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings in Libya marked the unstable atmosphere in the country's political and economic development. And secondly, faced with concerns over the Mali crisis and the Algeria hostage incident, Libya vowed cooperation against extremism and terrorism with other Maghreb states and also offered to assist France militarily if requested. Additionally, Libya engaged in talks with the United Kingdom regarding possible security coordination and training.



Morocco

Unlike the escalating turmoil and violence that adversely affected the region in 2012, Morocco was notably a more secure country last year. Several reasons account for this development.

First, King Mohammed VI, the country's hereditary monarch, is still seen as legitimate by the vast majority of the population.

Second, gradual political reform, greater economic and investment progress, increased employment opportunities, more social and civic equality for women, and some crackdowns on corruption have all contributed to improved internal stability.

And third, counterterrorism efforts at home and strategic cooperation and partnerships in the Maghreb, Sahel, and elsewhere have been strengthened.

Last December, for instance, an Al-Qaida cell that was allegedly recruiting young Moroccans to join the group in Algeria and other affiliates such as MUJAO in northern Mali was dismantled. In addition, members of Ansar al-Sharia, a new offshoot organization, were arrested on suspicion of plotting major attacks throughout Morocco.

Also, security services foiled a terrorist plan to establish a training camp in the Rif Mountains. In light of common threats to Morocco and Algeria, the two countries' intelligence services have held joint, regular meetings on counterterrorism issues.

In the face of the expanding terrorist threats in the Maghreb and Sahel, Morocco in January 2013 made a strategic decision to strengthen cooperation with fellow African nations as well as the West.

It signed security agreements with France, Spain, and Portugal allowing access to Moroccan bases during the Mali crisis.

Furthermore, Rabat also continued its national multi-faceted campaign against extremism.

Mauritania



In 2012, Mauritania faced a number of security threats from terrorist groups linked to AQIM, the Polisario, and Boko Haram, as well as former fighters from the Libyan Revolution. These challenges were compounded by internal tensions between the country's Arab and black populations, slavery and human trafficking, unemployment, and corruption.

Externally, the relationship between Mauritania and Senegal became strained over the use of water from the Senegal River, which serves as the border between the two countries, and thus is another source for conflict and violence.

Although the number of terrorist incidents, such as kidnapping, was lower in 2012 than in previous years, security issues were still on the government's agenda. For example, in July, Mauritania's cabinet considered monitoring the Internet to counter extremism.

Towards the year's end the government substantially increased its defense budget to enable its security forces to attack AQIM and other militant groups. Mauritania's president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz also called for the settlement of the Mali crisis in order to preserve its cultural heritage sites.

Also, it was reported by a Sharia media website on December 26, 2012 that Mauritanian authorities had arrested a British citizen en route to join terrorists in Timbuktu.

By January 2013, several security-related developments are noteworthy.

First, Tuareg MNLA separatists surrendered their arms in order to join other Malian refugees in Mauritania.

Second, threatened by rising AQIM threats, Mauritania and Senegal launched a joint campaign, based on both national security and educational considerations, aimed at combating terrorism along their shared border.

And third, Mauritania's President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz asserted at the Arab Economic Summit in Riyadh on January 25, 2013 the importance of international cooperation to fight organized crime and terrorism.

Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications

Chad



Inspired by the Arab Spring, Chad in 2012 has made some progress towards building democratic institutions when it held its first ever municipal elections. Yet the country continues to be confronted by several security challenges. Eight hundred Malian mercenaries reportedly fighting with the Gaddafi forces during the revolution were deported back to their homeland.

A flow of illegal weapons has reached Chad through its 1,000-kilometer common border with Libya, and bloody clashes in the city of Kufra, near the borders of Chad and the Sudan, were ignited by tribal rivalry. AQIM also has continued with its recruitment and training activities in the Tibesti Mountains.

Finally, since Chad was affected by increased confrontations with neighboring countries, the president of Chad called for the creation of a regional force to fight terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. Also, despite not being a member of ECOWAS, by January 2013, Chad contributed troops to be engaged in the Malian action.

Niger



Niger still has an active AQIM franchise within its borders that has successfully attacked foreigners in the past. Due to this threat, international development organizations, specifically the Peace Corps have withdrawn from the country. There also remains an element of Tuareg insurgency in northern Niger that is suspected of having ties to AQIM.

It has been estimated that 150,000 displaced persons have fled Libya to Niger, including many Tuareg militants who fought for Colonel Gaddafi's forces. Bilateral relations between Libya and Niger have suffered in the wake of the Libyan rebellion, as Niger has granted asylum to Saadi Gaddafi, one of Muammar Gaddafi's sons. In late 2012, the EU sent counterterrorism experts to Niger to provide the country with assistance against terrorists, particularly AQIM, in the Sahel region.

Lately, it has been reported in the wake of the Algerian hostage crisis in January 2013 that the terrorists involved in the attack traveled through Niger and bought weapons in Libya. In the face of the situation in Mali, Niger granted the United States permission to establish local bases in the country for surveillance drones.

Conclusion

The brief foregoing security assessment of North, West, and Central Africa in 2012 reveals once again that there are generic contributing factors that feed radicalization and violence.

These include poor education; ethnic, racial, tribal, and religious intolerance; lingering poverty, unemployment, and inadequate basic services; pervasive corruption; political fragmentation and weak law enforcement capacities; vulnerable borders; organized criminal activities linked with militants; and home-grown as well as foreign imported ideological extremism.

Clearly, the security challenges, such as threat perceptions of each country analyzed in this study, differ according to their unique historical and contemporary experience. However, there also exists a number of regional concerns as reflected in the unfolding Arab Spring and in the intensification of the “Arc of Instability” from Mali to Somalia.

Indeed, the dangerous unfolding of strategic developments in Mali have resulted in bringing together the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to pledge to form a pan-Africa force (called International Support Mission for Mali, AFISMA) with Western nations, led by France that already has engaged in military operations against AQIM and their affiliates in the occupied territory in the north.

The United States and Britain have provided some logistical support. Additionally, the United Nations has been working in concert with African countries to implement its December 20, 2012 Security Council Resolution to confront the escalating terrorism in the region.


Despite these international efforts, the terrorist offensives are continuing and their propaganda messages promise that the worst is yet to come. Most recently, a MUJAO leader issued an ominous warning that “France has opened the gates of hell. It has fallen into a trap much more dangerous than Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.”³

A stark glimpse of the future outlook was the latest hostage crisis in Algeria that underscored the need for a more effective international counterterrorism response in the coming months and years.

In sum, it is against this context of realities that both “hard” and “soft” power strategies must be developed by the international community as outlined previously in the “Selected Recommendations” segment of this study.

³ The Washington Post, January 15, 2013

CHRONOLOGY: Incidents of Terrorism in the Maghreb & Sahel



Data Table: Terrorism Incidents in Maghreb & Sahel since Sept. 11, 2001

TIMELINE	YEAR	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
NORTH & WEST/CENTRAL AFRICA NATIONS	Totals: 1,332 attacks	21 attacks	55 attacks	31 attacks	44 attacks	104 attacks	153 attacks	161 attacks	152 attacks	204 attacks	178 attacks	185 attacks	144 attacks
ALGERIA	1,234 attacks	20	54	28	39	93	120	110	121	185	168	164	132
CHAD	58 attacks				3	6	28	14	6		1		
LIBYA	7 attack						1						6
MALI	54 attacks			1	1	2	3	10	11	9	4	8	5
MAURITANIA	27 attacks				1	3		4	4	6	2	7	
MOROCCO	9 attacks			2				5				2	
NIGER	39 attacks						1	18	9	4	3	3	1
TUNISIA	4 attacks	1	1						1			1	

INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM IN MAGHREB & SAHEL:

Chronology from Sept. 11, 2001 to Dec. 31, 2012 (Updated with 2012 incidents below)

For full listing from 9/11/01 to 12/31/09, go to: http://www.potomac institute.org/attachments/524_Maghreb%20Terrorism%20report.pdf
 from 1/1/10 to 12/31/10, go to: http://www.potomac institute.org/attachments/863_2011%20REPORT%20UPDATE%20Maghreb%20%20Sahel%20Terrorism.pdf
 and from 1/1/11 to 12/31/11, go to: <http://www.terrorisemelectronicjournal.org/app/download/5656752982/2012-special-update-report-full-report-terrorism-in-africa-from-9-11-to-arab-spring-icts-potomac.pdf?t=1328807615>

Methodology — Compilation of this comprehensive listing of Maghreb/Sahel terrorism is based on monthly review of respected news and think tank websites, including international media and national press in **Countries monitored—Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia.** “Terrorist incidents” counted are those where a recognized terrorist group is reported or believed responsible, and results in death, injury, or kidnapping of civilians, government, or law enforcement officials, destruction of property, or threat to life and property where attacks are thwarted or bombs defused. Every incident includes the source cited.

All seven countries have suffered terrorist incidents during the 12 years tracked since Sept. 11, 2001. **The 2012 Chronology** below includes those countries experiencing incidents during the past calendar year — **Algeria, Libya, Mali and Niger.** See **table** on the preceding page and the **hyperlinks above** for incidents experienced by **Chad, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia** in other years.

Not included are acts of violence resulting from civil war or unrest not credibly attributed to terrorists (civil conflict in Libya, Tunisia), terrorist losses in gov’t counter-terror actions, or indigenous acts of religious extremism by ethnic and religious groups, including application of strict religious law (N. Mali). Lack of publicly available data likely results in undercounting in regions controlled by terrorists/extremists (N. Mali), and higher—though more accurate—relative counts where reporting is more widespread (Algeria).

2012

Algeria

December 26, 2012

Bomb kills 2 children in Ouled Ali, Bouira.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/deux-enfants-tues-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-bouira_23203.html

December 24, 2012

Communal guard assassinated by terrorists in Khiri Oued Adjoul, Jijel.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/jijel-un-garde-communal-assassine-a-kheiri-oued-adjoul-26-12-2012-197296_109.php

December 24, 2012

Repentant terrorist assassinated by terrorist group in Benchoud, Boumerdes.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/boumerdes-un-repentin-tue-a-benchoud-26-12-2012-197295_109.php

December 21, 2012

5 youths wounded in a bomb explosion in Sidi Ali Bounab, Tadmaït.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/tadmait-5-jeunes-blesses-a-sidi-ali-bounab-21-12-2012-196692_109.php

December 19, 2012

Army colonel, communal guard wounded by terrorist fire in Tiksrâi, Anhif, Bouira.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/accrochage-a-ahnif-bouira-un-colonel-tue-un-garde-communal-blesse-20-12-2012-196583_109.php

December 17, 2012

3 civilians wounded by bullets at a fake checkpoint on Mâatkas road, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/trois-citoyens-blesses-dans-un-faux-barrage-pres-de-tizi-ouzou_23106.html

December 16, 2012

Bomb hits freight train, Bouira. No injuries.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/bouira-un-attentat-a-la-bombe-cible-un-train-de-marchandises_23085.html

December 12, 2012

Bomb injures soldier, Mizrana, Tizi Ouzou.
<http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/un-militaire-blesse-par-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-mizrana-tizi-ouzou-190650>

December 11, 2012

Woman killed by bomb explosion in Ouzlad Ben Salah, Thénia, Boumerdes.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/boumerdes-une-femme-tuee-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe_23050.html

December 4, 2012

Guard, 3 soldiers wounded by bomb in military convoy in Béni Bouateb, Chlef.
<http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/un-garde-communal-tue-et-trois-militaires-blesses-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-beni-bouateb-chlef-190153>

December 4, 2012

Bomb injures civilian in Baghliâ, Boumerdes.
<http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/explosion-d-une-bombe-a-baghliâ-boumerdes-190083>

November 22, 2012

Brother of entrepreneur kidnapped by terrorists near Khemis El Khechna, Boumerdes.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/le-frere-d-un-entrepreneur-kidnappe-27-11-2012-193771_109.php

November 7, 2012

2 civilians injured by remotely-detonated bomb in Ait Yahia Moussa, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/11/08/newsbrief-03

November 1, 2012

Bomb injures shepherd, Iflissen, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/tizi-ouzou-un-berger-blesse-par-une-bombe-01-11-2012-190797_109.php

October 25, 2012

Soldier killed, another wounded in a terrorist attack in Adekâr, Béjaïa.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-militaire-tue-et-un-autre-blesse-pres-de-bejaia_22598.html

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October 20, 2012

Civilian killed by terrorists in Ouled Aïssa, Boumerdès.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/10/22/newsbrief-03

October 18, 2012

2 soldiers killed by terrorists at fake checkpoint in Timezrit, Isser, Boumerdès.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/deux-militaires-tues-dans-un-faux-barrage-pres-de-boumerdes_22510.html

October 18, 2012

Shepherd wounded by bomb in El Arima, Zighoud Yousef, Constantine.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/constantine-un-berger-blesse-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-20-10-2012-189520_109.php

October 14, 2012

Civilian wounded at a fake checkpoint in Bounouh, Boghni, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-citoyen-blesse-dans-un-faux-barrage-pres-de-tizi-ouzou_22474.html

October 6, 2012

Youth killed by a terrorist group in Ighoumrassene, Issers, Boumerdès, for refusing to cooperate with them.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-jeune-assassine-a-boumerdes_22394.html

October 4, 2012

Security agent killed, 1 wounded in terrorist attack on factory in Bordj Menaïel, Boumerdès.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-agent-de-securite-tue-dans-l-attaque-terroriste-d-une-usine-a-bordj-menaïel_22370.html

October 3, 2012

Gendarme wounded in a bomb explosion in Baghliia, Bourmedès.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/boumerdes-un-gendarme-blesse-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-baghliia-03-10-2012-187545_109.php

October 1, 2012

Gendarmerie convoy on road between El Ancer and El Milia, Jijel attacked by terrorists with homemade bomb, then by heavy gunfire. No casualties reported.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/10/02/newsbrief-01

September 30, 2012

2 communal guards killed in a bomb explosion in Tiliouine, Kadiria, Bouira.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/10/01/newsbrief-01

September 26, 2012

Communal guard assassinated by terrorists in Béni-Ksila, Béjaïa.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/bejaia-un-garde-communal-assassine-a-beni-ksila_22264.html

September 25, 2012

Civilian killed by terrorists in Bordj Menaïel, Boumerdès.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-citoyen-assassine-par-des-terroristes-a-bordj-menaïel_22258.html

September 25, 2012

Baker delivering bread to local army barracks kidnapped by terrorists.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/09/26/newsbrief-01

September 20, 2012

Farmer kidnapped by 4 armed men in Beni Douala, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-agriculteur-enleve-par-des-hommes-armes-pres-de-tizi-ouzou_22198.html

September 15, 2012

4 soldiers wounded in a bomb explosion in Médila, Ferkane, Tébessa.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/est/actu-est/tebessa-quatre-militaires-blessees-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-16-09-2012-185477_221.php

September 8, 2012

2 soldiers killed, 3 others wounded in a bomb explosion in M'Chounhe, Biskra.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/est/biskra/m-chouneche-biskra-deux-militaires-tues-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-10-09-2012-184780_131.php

September 6, 2012

Soldier killed, 3 wounded in a bomb explosion in Taourirt Ighil, Adekak.
<http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/un-soldat-blesse-et-trois-autres-blessees-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-dans-les-maquis-de-taourirt-ighil-184887>

September 2, 2012

2 civilians wounded in a bomb explosion in El Milia, Jijel.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/jijel-deux-blessees-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-el-milia-04-09-2012-184125_109.php

August 29, 2012

5 ANP soldiers wounded by bomb in M'chouèche, between Batna and Biskra.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/est/biskra/biskra-cinq-militaires-blessees-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-30-08-2012-183603_131.php

August 27, 2012

Soldier wounded in a bomb explosion in Sayar, Khenchela.
<http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/un-militaire-grievement-blesse-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-khenchela-184303>

August 26, 2012

Civilian killed in a bomb explosion in Oued El Machrah, Ferkane, Tébessa.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/un-homme-meurt-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-27-08-2012-183244_109.php

August 21, 2012

2 communal guards wounded by bomb in Sidi Mansour, Tamalous, Skikda.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/deux-gardes-communales-blessees-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-22-08-2012-182723_109.php

August 21, 2012

ANP troops scour wooded area of Chlef to find father, son abducted by terrorists on the eve of Eid El Fitr. Later found dead.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/chlef-un-patriote-et-son-cousin-retrouves-assassines-25-08-2012-183041_109.php

August 18, 2012

Repentant terrorist killed and his wife gravely injured when terrorists fired on their home in Ouled Rechache, Khenchela.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/khenchela-un-repentin-tue-et-son-epouse-gravement-blessee-21-08-2012-182590_109.php

August 16, 2012

Terrorists fire mortars at communal guard station in Tamalous. No injuries.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/est/skikda/tamalous-skikda-tirs-de-hebheb-sur-les-gardes-communales-17-08-2012-182364_128.php

TIMELINE: Terrorist attacks in the Maghreb and Sahel - 2012

Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications

August 13, 2012

7 soldiers wounded in a bomb explosion in Sidi Ali Bounab, Tadmait.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/tadmait-tizi-ouzou-sept-militaires-blesses-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-14-08-2012-181974_109.php

August 11, 2012

2 civilians wounded in a terrorist attack in Oglat Guessas, Tébessa.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/tebessa-deux-blesses-dans-une-attaque-terroriste-13-08-2012-181860_109.php

August 11, 2012

2 bombs explode on road between Béni Amrane and Bénit Khelifa, Boumerdès. No one wounded in attack.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/terrorisme-explosion-de-deux-bombes-artisanales-a-beni-amrane-boumerdes-11-08-2012-181670_109.php

August 7, 2012

Businessman kidnapped by armed group in Mechtras, Bogni, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/le-fils-d-un-commercant-enleve-a-mechtras-tizi-ouzou-08-08-2012-181342_109.php

August 7, 2012

Local defense forces member wounded by terrorists in El Megueb, Ain Turk, Bouira.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/kabylie/bouira/un-patriote-blesse-dans-un-attentat-terroriste-a-bouira-07-08-2012-181227_145.php

August 3, 2012

3 border guards killed by terrorists in Rhar Roubane, Tlemcen.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/08/03/newsbrief-01

July 31, 2012

Roadside bomb blast kills civilian and wounds 2 gendarmes near Jijel.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/08/01/newsbrief-01

July 29, 2012

Soldier killed, 4 others wounded by bomb in Boumoussa, Tlidjen, Tébessa.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/un-militaire-tue-et-quatre-autres-blesses-01-08-2012-180449_109.php

July 27, 2012

4 soldiers in convoy wounded by terrorists in Issoumathen, Azeffoun, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/tizi-ouzou-quatre-militaires-blesses-dans-le-mitraillage-d-un-convoi-de-l-anp_21594.html

July 25, 2012

Civilian driving to deliver bread to military barracks fired upon and killed by terrorists. in Drâa Taouil, Bordj Emir Abdelkader, Tissemsilt.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/un-citoyen-assassine-par-les-terroristes-a-tissemsilt-27-07-2012-179831_109.php

July 23, 2012

Terrorists attack military station in Passala, Ath Mansour, Bouira using mortars. No one wounded in the attack.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/kabylie/bouira/bouira-une-base-militaire-attaquee-au-hebheb-a-ath-mansour-24-07-2012-179515_145.php

July 22, 2012

Homemade bomb explodes in Taghit, Chechar, Khenchela. No one wounded.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/khenchela-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-taghit-23-07-2012-179335_109.php

July 22, 2012

Civilian assassinated by an armed group in Oueld Ali, Aïn El Hamra, Bordj-Menaïel. Kidnapped by two armed men disguised as police officers and killed several hours later.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-citoyen-assassine-pres-de-boumerdes_21548.html

July 21, 2012

Policeman killed and his brother and father injured in a terrorist attack in Omar, Bordj Menaïel, Boumerdès.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/07/22/newsbrief-01

July 16, 2012

Terrorists attack police station in Azeffoun with mortars. 3 police wounded.
<http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/attaque-terroriste-contre-le-commissariat-d-azeffoun-l-attentat-a-fait-trois-blesses-parmi-les-policiers-182113>

July 12, 2012

4 gendarmes wounded in a bomb explosion in Bordj Menaïel on the road between Tizi Ouzou and Algiers.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/quatre-gendarmes-blesses-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-bordj-menaïel_21430.html

July 11, 2012

Terrorists fire mortar shell at a gendarme barracks in Bouira. No one wounded in the attack.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/une-attaque-terroriste-au-hebhab-a-bouira-12-07-2012-178182_109.php

July 9, 2012

Communal guard kidnapped by armed terrorists in Taghit, Chechar, Khenchela
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/un-garde-communal-enleve-par-des-terroristes-a-khenchela-10-07-2012-177917_109.php

July 7, 2012

2 police officers wounded in attack by terrorist group in Zemmouri, Boumerdès.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/deux-policiers-blesses-dans-l-attaque-de-la-bmpj-de-zemmouri_21390.html

July 4, 2012

Terrorists attack the ANP barracks in Tala Bounana, Tizi Ouzou. No one wounded in the attack.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/tizi-ouzou-une-attaque-terroriste-repousee-a-tala-bounane-06-07-2012-177454_109.php

July 4, 2012

2 soldiers wounded in a bomb explosion in Babar, Khenchela.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/khenchela-deux-militaires-blesses-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-06-07-2012-177531_109.php

July 3, 2012

Soldier shot and wounded by terrorists at a false roadblock in Aïn Bessam, Bouira.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/terrorisme-un-militaire-blesse-a-bouira_21351.html

TIMELINE: Terrorist attacks in the Maghreb and Sahel - 2012

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Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach and Implications

July 2, 2012

Young man killed and his mother and sister seriously wounded in a bomb explosion in Sobaâ El Mimoune de Bir El Fodha, M'sila.

http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/m-sila-un-citoyen-dechiquete-par-une-bombe-artisanale-04-07-2012-177154_109.php

June 29, 2012

Security services defuse 2 bombs on road between Bordja Ménaïel and Tizi Ouzou.

http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/deux-bombes-desamorces-sur-la-rn-12-a-bordj-menaïel-29-06-2012-176624_109.php

June 29, 2012

Suicide bomber attacks command center of National Gendarmerie in Ouargla, killing 1 gendarme, wounding 3 others.

MUJAO claims responsibility for the attack, carried out using a car bomb.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/le-groupe-terroriste-mujao-revendique-l-attentat-contre-la-gendarmerie-a-ouargla_21304.html

June 27, 2012

Roadside bomb in Anhif, Bouira targets national gendarmerie patrol. Gunshots heard after explosion, but witnesses say it was the gendarmerie response to the attackers. No casualties were reported.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/06/28/newsbrief-05

June 21, 2012

Policeman killed, 2 others wounded in terrorist attack in center of Bouira.

http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-policier-tue-et-deux-autres-blesses_21208.html

June 20, 2012

Bomb targets national gendarmerie in Tadmaït, Tizi Ouzou, wounds 1 gendarme.

http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/une-patrouille-de-la-gendarmerie-ciblee-par-une-bombe-a-tadmait_21195.html

June 20, 2012

Terrorists assassinate a civilian in Ouanougha, Issers, Boumerdès.

http://www.elwatan.com/regions/kabylie/boumerdes/boumerdes-un-citoyen-assassine-par-des-terroristes-aux-issers-22-06-2012-175797_146.php

June 15, 2012

2 policemen killed in a large-scale terrorist attack in Ouacifs, Tizi Ouzou. Some 50 terrorists cut the telephone and electricity lines of the nearby security and police headquarters before opening fire on the BMPJ barracks with automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/06/17/newsbrief-01

June 12, 2012

2 soldiers wounded in a bomb explosion in Azazga, Tizi Ouzou.

<http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/deux-militaires-blesses-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-azazga-tizi-ouzou-180051>

June 11, 2012

Soldier and civilian wounded in a bomb explosion in Zemmouri, Boumerdès.

http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/un-civil-et-un-militaire-blesses-par-l-explosion-d-un-vehicule-piege-pres-de-boumerdes-11-06-2012-174344_109.php

June 3, 2012

Terrorists murder former mujahedeen in Kentidja, Aïn Zaouia, Tizi Ouzou.

http://www.elwatan.com/regions/kabylie/tiziouzou/un-ancien-moudjahid-assassine-par-des-terroristes-a-ain-zaouia-tizi-ouzou-04-06-2012-173421_144.php

June 3, 2012

Bomb explodes in Bechloul, Bouira. No one wounded in the attack.

http://www.elwatan.com/regions/kabylie/bouira/bouira-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-proximite-du-barrage-tiledit-de-bechloul-03-06-2012-173311_145.php

May 30, 2012

Communal guard wounded by terrorist attack in Meddah, Tizi Ghenif, Tizi Ouzou.

http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/tizi-ghenif-tizi-ouzou-un-garde-communal-blesse-dans-un-attentat-terroriste-30-05-2012-172933_109.php

May 25, 2012

Communal guard killed by terrorists in Ouled Ben Chaabana, Baghliia, Boumerdès.

http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-garde-communal-tue-par-une-rafale-de-balles-a-boumerdes_20894.html

May 18, 2012

2 military personnel die, another wounded by bomb close to navy barracks south of Azzefoun, Tizi Ouzou. Attack was the third in as many days.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/05/20/newsbrief-04

May 17, 2012

Bomb targeting military convoy explodes in Azzefoun, Tizi Ouzou. No one wounded in the attack.

http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/terrorisme-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-azzefoun-aucune-victime-17-05-2012-171060_109.php

May 16, 2012

Soldier killed following the explosion of a roadside bomb east of Azzefoun, Tizi Ouzou.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/05/17/newsbrief-03

May 15, 2012

Artisanal bomb explodes in Zaouia, Khenchela. No one wounded in the attack.

http://www.elwatan.com/regions/est/actu-est/khenchela-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-a-zaouia-16-05-2012-170877_221.php

May 10, 2012

4 communal guards wounded in a bomb explosion in El-Ogla, Malha, Tébessa.

<http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/quatre-gardes-communales-grievement-blesses-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-177950>

May 10, 2012

3 members of the GLD wounded in a bomb explosion in Tacheta, Aïn Defla.

http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/ain-defla-3-patriotes-blesses-dans-l-explosion-de-deux-bombes-artisanales-10-05-2012-170112_109.php

May 9, 2012

Bomb targeting a military convoy explodes in Azazga, Tizi Ouzou. No one wounded in the attack.

http://www.elwatan.com/regions/kabylie/tiziouzou/tizi-ouzou-explosion-d-une-bombe-de-faible-intensite-a-azazga-09-05-2012-169946_144.php

TIMELINE: Terrorist attacks in the Maghreb and Sahel - 2012

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3 artisanal bombs explode in Passala, Ath Mansour, Bouira. No one wounded.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/kabyli e/bouira/bouira-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-a-ath-mansour-09-05-2012-169941_145.php

May 7, 2012

Security defuse homemade bomb outside a primary school in Issers, Boumerdès.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/05/08/newsbrief-01

May 5, 2012

Communal guard killed, another wounded by bomb in Krarib, Aomar, Bouira.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/aomar-bouira-un-chef-de-la-garde-communale-tue-et-un-element-blese-07-05-2012-169557_109.php

May 5, 2012

2 civilians wounded in a bomb explosion on the border between Jijel and Skikda.
<http://fr.elkhabar.com/?Deux-blesses-dans-l-explosion-d>

May 4, 2012

2 officers killed in a bomb explosion in Keddara, Boumerdès.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/kabylie/boumerdes/boumerdes-deux-officiers-de-l-anp-tues-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-keddara-04-05-2012-169222_146.php

April 30, 2012

4 police officers killed when Kabylie terrorists open fire on their patrol vehicle in Mekla, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/05/01/newsbrief-01

April 28, 2012

2 policeman, 2 civilians wounded by bomb in Baghlia, Boumerdès,
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/quatre-blesses-dont-deux-policiers-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-baghlia_20506.html

April 26, 2012

3 soldiers wounded by bomb explosion in Ain Bouziane, Chetaïbi, Annaba.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/annaba-3-militaires-blesses-a-chetaibi-30-04-2012-168778_109.php

April 25, 2012

Businessman kidnapped by a group of armed men in Maâtkas, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/tizi-ouzou-un-entrepreneur-enleve-a-maatkas-26-04-2012-168364_109.php

April 25, 2012

Bomb wounds 3 people in Si Mustapha, Boumerdès. Explodes several minutes after national gendarmerie patrol passes.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/trois-blesses-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-sur-la-rn-12_20468.html

April 24, 2012

Soldier wounded in a clash with armed terrorists in Mizrana, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/kabyli e/tiziouzou/tizi-ouzou-accrochage-a-mizrana-25-04-2012-168218_144.php

April 23, 2012

3 soldiers seriously wounded in a bomb explosion in Siar, Khenchela.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/khenchel a-trois-militaires-blesses-dans-une-explosion-a-siar-25-04-2012-168135_109.php

April 21, 2012

Soldier wounded by bomb in Guentiss, between Khenchela & Tébessa provinces.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/khenchel a-un-militaire-blese-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-23-04-2012-167833_109.php

April 10, 2012

Soldier killed, 2 wounded by roadside bomb explosion in Mizrana, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/04/11/newsbrief-04

April 5, 2012

5 soldiers wounded in a bomb explosion in Boudekhane, Tébessa.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/khenchel a-5-militaires-blesses-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-07-04-2012-165806_109.php

April 4, 2012

Bomb targets gendarme convoy on road between Si Mustapha and Issers, Boumerdès. Civilian motorist wounded.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/kabyli e/boumerdes/boumerdes-un-citoyen-blese-par-une-bombe-a-si-mustapha-04-04-2012-165489_146.php

April 4, 2012

2 policemen seriously wounded in armed attack on the Pont de Bougie linking Tizirt and Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/explosion-d-une-bombe-sur-la-rn12-et-deux-policiers-blesses-a-tizi-ouzou_20181.html

April 4, 2012

Teenager wounded in a bomb explosion in Yakouren, Tizi Ouzou.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/04/05/newsbrief-02

April 1, 2012

Algerian army officer killed in clashes between ANP troops and terrorists in Cap Djinet, Boumerdès. AQIM gunmen reportedly open fire on an army patrol preparing to search a bunker. Kalashnikovs and explosives found inside the bunker.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/04/03/newsbrief-02

March 31, 2012

Bomb targets headquarters of communal place in Kaf El-Aogab, Tadmaït.
<http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/pas-de-victimes-ni-de-degats-signales-a-tadmait-une-bombe-artisanale-a-cible-la-police-communale-175095>

March 29, 2012

Student wounded in a bomb explosion in Ghebala, Jijel.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/jijel-un-etudiant-blese-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-31-03-2012-164867_109.php

March 28, 2012

5 gendarmes wounded in a bomb explosion in Dellys, Boumerdès.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/boumerdes-cinq-gendarmes-blesses-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-a-dellys-28-03-2012-164585_109.php

March 23, 2012

Soldier wounded during sweep operation in Ellouza, Tarek Ibn Ziad, Ain Defla.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/ain-defla-un-garde-communal-tue-et-deux-blesses-a-tarek-ibn-ziad-24-03-2012-163985_109.php

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March 23, 2012

Communal guard killed, another wounded when armed individuals attack post in Ellouza, Tarek Ibn Ziad, Ain Defla.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/ain-defla-un-garde-communal-tue-et-deux-blesses-a-tarek-ibn-ziad-24-03-2012-163985_109.php

March 20, 2012

Security forces defuse bombs on road from Issers to Chabet-El-Ameur, Boumerdès.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/boumerdes-deux-bombes-desamorces-et-une-casemate-detruite-aux-issers-21-03-2012-163674_109.php

March 20, 2012

Terrorists kidnap civilian in Mekla, Tizi Ouzou. Family receives ransom demand of 200,000 Euros for his safe return.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/03/21/newsbrief-01

March 17, 2012

Terrorists kill a communal guard at a fake checkpoint on the road between Tizi Ouzou and Draâ El Mizan.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/03/19/newsbrief-02

March 8, 2012

Soldier killed, another wounded by bomb in Djaouan, Bordj Menaïel.
<http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/un-militaire-tue-et-un-autre-blesse-aux-issers-boumerdes-173761>

March 4, 2012

Security forces investigating Tamanrasset bombing find 2nd vehicle with explosives. According to law officers, terror cell planned several attacks, forced to change plans after suspect arrest at Mali border.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/03/06/newsbrief-01

March 3, 2012

Al-Qaeda group mounts suicide bombing of Tamanrasset gendarmerie headquarters, wounds 15 officers, 8 civilians. Movement for Unity & Jihad in West Africa, group that abducted 3 aid workers from Tindouf camps in October, claims responsibility.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/03/04/newsbrief-01

February 28, 2012

Security forces defuse a bomb found by the roadside in Bordj Menaïel, Boumerdès.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/deux-terroristes-abattus-a-boumerdes-une-bombe-artisanale-desamorcee_19639.html

February 20, 2012

Soldier killed, 12 others injured during a firefight in Beni Khelifa, Boumerdès.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/quatre-terroristes-abattus-dans-un-accrochage-avec-l-armee-a-beni-amrane_19541.html

February 19, 2012

Roadside bomb kills 4 bus passengers and injures 9 others. The bomb reportedly targets a military convoy, but goes off early and hits a civilian bus as it drives between Issers and Bordj Menaïel, Boumerdès.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/02/20/newsbrief-01

February 15, 2012

Bomb targeting a gendarme convoy explodes on the road between Tidjllabine and Thénia, Boumerdès. No one wounded in the attack.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/boumerdes-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-pres-de-thenia-15-02-2012-159161_109.php

February 13, 2012

Gendarme killed, 3 others wounded in clash near Tinzaouatine, Tamanrasset, along the Algerian-Malian border. Fighting erupts when border guards try to intercept two all-terrain vehicles infiltrating Algeria from Mali. Assaultants reportedly members of al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/02/14/newsbrief-01

February 11, 2012

Algerian soldiers foil attack on border guards in Tinzaouatine, Tamanrasset. 7 terrorists dressed as Malian soldiers killed in operation near Malian border. Algerian forces recover an all-terrain vehicle, nine different types of machine guns and 400kg of explosives.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/02/13/newsbrief-01

February 5, 2012

Soldier killed by bomb during sweep operation in Sidi Bnou, Annaba.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/un-jeune-militaire-succombe-a-ses-blessures-a-sidi-bnou-d-chetaibi-06-02-2012-157872_109.php

February 4, 2012

Civilian wounded in a bomb explosion in Oglat El Melha, Tébessa.
http://www.elwatan.com/regions/est/actu-est/tebessa-un-homme-blesse-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-05-02-2012-157699_221.php

February 3, 2012

2 gendarmes wounded in terrorist attack Ain Torki, Ain Defla.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/ain-torki-ain-defla-deux-gendarmes-tues-dans-une-attaque-terroriste-03-02-2012-157591_109.php

January 29, 2012

Bomb explodes on road between Baghlia & Dellys, Boumerdès. No one wounded.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/boumerdes-explosion-d-une-bombe-artisanale-a-baghlia-29-01-2012-156850_109.php

January 29, 2012

Soldier wounded in a roadside bomb explosion in Annaba.
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/01/30/newsbrief-03

January 27, 2012

5 people killed and 1 wounded in a bomb explosion in Rass El Miad, Biskra.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/rass-el-miad-biskra-5-morts-et-1-blesse-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-31-01-2012-157137_109.php

January 25, 2012

Terrorists wound policeman at urban security hdqtrs in Zemmouri, Boumerdès.
http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/un-policier-blesse-dans-l-attaque-de-la-surete-urbaine-de-zemmouri-pres-de-boumerdes_19171.html

January 24, 2012

Security forces defuse bomb near Akli Mohand Oulhadj University in Bouira.
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/bouira-une-bombe-de-fabrication-artisanale-desamorcee-a-proximite-de-l-universite-24-01-2012-156205_109.php

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January 21, 2012

Young man wounded in a bomb explosion in Ighil Azougagh, Draâ Ben Khedda, Tizi Ouzou.

http://www.tsa-algerie.com/divers/unblessed-dans-l-explosion-d-une-bombe-pres-de-tizi-ouzou_19095.html

January 20, 2012

4 soldiers wounded in a bomb explosion in Aïn Rich, M'sila.

http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/terrorisme-bombes-a-tizi-ouzou-et-m-sila-22-01-2012-155860_109.php

January 17, 2012

High-ranking Algerian regional official kidnapped near the Libya border. Mohamed Laid Khelfi, the top security official for the Sahara desert region of Illizi, abducted by several armed men in Timeroualine, near Debdeb. Two other officials and the group's driver are soon freed but the governor is reportedly taken toward the Algeria-Libya border. No group has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping, the first in Algeria against an official of Khelfi's standing since 1992.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/01/17/newsbrief-01

January 15, 2012

Rail service to eastern Algeria cancelled after a bomb explodes on the tracks between Bouira and Bordj Bou Arreridj. No casualties reported, but the blast damages the passing cargo train.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/01/16/newsbrief-01

January 11, 2012

Two customs officials wounded in a bomb explosion in Thénia, Boumerdès.

http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/boumerdes-deux-douaniers-blesses-par-une-bombe-a-thenia-11-01-2012-154501_109.php

January 4, 2012

3 soldiers injured in a bomb explosion near the town of Cap Djenet, Bourmedès,

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/01/05/newsbrief-03

**Libya
2012****September 11, 2012**

Unidentified armed men storm the grounds of the US consulate in Benghazi, shooting at buildings and throwing handmade bombs into the compound. The US Ambassador, J. Christopher Stevens, and 3 other Americans killed in the attack.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19570254>

August 5, 2012

Unknown assailants attack a compound of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Libyan port of Misrata with grenades and rockets, forcing it to suspend its work there and in the eastern city of Benghazi. No one wounded in the attack.

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-05/news/sns-rt-us-libya-crossbre8740jn-20120805_1_misrata-benghazi-libyan-port

June 11, 2012

2 British bodyguards injured in attack on convoy carrying British ambassador to Libya. Ambassador Dominic Asquith, other staff unhurt in attack in Benghazi.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18401792>

June 5, 2012

US diplomatic office in Benghazi attacked by IED. Jihadist group suspected of strike. No one wounded.

<http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/06/world/africa/libya-violence/index.html>

May 22, 2012

Rocket-propelled grenade hits the offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Libya's eastern city of Benghazi overnight, leaving a small hole in the side of the building but causing no casualties.

<http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFBRE84L0NL20120522>

April 10, 2012

Bomb thrown at convoy carrying head of UN mission to Libya. No one hurt in explosion.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/10/us-libya-explosion-idUSBRE8390T220120410>

**Mali
2012****November 20, 2012**

French national kidnapped in Diema, Kayes, near Mauritania and Senegal border. MUJAO claims responsibility.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/11/22/newsbrief-01

September 1, 2012

MUJAO carries out threat to execute one of Algerian diplomats kidnapped in April, killing defense attaché Taher Touati.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2012/09/04/feature-01

April 15, 2012

Swiss woman kidnapped in Timbuktu by Islamists linked to Ansar Dine, AQIM.

<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/report-swiss-woman-kidnapped-north-mali-16145193>

April 5, 2012

Armed Islamists attack Algerian consulate in Gao, kidnap 7 Algerian diplomats. AQIM splinter group, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, takes responsibility.

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hvAI48Rwfgok79DDArYdCVa0NtjQ?docId=CNG.9b85ddfd992bc880ec93ea69da75b738.681>

March 9, 2012

Azaouad notable hostage negotiator in Mali, assassinated, possibly by AQIM; Sheikh Bahla Ag Nouh, 3 associates killed in ambush driving from Taoudenni to Anefis.

Victim, who ran mosque near Anefis, reportedly tied to Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2012/03/12/newsbrief-02

**Niger
2012****October 14, 2012**

6 people, including 5 humanitarian workers, kidnapped in Dakoro, in southern Niger, by armed men.

http://www.elwatan.com/international/des-humanitaires-nigeriens-et-tchadiens-enlevés-au-niger-16-10-2012-189044_112.php

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Yonah Alexander:

Professor Yonah Alexander serves as a Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and Director of its International Center for Terrorism Studies as well as a member of the Board of Regents. Concurrently, he is Director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and Co-Director of the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies. Both are consortia of universities and think tanks throughout the world. In addition, Professor Alexander directed the Terrorism Studies program (George Washington University) and the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism (State University of New York), totaling 35 years of service.

Educated at Columbia (Ph.D.), and Chicago (M.A.), he has held many academic appointments in the United States and abroad. Moreover, Professor Alexander lectured extensively in Europe (e.g. Berlin, Brussels, Geneva, Moscow, Oxford, Paris, Stockholm), the Middle East and Africa (e.g. Amman, Ankara, Cairo, Istanbul, Jerusalem, Rabat), Asia (e.g. Astana, Beijing, Bishkek, Colombo, New Delhi, Seoul, Tokyo), and elsewhere in Latin America and the Pacific.

Professor Alexander is the founder and editor-in-chief of five international journals: *Terrorism*, *Political Communication and Persuasion*, *Minority and Group Rights*, *NATO's Partnership for Peace Review*, and *Terrorism Knowledge Base (Electronic)*. He has published over 100 books, including *Al-Qaida: Ten Years After 9/11 and Beyond* (2012). His works have been translated into more than two dozen languages. Professor Alexander's personal papers and collection on terrorism are housed at the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford University.

The Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)

Background

Established in 1994 by GWU's Terrorism Studies Program, the activities of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS) are guided by an International Research Council that offers recommendations for study on different aspects of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. IUCTS is affiliated with universities and think tanks in over 40 countries. It is jointly administered by the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute (Washington, DC), and the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (Arlington, VA).

Purpose

There exists the need to educate policy makers, and the public in general, on the nature and intensity of the terrorism threat in the twenty-first century. As a member of the academic and research community, the IUCTS has an intellectual obligation, as well as a moral and practical responsibility, to participate in the international effort to arrest the virus of terrorism. The purpose of IUCTS, therefore, is four-fold:

- To monitor current and future threats of terrorism;
- To develop response strategies on governmental and non-governmental levels;
- To effect continual communication with policy-makers, academic institutions, business, media, and civic organizations;
- To sponsor research programs on critical issues, particularly those relating enabling technologies with policy, and share the findings nationally and internationally.



INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES
Potomac Institute For Policy Studies
 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington, VA 22203
 E-mail: ICTS@potomac institute.org Tel. 703-525-0770
yalexander@potomac institute.org www.potomac institute.org

MEPs approve renewed EU-Morocco Fisheries agreement

Plenary Session Press release - Fisheries – 10-12-2013 - 12:39

Fishing vessels from 11 EU countries will be allowed to fish in the waters of the Kingdom of Morocco in return for an annual EU payment of €30 million under a fisheries agreement approved by MEPs on Tuesday. This sum includes €14 million earmarked to support the development of the Moroccan fisheries sector.

"This is an excellent deal for both sides, which fulfils all the conditions requested by the European Parliament in its 2011 resolution, by ensuring both environmental sustainability and a proper return for the EU budget contribution. Morocco will have to prove that this money is invested in a way that benefits the Sahrawi population. On the other side, the fishing possibilities for 11 member states will allow 1,500 fishermen, 500 of whom are Moroccan, to go ahead and fish", said rapporteur Carmen Fraga Estévez (EPP, ES).

MEPs approved the new protocol by 310 votes to 204, with 49 abstentions.

The new agreement will apply for four years from its entry into force. The cost to the EU has been reduced compared to that of the previous one (€36.1 million) and fishing opportunities have been increased by a third, thus addressing Parliament's concerns over the cost-benefit ratio.

In addition to the €30 million provided annually through the EU, an estimated €10 million will be paid to the Moroccan state in fees by ship-owners intending to fish under the agreement. The 11 EU

member states with an interest in this agreement are Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Ireland, Poland and the United Kingdom. Non-respect of any provision by Morocco could entail the suspension of the protocol.

New version, two years later

The previous agreement was negotiated in February 2011 and provisionally applied until December 2011, when the European Parliament rejected it. MEPs argued then that the cost-benefit ratio was too low and that the agreement was unsustainable, because it targeted some overexploited species, but the key issue was whether it complied with international law, since it was unclear whether the agreement benefited the population of the disputed Western Sahara region.

Today MEPs from several political groups again voted against the agreement on the grounds that "it does not respect international law provisions, as it does not exclude the waters of the Western Sahara coast", and underlined that the Sahrawi population had not been consulted.

Morocco under King Mohammed VI: 15 Years of Leadership in Promoting Reform

2014 marks the 15th anniversary of King Mohammed VI's reign. Since ascending the throne in 1999, King Mohammed VI has consolidated, accelerated, and broadened democratic reforms begun during the reign of his father, King Hassan II, to empower individual citizens and the institutions that represent them. He has also strengthened Morocco's longstanding alliance with the US. And he has deepened and enhanced Morocco's ties with Africa in an effort to promote security, economic development, stability, and religious tolerance in the region.

Reform

- Some of the hallmark achievements over the past 15 years include:
 - **The 2004 Moroccan Truth & Reconciliation Commission (IER)**, which was the first truth and reconciliation commission established in the Arab world. The independent investigative body shed light on human rights violations that took place in Morocco from 1956 to 1999, examining Morocco's past and the circumstances that permitted the abuses. After many public hearings and testimonies, 23,676 Moroccans received compensation checks totaling \$193 million. The King accepted all of the IER recommendations and the government has worked to pass the necessary legislation to implement them.
 - http://www.cndh.ma/sites/default/files/documents/rapport_final_mar_eng-3.pdf
 - <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61702.htm>
 - **The 2004 reform of the family code, the *moudawana***, which is one of the most progressive laws on women's and family rights in the Arab world. It raised the minimum age of marriage for girls from 15 to 18 and gave wives joint responsibility of the family with their husbands, and equal rights to property upon divorce. This law ushered in profound changes in Moroccan society, and helped to promote women's participation in society and politics to reinforce their rights and eliminate gender discrimination in private and public affairs. This reform set the stage for rapid advancement of women in Moroccan business and politics.
 - <http://www.hrea.org/moudawana.html>
 - By 2011, the number of women in Morocco's Parliament more than doubled. Mbarka Bouaida, Morocco's Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs & Cooperation, is a former Parliamentarian and a rising star in Moroccan politics. She represented her country in the Atlantic Dialogues and during King Mohammed VI's recent visit to the US, and described the family code reform as "revolutionary."
 - <http://www.blog.learningpartnership.org/2010/10/morocco-mbarka-bouaida/>; <https://www.ndi.org/morocco>
 - *Jeune Afrique's* article, "The 25 Most Influential Businesswomen in Africa" featured 8 Moroccans – more than any other country.
 - <http://economie.jeuneafrique.com/regions/international-panafricain/16878-les-25-femmes-les-plus-influentes-du-business-en-afrique.html>
 - **A series of free and fair parliamentary and local elections**, in which large numbers of Moroccans voted, validating the key elements of the nation's ongoing reforms and political transformation, elevating women and youth candidates to positions of leadership, and empowering local communities to take more control of their future.
 - http://www.moroccanamericanpolicy.org/upload/media/Press_Release_Elections_7July09FINAL%20.pdf
 - <http://moroccoonthemove.wordpress.com/fag-moroccos-2011-parliamentary-elections/>

- **The 2011 reform of the Constitution**, which was an effort to consolidate democracy in Morocco, devolve power to the regions, broaden individual freedoms, solidify the rule of law, and strengthen human rights. The Constitution, adopted by a national referendum, enshrined several key changes to Morocco's political system, advancing democratization by strengthening the principle of separation of powers and bringing all stakeholders into the political process. The Constitution:
 - Establishes that the Head of Government will be appointed from the party that wins the most seats in Parliamentary elections.
 - Expands the powers of the Head of Government and the Parliament, giving them broad legislative powers.
 - Empowers Moroccans with more control and leadership at the local government level—making local and regional officials directly accountable to voters.
 - Establishes independent agencies to guarantee civil and human rights protections.
 - Establishes an independent judiciary with a newly mandated Constitutional Court.

<http://moroccoonthemove.wordpress.com/faq-moroccos-2011-parliamentary-elections/>
- **The 2011 reform of Morocco's national human rights oversight body, the National Human Rights Council (CNDH)**, establishing its autonomy, enlarging its investigative and monitoring powers, and reinforcing its pluralistic composition. The Council has the power to investigate allegations of human rights violations; act as an early warning mechanism to prevent human rights violations; and examine and make recommendations on how to bring legislation in line with the Constitution, international human rights treaties, and international law.

<http://www.cndh.ma/?lang=en>
- CNDH, Morocco's active civil society, and liberalizing government work together to address ongoing human rights challenges through both judicial and legislative mechanisms. In the past year alone, Morocco has made significant advances in its human rights policies in the areas of migration, women's rights, and the court system.
 - In November 2013, Morocco adopted a policy providing protections for migrants and asylum seekers. This policy change was the result of an investigation and subsequent recommendation by CNDH to reform Morocco's immigration policy.
 - In January 2014, the Moroccan parliament voted unanimously to amend existing statutes so that rapists can no longer be exonerated by marrying their victims.
 - In March 2014, the Council of Ministers, chaired by King Mohammed VI, approved the draft law on military justice, which will exclude civilians from being tried in military courts. The policy change was the result of CNDH recommendations to bring the law in line with the principles of the Constitution.

http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2013/11/14/feature-02

<http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/feb/07/ngo-change-morocco-rape-law>

<http://news.yahoo.com/morocco-adopts-law-end-military-trial-civilians-173458696.html>

- In a statement made at a Congressional hearing on US-Morocco relations, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department William Roebuck stated, “We are pleased to see this commitment made concrete in the Moroccan government’s initiative to reform the Military Code of Justice and to exempt civilians from trial by military tribunals through a draft law which has moved to Parliament for approval. We have also remarked on the growing role of the National Council on Human Rights (CNDH) as a credible and proactive defender of human rights, and are encouraged by the Council of Government’s decision to strengthen the CNDH by ensuring that government agencies address complaints directed to it. Both of these measures are important steps forward in strengthening the protection of human rights in Morocco and in realizing the promise of the 2011 Constitution.
<http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-us-policy-towards-morocco>
- At the conclusion of a May 2013 visit to Morocco, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay stated, “Morocco is undergoing an important transition and is setting high standards through its Constitution and laws. In my exchanges with the authorities, including His Majesty King Mohammed VI and various ministers, it was clear that there is the political will at the highest levels to continue efforts to set a firm human rights foundation for Moroccan society.”
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14652&LangID=E>

Development

Human, social, and economic development in Morocco is a very high priority for King Mohammed VI. Under his rule, Morocco has undertaken a multi-year strategy for promoting human development and greater economic growth to improve the lives of its citizens.

- Some of the most important development initiatives of the past 15 years include:
 - The commitment in 2000 to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals – reaching a set of human development indicators set by the international community and doing so in an inclusive manner. Morocco is on the path toward achieving all of the MDGs – improving the lives of its citizens, promoting equality, and ensuring that the benefits of development impact even the most marginalized populations. Morocco looks set to achieve all eight principal MDGs, including reducing extreme poverty, providing potable water to all parts of the country, promoting maternal and child health, and achieving universal primary education and gender equality, by the target date of 2015.
<http://www.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/MDGs/morocco-mdg-report/>
 - Morocco won recognition from the UN for outstanding progress in fighting hunger, by reaching international targets ahead of an end-of-2015 deadline. The MDG-1 hunger target requires countries to halve the proportion of hungry people in the population before the end of 2015 compared to the level in 1990.
www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/235416/icode/
 - 2006 launch of the multibillion dollar National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) to reduce poverty in rural areas, increase social and health services, including education, health care, electricity, and potable water, to marginalized communities, and create sustainable economic development projects. The plan was renewed in 2012 for another five years.
<http://www.indh.ma/fr/index.asp>

Diplomacy

King Mohammed VI's commitment to promoting peace, security, stability, reform, interfaith dialogue, and sustainable development goes beyond Morocco borders.

- Under his leadership, Morocco has become increasingly engaged in the Maghreb and Africa and has contributed positively to the stability of the region and the promotion of values and interests that are shared by the US across the continent.
 - Morocco is a key ally of the new Malian government and in late 2013 launched a program to train 500 imams from Mali to promote religious moderation. Morocco has since signed agreements to train imams from Libya, Tunisia, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, the Maldives, and Nigeria.
- Under the King's leadership, Morocco has deepened its partnership with the US and other regional partners in Europe, Africa, and the MENA region. In addition to being designated as a non-NATO ally, a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact recipient, and a Strategic Dialogue partner of the US, Morocco has advanced status with the European Union, as well as multiple free trade agreements with the US, the EU, and several MENA countries.
- On the 15th Anniversary of the reign of King Mohammed VI, Morocco stands as a leading partner for the US in the region due to its long history of shared values, common interests in human, social, and economic development, and commitment to regional security and stability.

For more information, visit <http://www.moroccoonthemove.com> - Follow on Twitter [@MorocOnTheMove](https://twitter.com/MorocOnTheMove)

The History of the Western Sahara

A Timeline

The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Polisario Front, a separatist group based in southern Algeria. Morocco reasserted its sovereignty over the territory after Spain withdrew its colonial interests from the area in 1975. The Polisario Front has challenged Morocco's control over the Western Sahara.

The Moroccan Government has undertaken a sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara to provide economic, political, and social infrastructure for the region's residents. Today, international efforts are underway to encourage a political settlement between Morocco, the Polisario Front, and Algeria that would resolve sovereignty over the Western Sahara through autonomy, a solution widely supported in the international community, particularly the US and Europe.

1578 to 1727	Moroccan Kings rule over the territory currently known as the Western Sahara.	<p>"[Morocco's compromise autonomy initiative] originated in the Clinton Administration. It was reaffirmed in the Bush Administration and it remains the policy of the United States in the Obama Administration. [...] And I don't want anyone in the region or elsewhere to have any doubt about our policy, which remains the same." -U.S. Sec. of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, November 3, 2009</p>	2004	UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1541, urging the parties to the Western Sahara conflict to "to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution."	
1884	Spanish colonization begins.		2005	Dutch ambassador Peter Van Walsum is appointed as the new UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy to the Western Sahara.	
1956	Morocco claims independence from France and reclaims the Western Sahara at the UN for the first time.		2007	Morocco releases autonomy under sovereignty plan for the Western Sahara which is endorsed by the many in the international community, including the United States, Spain, and France.	
1958	King Mohammed V formally lays claim to the Sahara.			2008	Morocco and the Polisario Front conduct the first of four rounds of talks. After the final round of talks, UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy Van Walsum calls for realism, deems independence an unattainable option, and calls for future negotiations to be based solely on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.
1963	The UN includes the Western Sahara on the list of non self-governing territories.			2009	UN Sec. Gen. appoints US diplomat Christopher Ross as the new Special Envoy for the Western Sahara. US Sec. of State Hillary Rodham Clinton reaffirms that US policy, supporting a solution based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, remains unchanged.
1965	The UN General Assembly adopts its first resolution calling on Spain to decolonize the Sahara.		<p>"[A]utonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution for the Western Sahara dispute [...]" -Dana Perino, White House Press Secretary, June 23, 2008</p> <p>"My conclusion that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process..." - UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara Peter Van Walsum, April 21, 2008</p>	2011	Morocco and the Polisario Front conduct first of nine rounds of informal talks. Ending in 2012, the talks yield no progress.
1973	The Polisario Front is founded and stages its first attack.			2012	Sec. Clinton meets with Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri in 2011 and with Moroccan Foreign Minister Saad-Eddine Al-Othmani in 2012, reiterating that the Moroccan autonomy plan is "serious, realistic, and credible."
1974	Algeria begins to oppose Moroccan policy on the Sahara and trains Polisario guerillas.			2013	In a Joint Statement issued on November 22, 2013, following a meeting between President Obama and King Mohammed VI, the US reiterates that Morocco's autonomy plan is "serious, realistic, and credible," and both leaders affirm their shared commitment to the improvement of the lives of the people of the Western Sahara.
1975	The Green March takes place in which 350,000 unarmed Moroccans march South into the desert to reassert Moroccan sovereignty of the Sahara from the Spanish. Morocco signs Madrid Agreement, which seeks to transfer control of the Sahara to a three party administration divided between Morocco, Spain, and Mauritania. Spain officially terminates its administration of the Sahara.			2014	US law is enacted that permits US funding for Morocco to be used in the Western Sahara
1976	The Polisario Front declares the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and raises the flag of "Western Sahara."				
1977	Spanish-Moroccan fishing agreement is signed; the Polisario begins attacks on Spanish fishing vessels.				
1991	UN Security Council approves the establishment of MINURSO. Cease-fire declared in the disputed Western Sahara region.				
1997	Former US Sec. of State James Baker III is appointed as UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy in the Sahara region. Houston Accord is signed between Morocco and Polisario establishing the implementation of a referendum to decide the future of the Western Sahara.				
2002	UN Sec. Gen. Kofi Annan presents the Security Council with four options to break the impasse in the Western Sahara: referendum, autonomy, partition, or complete withdrawal.				

This material is distributed by the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) on behalf of the Kingdom of Morocco.
Additional information is available at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C.

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Excerpt from Joint Statement of the Second Session of the United States – Kingdom of Morocco Strategic Dialogue

April 4, 2014

The Issue of the Western Sahara

The Secretary reaffirmed our commitment to a peaceful, sustainable, mutually agreed-upon solution to the Western Sahara question. The United States' policy toward the Western Sahara has remained consistent for many years. The United States has made clear that Morocco's autonomy plan is serious, realistic, and credible, and that it represents a potential approach that could satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity. The United States supports the negotiations carried out by the United Nations, including the work of the UN Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General Ambassador Christopher Ross, and urges the parties to work toward a just, lasting and mutually agreed political solution. The two parties affirmed their shared commitment to the improvement of the lives of the people of the Western Sahara. In this regard, Morocco presented the report on the new economic model prepared by the Economic, Social and Environmental Council. The Secretary welcomed the recent actions and initiatives taken by Morocco to continue to protect and promote human rights in the territory, including the growing and important role of the National Council for Human Rights.



Excerpt from Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco

November 22, 2013

The Issue of the Western Sahara

The President pledged to continue to support efforts to find a peaceful, sustainable, mutually agreed-upon solution to the Western Sahara question. U.S. policy toward the Western Sahara has remained consistent for many years. The United States has made clear that Morocco's autonomy plan is serious, realistic, and credible, and that it represents a potential approach that could satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity. We continue to support the negotiations carried out by the United Nations, including the work of the UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy Ambassador Christopher Ross, and urge the parties to work toward a resolution. The two leaders affirmed their shared commitment to the improvement of the lives of the people of the Western Sahara and agreed to work together to continue to protect and promote human rights in the territory.



Excerpt from Remarks with Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri

Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

Treaty Room

Washington, DC

March 23, 2011

SECRETARY CLINTON: We also look forward with great optimism to further deepening our strong and strategic partnership in working with Morocco on so many issues. Let me close with an issue that I know is of great importance to Morocco and its neighbors, the Western Sahara. U.S. policy toward the Western Sahara has remained constant from administration to administration. We want to see a peaceful resolution. Starting with the Clinton Administration and continuing through the Bush Administration and up to the present in the Obama Administration, we have stated our belief that Morocco's autonomy plan is serious, realistic, and credible – a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity. The United States strongly supports the role of Ambassador Christopher Ross and the United Nations in resolving this issue.

PRN: 2011/458



Interview With Fouad Arif of Al-Aoula Television (Excerpt)

Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

Marrakech, Morocco

November 3, 2009

QUESTION: Yesterday, Madame Secretary, you reaffirmed that there is no change in the Obama Administration's position as far as the Moroccan autonomy plan in the Sahara is concerned. Would you like please to elaborate some more?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, this is a plan, as you know, that originated in the Clinton Administration. It was reaffirmed in the Bush Administration and it remains the policy of the United States in the Obama Administration. Now, we are supporting the United Nations process because we think that if there can be a peaceful resolution to the difficulties that exist with your neighbors, both to the east and to the south and the west, that is in everyone's interest.

But because of our long relationship, we are very aware of how challenging the circumstances are. And I don't want anyone in the region or elsewhere to have any doubt about our policy, which remains the same.



White House Press Office On-the-record Statement

by Dana Perino, *White House Press Secretary*

June 23, 2008

"Yes, the President sent a letter to King Mohammed. It reiterated the U.S. position, first announced in the UN Security Council, that autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution for the Western Sahara dispute and our support for substantive negotiations on this matter within the U.N.-led framework.

The letter also called on Morocco to continue its efforts to better relations with Algeria and to improve conditions in the Western Sahara."

United Nations

S/PV.5884



Security Council

Sixty-third year

Provisional

5884th meeting

Wednesday, 30 April 2008, 10.25 p.m.

New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Kumalo	(South Africa)
<i>Members:</i>	Belgium	Mr. Verbeke
	Burkina Faso	Mr. Kafando
	China	Mr. Liu Zhenmin
	Costa Rica	Mr. Urbina
	Croatia	Mr. Viločić
	France	Mr. Ripert
	Indonesia	Mr. Kleib
	Italy	Mr. Spatafora
	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Mr. Dabbashi
	Panama	Mr. Suescum
	Russian Federation	Mr. Safronkov
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Quarrey
	United States of America	Mr. Wolff
	Viet Nam	Mr. Hoang Chi Trung

Agenda

The situation concerning Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara
(S/2008/251)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

08-32472 (E)



in favour of the resolution in the hope that through the negotiating process and with the support of MINURSO the people of Western Sahara can one day achieve their right to self-determination.

I now resume my function as President of the Council.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Belgium, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Italy, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Panama, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1813 (2008).

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Wolff (United States of America): I had intended to focus my remarks on the issue before us, and will do so. But that does not mean we agree with either the interpretation of the process that led to this resolution or the representation of the arguments presented by Council members on the specific issues raised by both Ambassador Urbina and Ambassador Kumalo reflecting the substance of the issue. But let me focus on the issue as we see it before us.

The Western Sahara conflict has gone on too long, provoking tensions, causing human suffering and preventing progress towards regional integration in North Africa. I am sure that all of us around this table yearn for a mutually agreed political solution to this conflict. Four rounds of discussions in the framework of the latest settlement initiative have, however, confirmed the difficulty of arriving at such a solution, despite the seriousness, dedication and sincerity of the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Peter van Walsum.

In the absence of a settlement, my Government judges the mission of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara to be vital and is pleased that the Council has renewed its mandate for a full year; we appreciate the fact that it was done consensually.

It is our hope that this will permit the parties to engage in the search for a solution in a sustained, intensive and creative manner. To encourage them to do so, we intend to broaden our own engagement with them over the coming weeks and months. For our part, we agree with Mr. van Walsum's assessment that an independent Sahrawi State is not a realistic option for resolving the conflict and that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. In our view, the focus of future negotiation rounds should therefore be on designing a mutually acceptable autonomy regime that is consistent with the aspirations of the people of the Western Sahara.

In that regard, Morocco has already produced a proposal that the Security Council has qualified as serious and credible, and we urge the POLISARIO to engage Morocco in negotiation of its details — or to submit a comprehensive autonomy proposal of its own.

Mr. Ripert (France) (*spoke in French*): With the adoption of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), the international community unanimously welcomed the end of the stalemate on Western Sahara, with the commencement of negotiations without preconditions and in good faith. The lack of progress in the Manhasset negotiations undermines the search for a mutually acceptable, just and lasting political solution negotiated under United Nations auspices, allowing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. The continuation of the status quo in Western Sahara is an obstacle to building an integrated, prosperous Maghreb and poses a threat to the stability of the entire region.

By resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), the Security Council unanimously welcomed the serious and credible Moroccan efforts to produce an autonomy plan for Western Sahara. That, of course, is not a sine qua non: the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco forms the basis for serious and constructive negotiation aimed at a negotiated settlement between the parties, with respect for the principle of self-determination, to which we are committed.

We have taken note with interest of the assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, which supplements the information set out in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2008/251). We pay tribute once again to Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy for their efforts to resolve the question of Western Sahara.

Excerpt from Public Law 113-76
Signed into Law: January 17, 2014

PUBLIC LAW 113—76—JAN. 17, 2014

Public Law 113-76
113th Congress

**DIVISION K—DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND
RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2014**

TITLE VII

GENERAL PROVISIONS

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

SEC. 7041.

(h) MOROCCO.—Funds appropriated under title III of this Act that are available for assistance for Morocco should also be available for assistance for the territory of the Western Sahara: *Provided*, That the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations, not later than 90 days after enactment of this Act, on proposed uses of such assistance.

Excerpt from Committee Reports:

House Report 113-185
113th Congress (2013-2014)

Subsection (g), “Morocco” requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, to submit a report, not less than 90 days after enactment of this Act, which shall include: (1) a description of the needs related to development and democratic reform in the regions and territories administered by Morocco and how funds made available in title III of this Act for assistance for Morocco will be used to address such needs; and (2) steps taken to resolve the longstanding dispute over the Western Sahara, based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, including efforts to address durable humanitarian solutions to the protracted refugee crisis in the camps near Tindouf, Algeria.

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One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
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JASON STEINBAUM
DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

November 15, 2013

The Honorable Barack Obama
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In anticipation of your upcoming meeting with His Excellency King Mohammed VI, we write to express our support to solidify and strengthen the strong partnership between the United States and Morocco.

The current situation in North Africa is troubling as we see the growing influence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, other extremist groups, and transnational criminal networks that continue to destabilize the region and undermine our national security interests. However, under the leadership of King Mohammed VI, Morocco has refrained from witnessing such violence and chaos, and serves as a model for stability in this volatile region that merits our support and commitment. Morocco has developed an effective multifaceted approach for combating extremist movements that relies not only on security cooperation but also values social and political reforms, economic development, and religious education.

A key component of our strong strategic relationship with Morocco is a commitment to peacefully resolve the issue of the Western Sahara. Longstanding U.S. policy supports a solution based on a formula of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. This position, supported by your administration and the two previous administrations, continues to earn strong bipartisan support from Congress.

We would like to take this opportunity to urge your Administration to take full advantage of this upcoming meeting with His Excellency to enhance the strategic relationship between our nations and to explicitly reaffirm and strengthen the longstanding bipartisan position on the Western Sahara.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter and we look forward to working with you to strengthen the U.S. – Morocco bilateral relationship.

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN
Chairman
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

Sincerely,

TED DEUTCH
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20515

March 16, 2010

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Clinton:

We are writing to urge you to make the resolution of the Western Sahara stalemate a U.S. foreign policy priority for North Africa.

We are very concerned about the mounting evidence of growing instability in North Africa. Terrorist activities are increasing and countries in the region are under substantial pressure from a growing and restless youth population and a precarious economic base. United States leadership in close cooperation with our allies in Europe and the region can help stabilize the situation and reverse these worrisome trends. We should begin with a more sustained American attention to one of the region's most pressing political issues, the Western Sahara.

Indeed, a report released on March 31, 2009, by a panel that included former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark, and former Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, argued that “the U.S. must work diligently with its friends to resolve the stalemate over the Western Sahara.”

We agree with you that the proposal introduced by Morocco in 2007 – based on broad autonomy for the Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty – is serious and credible. As you acknowledged in your remarks in Morocco last November, it has been the policy of the United States to support a resolution of this conflict based on this formula since the Administration of President Clinton. We support this bipartisan U.S. policy and the efforts of the United Nations to bring all parties together to resolve this matter peacefully at the negotiating table.

The challenges in North Africa for the United States and its allies are clear, and our leadership can make a significant difference for the better in promoting greater coordination to diminish and eliminate terrorist threats, in encouraging regional integration that will facilitate economic growth and prosperity, and in resolving the Western Sahara to remove the major obstacle to stability in the region.

We look forward to working with you towards the success of this policy.

Sincerely,

List of Signers for the
March 16, 2010 Senate Letter

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
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| 27) Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) | 54) Sen. Debbie Stabenow (D-MI) |

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 3, 2009

The Honorable Barack Obama
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Vital U.S. interests in North Africa are increasingly challenged by growing regional instability. Terrorist incidents in the Maghreb have increased by more than 400 percent since September 11, 2001, and the emergence of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has led to a spike in terror attacks against both symbols of national government and institutions reflecting cooperation between the Arab world and the West. The single greatest obstacle impeding the security cooperation necessary to combat this transnational threat is the unresolved territorial dispute over the Western Sahara.

In addition to bringing peace to the people of Morocco and to the Saharawi, and shrinking the space for global terrorist elements to recruit and operate, resolving the conflict in the Western Sahara would have considerable economic benefits and improve the lives of millions of Africans. The entire Maghreb would finally be free to pursue serious economic integration, attract increased foreign investment, and realize the potential for regional trade and cooperation. All of these important goals are currently blocked by the continued conflict and the tension it creates between states in the region.

In 2007, at the urging of the United States and the United Nations, Morocco, our oldest ally and partner for peace in the Middle East, initiated a ground-breaking autonomy plan to resolve the more than 30 year-old conflict within the framework of self-determination for the Western Sahara. The Moroccan compromise plan received widespread support from the international community as a critical breakthrough for achieving peace and led to four rounds of UN mediated negotiations.


The UN Security Council, in resolution 1813 (2008), described Morocco's compromise efforts as "serious and credible." In pressing for adoption of the resolution the United States reaffirmed the policy initiated under President Clinton, and continued under President Bush, that, "Genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution."

After the four rounds of negotiations did not produce any real progress, the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, Mr. Peter van Walsum, issued an assessment to the Security Council in April 2008. He said, "My conclusion is that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal that is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process," and he urged that future rounds of talks be held only on the subject of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

Unfortunately, following this bold statement the negotiations process stalled. Mr. van Walsum has been replaced by Ambassador Christopher Ross as the new UN Personal Envoy. We are hopeful that Ambassador Ross's appointment will result in the continuation of the talks based on Mr. van Walsum's assessment.

We remain convinced that the U.S. position, favoring autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. We urge you to both sustain this longstanding policy, and to make clear, in both words and actions, that the United States will work to ensure that the UN process continues to support this framework as the only realistic compromise that can bring this unfortunate and longstanding conflict to an end. We look forward to working with you towards the success of this policy.

Sincerely,


List of 2009 Morocco Letter Signers (Alphabetical)

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Ed Whitfield (KY-1)
Joe Wilson (SC-2)
David Wu (OR-1)
Bill Young (FL-10)

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 26, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Kingdom of Morocco, one of our oldest and closest allies, recently submitted a proposal to resolve the three decade long struggle over the Western Sahara. This historic initiative grants profound local autonomy to the Western Sahara while recognizing Morocco's territorial integrity. This compromise is a breakthrough opportunity to find an enduring political solution, and U.S. support is critical to its successful implementation.

As you know, the conflict in the Western Sahara has gone on for too long at great humanitarian cost. Since the 1991 UN imposed cease-fire, all efforts to provide a realistic and durable solution to the conflict have failed. The new Moroccan proposal provides a realistic framework for a negotiated political solution, which is the best way to ensure a lasting peace for all parties.


The United States has a major national security interest in the stability and economic prosperity of North Africa. With al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups expanding their presence into North Africa, we are concerned that the failure to resolve this conflict of more than 30 years poses a danger to U.S. and regional security, while simultaneously preventing the economic integration of the Arab Maghreb Union.

The Moroccan autonomy proposal constitutes an historic opportunity for the United States to help end this problem and provide a better future for the entire region. We urge you to embrace this promising Moroccan initiative so that it receives the consideration necessary to achieve international acceptance.

Sincerely,



Tom Lantz



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Tom Lantos (CA)

Gary Ackerman (NY)
Steny Hoyer (MD)

David Scott (GA)
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Carolyn McCarthy (NY)
Jim Marshall (GA)
Elliot Engel (NY)

Alcee Hastings (FL)
Ruben Hinojosa (TX)
Charles Boustany (LA)
Jeff Fortenberry (NE)
John Tanner (TN)
James Clyburn (SC)
Mary Bono (CA)
David Scott (GA)
Chris Murphy (CT)

Tammy Baldwin (WI)
Vernon Ehlers (MI)
Keith Ellison (MN)
John Boehner (OH)
Pat Murphy (PA)
Steve Chabot (OH)
Ron Klein (FL)
Brian Higgins (NY)
Adrian Smith (NE)

Shelly Berkeley (NV)
Solomon Ortiz (TX)
Bud Cramer (AL)
Rahm Emanuel (IL)
Marcy Kaptur (OH)
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Roscoe Bartlett (MD)
Norm Dicks (WA)
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Ed Pastor (AZ)
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Loretta Sanchez (CA)
Maurice Hinchey (NY)
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D. Wasserman Schultz (FL)
Eric Cantor (VA)
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Edward Markey (MA)
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Doc Hastings (WA)
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Rodney Frelinghuysen (NJ)
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Brian Bilbray (CA)
Jerry Weller (IL)
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Jim Saxton (NJ)

United Nations

S/RES/2152 (2014)

**Security Council**Distr.: General
29 April 2014

Resolution 2152 (2014)**Adopted by the Security Council at its 7162nd meeting, on
29 April 2014***The Security Council,**Recalling* and *reaffirming* all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,*Reaffirming* its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions [1754 \(2007\)](#), [1783 \(2007\)](#), [1813 \(2008\)](#), [1871 \(2009\)](#), [1920 \(2010\)](#), [1979 \(2011\)](#), [2044 \(2012\)](#), and [2099 \(2013\)](#),*Reaffirming* its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and *noting* the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,*Reiterating* its call upon the parties and the neighbouring states to cooperate more fully with the United Nations and with each other and to strengthen their involvement to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,*Recognizing* that achieving a political solution to this long-standing dispute and enhanced cooperation between the Member States of the Maghreb Arab Union would contribute to stability and security in the Sahel region,*Welcoming* the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), under close review and reiterating the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments, and effective management of resources,*Expressing concern* about the violations of existing agreements, and *calling on* the parties to respect their relevant obligations,*Taking note* of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-General and *welcoming* serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also *taking note* of the Polisario Front proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary-General,

14-31481 (E)



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S/RES/2152 (2014)

Encouraging in this context, the parties to demonstrate further political will towards a solution including by expanding upon their discussion of each other's proposals,

Taking note of the four rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of the Secretary-General and *welcoming* the commitment of the parties to continue the negotiations process,

Encouraging the parties to continue cooperating with the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees in implementing the January 2012 updated Plan of Action on Confidence Building Measures,

Stressing the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps, and encouraging the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights, bearing in mind their relevant obligations under international law,

Encouraging the parties to continue in their respective efforts to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights in Western Sahara and the Tindouf refugee camps, including the freedoms of expression and association,

Recognizing and *welcoming*, in this regard, the recent steps and initiatives taken by Morocco to strengthen the National Council on Human Rights Commissions operating in Dakhla and Laayoune, and Morocco's ongoing interaction with Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council, including those planned for 2014, as well as the planned visit of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 2014,

Also welcoming the implementation of the enhanced refugee protection programme developed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in coordination with the Polisario Front, which includes refugee and human rights training and awareness initiatives,

Reiterating its request for consideration of a refugee registration in the Tindouf refugee camps and *inviting* efforts in this regard,

Welcoming the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through the United Nations-sponsored talks,

Recognizing that the consolidation of the status quo is not acceptable, and *noting further* that progress in the negotiations is essential in order to improve the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

Affirming support for the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Ambassador Christopher Ross and his work in facilitating negotiations between the parties, and, *welcoming* to that effect his recent initiatives and ongoing consultations with the parties and neighbouring states,

Affirming support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 10 April 2014 (S/2014/258),

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 30 April 2015;

2. *Reaffirms* the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire and *calls on* the parties to adhere fully to those agreements;

3. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of MINURSO, including its free interaction with all interlocutors, and to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of as well as unhindered movement and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, in conformity with existing agreements;

4. *Welcomes* the parties' commitment to continue the process of preparation for a fifth round of negotiations, and recalls its endorsement of the recommendation in the report of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251) that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to achieve progress in negotiations;

5. *Calls upon* the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), 1979 (2011), 2044 (2012), and 2099 (2013), and the success of negotiations;

6. *Affirms* its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context and calls for renewed meetings and strengthening of contacts;

7. *Calls upon* the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;

8. *Invites* Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to brief the Security Council on a regular basis, and at least twice a year, on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices, on the implementation of this resolution, challenges to MINURSO's operations and steps taken to address them, *expresses* its intention to meet to receive and discuss his briefings and in this regard, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;

10. *Welcomes* the commitment of the parties and the neighbouring states to hold periodic meetings with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to review and, where possible, expand confidence-building measures;

11. *Urges* Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund confidence-building measures agreed upon between the parties, including those that allow for visits between separated family members;

12. *Notes* the Secretary-General's request for an additional 15 United Nations military observers and *supports* this request within existing resources;

S/RES/2152 (2014)

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in MINURSO with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including predeployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

21 April 2008

Assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

1. During my visit to the region, I told each of my hosts that I stood by the conclusions I had drawn in my first briefing to the Security Council on 18 January 2006. As the Council had made it clear from the outset that it could only contemplate a consensual solution to the question of Western Sahara and, more specifically, had not reacted in 2004 when Morocco decided that it could not consent to any referendum in which independence was an option, I had concluded that there was no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim of sovereignty over the Territory and, therefore, that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition. I felt it necessary to reiterate this conclusion, because it might have become obscured by the fact that both the Moroccan proposal and that of the Frente Polisario were on the agenda of the Manhasset negotiations.
2. My interlocutors in Tindouf and Algiers did not contest my analysis, but disagreed strongly with my conclusion; first, because international legality had to prevail, and second, because the circumstances I described as 'reality' might change.
3. **My conclusion that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process.** In my briefing to the Security Council in January 2006, I observed that once the Council recognized that Morocco would not be made to give up its claim to Western Sahara, it would realize that there were only two options: indefinite prolongation of the deadlock or direct negotiations between the parties.
4. On this basis, Secretary-General Annan recommended, first in April and again in October 2006, that the Security Council call on the two parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions. The Security Council did not act on these recommendations. In the second week of April 2007, both parties introduced their respective proposals for the solution of the question of Western Sahara. In his report to the Security Council of 13 April 2007 (S/2007/202), the Secretary-General acknowledged receipt of both proposals and repeated the recommendation to call on the two parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions. Subsequently, in its resolution 1754 (2007) of 30 April 2007, the Security Council took note of both proposals and followed the Secretary-General's recommendation, presumably due to the impact of the Moroccan proposal to negotiate an autonomy statute for the region. And finally, during the first round of the negotiations, on 18 June 2007, I explained to the parties that I had drawn the conclusion that both proposals were on the agenda.
5. Although this procedure cannot be faulted, its outcome is paradoxical. While Morocco's rejection of a referendum with independence as an option had triggered the Council's recourse to recommending negotiations without preconditions, one of the two proposals that are now on the table in these negotiations demands precisely the holding of a referendum with independence as an option. This contradiction may explain why the negotiation process is not leading anywhere: the fundamental positions of the two parties are mutually exclusive. What is an absolute necessity for one is absolutely unacceptable

21 April 2008

for the other. For the Frente Polisario, a referendum with independence as an option is indispensable for the achievement of self-determination, whereas Morocco is unable to accept such a referendum, but believes self-determination can be achieved through other forms of popular consultation.

6. As a result, an even more unyielding impasse has established itself right in the heart of the process that was meant to show a way out of the impasse brought about by Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan (Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara) in 2004 (S/2004/325). A month after the end of my latest tour of the region from 5-15 February 2008, the parties and neighbouring countries met again in Manhasset, from 16-18 March 2008, for the fourth round of their talks. As had been the case in the first three rounds, from 18-19 June and 10-11 August 2007 and 7-9 January 2008, there was hardly any exchange that could be characterized as negotiations. Since April 2007, the equal treatment the Secretary-General had allotted to the two proposals had been progressively modified by the Security Council through the addition of certain references to the Moroccan proposal. First, in resolution 1754 (2007), the Council had inserted the words "welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution" (fifth preambular paragraph) and called upon the parties to take into account "the developments of the last months" (paragraph 2), and later, in resolution 1783 (2007), it had expanded the latter phrase to: "taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and developments of the last months." In Manhasset, I reminded the delegations that these insertions were integral parts of the two Security Council resolutions, as was the Council's "taking note" of both proposals.

7. Both parties repeatedly commented on the exact meaning of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), and, it goes without saying, they attached paramount importance to very different elements. For the Frente Polisario, all that matters is that both proposals are on the table, while according to Morocco the Council has established a clear order between the two. This exercise in textual explanation may be intellectually challenging, but it does not yield the kind of authoritative interpretation that induces the parties to reconsider their positions and to negotiate a compromise solution. What is needed is clearer guidance from the Council itself. I am, of course, aware of the constraints under which Security Council resolutions come into being; but the answer to the vital question of whether one proposal has priority over the other cannot be left to the inevitably controversial interpretation of a number of indistinct phrases. If the Council cannot make a choice, the parties cannot either.

8. There is no conceivable compromise between the parties' views on the role of a referendum with independence as an option. However, I had hoped that the parties, who at the conclusion of the second round of talks agreed that the current *status quo* was unacceptable, would sooner or later show some willingness to explore the implications of possible movement on the basis of the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed;" but in four rounds of talks, no sign of such willingness has been detected. Therefore, the process is at a standstill, despite the agreement to meet for a fifth round at a date still to be determined.

21 April 2008

9. Much will now depend on the interaction between the Security Council's adoption of a new resolution before the end of April, and that fifth round of the negotiation process. If the Council simply extends the process begun by resolution 1754 (2007) and continued by resolution 1783 (2007), there is no doubt that the fifth round will be no different from the first four, and the process will be rightly regarded as deadlocked. Yet, this seems the most likely outcome because in the wider international community the feeling that the *status quo* in Western Sahara is unacceptable is far less prevalent than the feeling that, on balance and all alternatives considered, it may be the least disadvantageous option. Numerous countries consider the *status quo* quite tolerable because it relieves them from the necessity of making painful choices, such as taking sides between Algeria and Morocco. Consolidation of the *status quo* may well be the natural outcome – so to speak, the *default mode* – of the negotiation process.

10. Apart from what the Security Council may or may not be able to do, countries that have close ties with either party might make a greater effort at counteracting that party's tendency to overestimate the strength of its position. Both parties are quick to interpret positive comments from third countries as support for their cause. I have the impression that the prevalence of this phenomenon is responsible for a large number of misconceptions that weaken the political will to search for compromise solutions. In the international community, there is a widespread view that legally the Frente Polisario has the stronger case, but that it is not incumbent on the Security Council to pressure Morocco to pull out of Western Sahara thirty-three years after its taking possession of the Territory. It is as if the Frente Polisario hears only the first part of this sentence, and Morocco only the second. By far the greatest misconception in this category must be the belief that once the current negotiations have foundered, the Security Council will realize that the question of Western Sahara can only be solved by means of a referendum with independence as an option and take action accordingly.

11. If the negotiations end in stalemate again, the continuation of the *status quo* seems unavoidable. It is highly unlikely that in such a situation the Security Council would unanimously lend its full support to one of the two proposals. Yet, the stalemate would have been caused by the fact that the process was launched with two proposals on the table, one that requires a referendum with independence as an option, and the other that rules that out. A way out of this dilemma might be a tentative and temporary change of focus.

12. To initiate this, the Security Council might ask the parties:

- to reconfirm their acceptance of the principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”;
- to temporarily (e.g. for six to nine months) remove both proposals from the agenda of the talks;
- to negotiate, this time really without preconditions but on the temporary assumption that there will not be a referendum with independence as an option and that, therefore, the outcome will necessarily fall short of full independence.

21 April 2008

In addition, the Council might announce its intention to evaluate the process at the end of the trial period. If at that time it perceives the contours of a possible political solution, it may decide to extend the trial period; if it does not, the *status quo* – with the existing incompatible positions of the parties – will resume of itself.

13. I am aware that the removal of the two proposals from the table would be largely symbolic. Still, as the negotiations are hindered by the fact that two irreconcilable proposals are on the table, the right solution might be to remove both of them. Of course, they would not cease to exist; but their status would be clear: they would just be the parties' goals, to be negotiated between them on the basis of two realities:

- (for the Frente Polisario:) that the Security Council will not make Morocco accept a referendum with independence as an option;

- (for Morocco:) that the United Nations does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over any part of Western Sahara.

It is important to be as explicit about the latter as about the former because, in the context of the current negotiation process, Morocco so consistently refers to its sovereignty over Western Sahara that it would seem advisable to clarify that this can only express a Moroccan claim, so that in case of an unexpected breakdown of the negotiations there will be absolute clarity about the status of Western Sahara as disputed territory.

14. From the outset, I have emphasised the need to respect political reality alongside international legality. Morocco's physical possession of Western Sahara is political reality, but so is the reality that no country has so far recognized its sovereignty over the Territory. This fact is linked to international legality; the two concepts do not exist in separation. What matters is how political reality and international legality interact to enable us to take the best decisions in real life. I do not accept the view that taking political reality into account is a concession or a surrender, and that it is wrong ever to settle for less than pure legality. The choices to be made are not limited to the dilemma between international legality and political reality. There is also a moral dilemma that comes to light when the virtue of international legality is weighed against the consequences of its pursuit for the people of Western Sahara in real life. The main reason why I find the *status quo* intolerable is that it is too readily accepted, not only by uncommitted onlookers in distant lands, but also by deeply involved supporters of the Frente Polisario, who do not live in the camps themselves but are convinced that those who do would rather stay there indefinitely than settle for any negotiated solution that falls short of full independence.

June 6, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. President:

We applaud the support of your Administration for the adoption of Resolution 1754 by the United Nations Security Council on April 30, 2007, which incorporates the historic initiative by Morocco to end the conflict in the Western Sahara through direct negotiations. This new direction for solving the crisis is in large part the result of your efforts and encouragement.


As the first country to officially recognize the United States in 1777, Morocco has been an historic and reliable ally to our great nation, and we encourage you to continue this cooperation in the challenging months ahead as the negotiations are inaugurated.

Recent terrorist attacks in Morocco and Algeria show that we cannot afford to continue to ignore the problems of this region. Failure to resolve this conflict jeopardizes international stability, our fight against terrorism, and economic integration efforts in the region.

By giving the people of the Western Sahara a true voice in their future through the full benefits of autonomy as presented by Morocco, a credible political solution can be achieved. Morocco's commitment merits the support of the international community and we must ensure that its neighbors assume their responsibility for contributing to the success of these negotiations, as called for in UNSC Resolution 1754.

Mr. President, we know that with your encouragement and support Morocco has courageously shown its leadership with this initiative. Your commitment can make possible a solution to this lingering issue and reaffirm our bipartisan support to a realistic and lasting peace in North Africa.

Sincerely,


Madeleine K. Albright
Former United States Secretary of State



Frank Charles Carlucci III
Former United States Secretary of Defense



Mickey Kantor
Former United States Secretary of Commerce and
Former United States Trade Representative




Hazel R. O'Leary
Former United States Secretary of Energy



Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander



Ben Gilman
Former Member, United States House of Representatives and
Chairman, House Committee on International Relations



Thomas Daschle
Former United States Senator and Senate Majority Leader



Thomas R. Pickering
Former United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and
Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Russia, India,
Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan



Martin Indyk
Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs and Former United States Ambassador to Israel



Edward S. Walker Jr.
Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs and Former United States Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the
United Arab Emirates




Thomas Nassif
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and
South and Central Asian Affairs




Michael Ussery
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central
Asian Affairs



Frederick Vreeland
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and
South and Central Asian Affairs



Dov Zakheim
Former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and
Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense



Peter W. Rodman
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs



Leon Fuerth
Former National Security Advisor to Vice President Albert A. Gore Jr.



American Jewish Committee

Office of Government and International Affairs

1156 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005 www.ajc.org 202-785-4200 Fax 202-785-4115 E-mail ogia@ajc.org

Jason F. Isaacson
DIRECTOR

April 19, 2007

Dear Representative:

The American Jewish Committee, an organization that advances inter-religious and inter-ethnic understanding and is dedicated to the success of moderation and pluralism in the Arab and Muslim world, urges your endorsement of a letter circulated by Representatives Ackerman and Diaz-Balart supporting a just-released proposal for autonomy in the disputed Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty.


The Ackerman/Diaz-Balart letter asks President Bush to support the Moroccan plan – and seek international acceptance of it – as a sound basis to resolve the Western Sahara conflict, a source of regional instability and human suffering for more than 30 years.

Cognizant of the historic links between – and the broad common interests of – the United States and Morocco, and as an institutional partner of the Moroccan Jewish community, the American Jewish Committee strongly supports efforts by our Government and the Kingdom to enhance cooperation in many spheres, from the struggle against terrorism and extremism, to expanded economic opportunity in the Maghreb, cultural and educational exchange, and political reform. It was our faith in this vital relationship that underlay AJC's support for the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement of 2004, and is the foundation of our ongoing dialogue with Moroccan officials and civil society on pressing issues of regional peace, security and human rights.

Reinforced by the recent assertion of Under Secretary Burns that the Moroccan proposal is “serious and credible” and would “provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara,” we view U.S. advocacy of this approach as critical to the further enhancement of ties between our nation and the Kingdom, the continued advance of political and economic progress in Morocco, and effective pursuit of cooperative strategies to counter regional instability and international terrorism. We urge your signature on the Ackerman/Diaz-Balart letter to President Bush.

With appreciation for your consideration of AJC's views on this matter, I remain,

Respectfully,



Jason F. Isaacson

American Jewish Committee
A Century of Leadership



Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, and Options for Effective American Engagement in North Africa

MARCH 31, 2009

“The US needs a policy to promote American interests in the area by treating the five North African states as a region and working to strengthen the economic and security ties among them – and with the US and Europe – and by taking the lead in promoting a resolution to the Western Sahara conflict based on the proposal of autonomy within Moroccan sovereignty now on the table at the United Nations (UN) and supported by a bipartisan consensus in the US Congress.”

“The single greatest obstacle to this integration [greater regional economic integration and Atlantic cooperation] is the Western Sahara conflict. Ongoing negotiations at the UN have brought no discernable progress. This stalemate must be brought to an end if the larger issues of integration are to be addressed.”

“Removing the single largest issue in the way of security cooperation by resolving the Western Sahara conflict would allow Morocco and Algeria to turn coordinated attention to the security problem to their south, permit them to reduce their forces level and halt their arms race, and free them to devote more of their budgets to civilian needs.”

“Finally, the US can help broker resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, which is the major obstacle to regional integration and the central impediment to effective coordination of efforts to combat terrorism, illegal immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking, and to promote economic cooperation and other regional initiatives. If regional integration is the goal, then a solution to the Western Sahara conflict will remove the primary barrier to cooperation.”

“Successive US administrations have declared that the only feasible solution is to be found in the autonomy compromise. In this regard, the United States needs to begin immediately to treat the Western Sahara in a manner consistent with the declared policy—and encourage its allies to do the same.”

“Regional integration in North Africa will support a range of US interests that are central to the strategic pursuit of the region’s stability, security, and economic goals. But regional integration cannot be realized without resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Given the current position of the US government – that broad autonomy for the Sahrawi people under Moroccan sovereignty is the only realistic solution – the platform is in place to move proactively and successfully to bring an end to that conflict, to increase counterterrorism cooperation, and effectively to encourage regional economic integration that will bring greater prosperity and opportunity to the peoples of the Maghreb and greater security for US interests.

Panel Members for the North Africa Policy Paper Project

The following foreign policy experts are members of the blue-ribbon panel that reviewed and approved the report:

Secretary Madeleine Albright

Fmr US Sec. of State, Principal Albright Group LLC

Professor Yonah Alexander

Dir. Int'l Center, Terrorism Studies, Potomac Inst.

General Wesley Clark

Ret. 4-star US Gen, NATO Sup. Allied Commander

President Lorne Craner

President, International Republican Inst.

Professor Chester Crocker

Prof. Strategic Studies, Georgetown U.

Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat

Covington & Burling, Fmr White House Policy Adviser

Professor John Entelis

Dir. Middle East Studies, Fordham U.

Ambassador Lucia Guerrato

Former Ambassador, European Union

Ambassador Robert Pelletreau

Fmr Assist. Sec. of State, Near Eastern Affairs

Ambassador Robin Raphel

Former US Ambassador to Tunisia

Ambassador Ed Walker

Former US Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, & UAE

Ambassador David Welch

Former Assist. Sec. of State, Near Eastern Affairs and Former Ambassador to Egypt

Professor I William Zartman

Jacob Blaustein Professor Emeritus, SAIS





The Moroccan Initiative in the Western Sahara

Background:

The Moroccan initiative comes in response to repeated requests of the United Nations Security Council and several of its key members, including the United States, that Morocco propose a solution to this longstanding problem that could facilitate the opening of negotiations for a "just, durable and peaceful" political solution.

After nearly a decade of trying to bring the Polisario and Morocco to agreement to conduct a referendum to determine the territories future, Kofi Annan, then Secretary General, and James Baker, then Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, reported to the Security Council that it was not possible to achieve agreement between the Polisario and Morocco on the central issue of who should be permitted to vote in a referendum. Consequently, Annan and Baker recommended that the Security Council encourage Morocco and the Polisario to enter into direct negotiations to find a compromise political solution. The Security Council accepted the assessment of Annan and Baker that a referendum would not be possible, and began a process carried through several years of UNSC resolutions calling for direct negotiations.

James Baker proposed two such compromise political solutions based on the underlying assumption that the proposals would allow Morocco to remain sovereign in the Western Sahara, but that the territory would benefit from a substantial autonomy that would allow it to become self-governing. Morocco accepted the first Baker proposal as the basis for direct negotiations, but the Polisario refused. The Polisario accepted the second Baker proposal, but Morocco refused since it did not allow for direct negotiations between the parties on the terms of the arrangement.

The Moroccan proposal is the first and only proposal to come from one of the Parties to the conflict in response to the Security Council encouragements. In various forms, the Polisario has continued to insist that the referendum be held, and threatens a renewal of hostilities and the eviction of the United Nations peacekeeping force from the territory under its control, despite the fact that the Security Council repeatedly has made clear that this solution is no longer viable.

Summary of the Moroccan Initiative:

The initiative is the product of a year long internal and foreign Moroccan consultation process. All sectors of the Sahrawi population were included in the consultations and the views of foreign governments and expert international authorities were sought before the plan was finalized for presentation to the United Nations.

The plan itself represents an outline for a political solution that traces what Morocco considers to be the broad scope of an autonomy arrangement for the Western Sahara. It does not go into extensive detail on its various aspects on the assumption that such specific arrangements should be the result of direct negotiations rather than the imposition of only one of the parties to the dispute.

The plan provides for a local elected legislature that would subsequently elect an executive authority. It also would establish a separate judiciary for the autonomous region with competence to render justice on matters specific to the autonomous status of the region. The legislature would elect a chief executive.

The formula proposed by Morocco would ensure majority representation in the legislature for Sahrawi inhabitants of the autonomous region, while also ensuring credible legislative representation for non-Sahrawis who have been long-time residents in the territory. Residents of the autonomous region would also continue to elect representatives to the national legislature.

The government of the autonomous region would have exclusive authorities on some issues, shared authority with the central government of Morocco on others and consultative rights on authorities that remain reserved to the central government and that effect the region.

The autonomous government would control local administration, local police, education, cultural development, economic development, regional planning, tourism, investment, trade, public works and transportation, housing, health, sports and social welfare. It would have taxing authorities to support these functions and would continue to receive funding from the central budget as well. It would be able to establish foreign regional trade relations offices and would have consultative rights on other sovereign foreign agreements affecting the region.

The central government would retain exclusive jurisdiction over the normal elements of sovereign authority: national defense, currency, postal, and foreign affairs and religion, over which the Monarchy has a special status in Morocco.

The chief executive of the autonomous region would be elected by the legislature, but would be invested by and serve in the name of the Monarchy.

The initiative also envisages transitional bodies to guide the central government and the autonomous authority through the initial stages of implementation of the plan.

All individual rights guaranteed under the Moroccan Constitution would continue to apply to all residents of the autonomous region.

MOROCCAN INITIATIVE FOR NEGOTIATING AN AUTONOMY STATUTE FOR THE SAHARA REGION

I. Morocco's commitment to a final political solution

1. Since 2004, the Security Council has been regularly calling upon *"the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution."*
2. Responding to this call by the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco set a positive, constructive and dynamic process in motion, and pledged to submit an autonomy proposal for the Sahara, within the framework of the Kingdom's sovereignty and national unity.
3. This initiative is part of the endeavors made to build a modern, democratic society, based on the rule of law, collective and individual freedoms, and economic and social development. As such, it brings hope for a better future for the region's populations, puts an end to separation and exile, and promotes reconciliation.
4. Through this initiative, the Kingdom of Morocco guarantees to all Sahrawis, inside as well as outside the territory, that they will hold a privileged position and play a leading role in the bodies and institutions of the region, without discrimination or exclusion.
5. Thus, the Sahara populations will themselves run their affairs democratically, through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive powers. They will have the financial resources needed for the region's development in all fields, and will take an active part in the nation's economic, social and cultural life.
6. The State will keep its powers in the royal domains, especially with respect to defense, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of His Majesty the King.
7. The Moroccan initiative, which is made in an open spirit, aims to set the stage for dialogue and a negotiation process that would lead to a mutually acceptable political solution.
8. As the outcome of negotiations, the autonomy statute shall be submitted to the populations concerned for a referendum, in keeping with the principle of self-determination and with the provisions of the UN Charter.
9. To this end, Morocco calls on the other parties to avail the opportunity to write a new chapter in the region's history. Morocco is ready to take part in serious, constructive negotiations in the spirit of this initiative, and to contribute to promoting a climate of trust.
10. To achieve this objective, the Kingdom of Morocco remains willing to cooperate fully with the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.

II. Basic elements of the Moroccan proposal

11. The Moroccan autonomy project draws inspiration from the relevant proposals of the United Nations Organization, and from the constitutional provisions in force in countries that are geographically and culturally close to Morocco. It is based on internationally recognized norms and standards.

A. Powers of the Sahara autonomous Region

12. In keeping with democratic principles and procedures, and acting through legislative, executive and judicial bodies, the populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall exercise powers, within the Region's territorial boundaries, mainly over the following:

- Region's local administration, local police force and jurisdictions;
- in the economic sector: economic development, regional planning, promotion of investment, trade, industry, tourism and agriculture;
- Region's budget and taxation;
- infrastructure: water, hydraulic facilities, electricity, public works and transportation;
- in the social sector: housing, education, health, employment, sports, social welfare and social security;
- cultural affairs, including promotion of the Saharan Hassani cultural heritage;
- environment.

13. The Sahara autonomous Region will have the financial resources required for its development in all areas. Resources will come, in particular, from:

- taxes, duties and regional levies enacted by the Region's competent authorities;
- proceeds from the development of natural resources allocated to the Region;
- the share of proceeds collected by the State from the development of natural resources located in the Region;
- the necessary funds allocated in keeping with the principle of national solidarity;
- proceeds from the Region's assets.

14. The State shall keep exclusive jurisdiction over the following in particular:

- the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency;
- the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual and collective freedoms;
- national security, external defense and defense of territorial integrity;
- external relations;
- the Kingdom's juridical order.

15. State responsibilities with respect to external relations shall be exercised in consultation with the Sahara autonomous Region for those matters which have a direct bearing on the prerogatives of the Region. The Sahara autonomous Region may, in consultation with the Government, establish cooperation relations with foreign Regions to foster inter-regional dialogue and cooperation.
16. The powers of the State in the Sahara autonomous Region, as stipulated in paragraph 13 above, shall be exercised by a Representative of the Government.
17. Moreover, powers which are not specifically entrusted to a given party shall be exercised by common agreement, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.
18. The populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be represented in Parliament and in the other national institutions. They shall take part in all national elections.

B. Bodies of the Region

19. The Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be made up of members elected by the various Sahrawi tribes, and of members elected by direct universal suffrage, by the Region's population. There shall be adequate representation of women in the Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region.
20. Executive authority in the Sahara autonomous Region shall lie with a Head of Government, to be elected by the regional Parliament. He shall be invested by the King.

The Head of Government shall be the Representative of the State in the Region.
21. The Head of Government of the Sahara autonomous Region shall form the Region's Cabinet and appoint the administrators needed to exercise the powers devolving upon him, under the present autonomy Statute. He shall be answerable to the Region's Parliament.
22. Courts may be set up by the regional Parliament to give rulings on disputes arising from enforcement of norms enacted by the competent bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region. These courts shall give their rulings with complete independence, in the name of the King.
23. As the highest jurisdiction of the Sahara autonomous Region, the high regional court shall give final decisions regarding the interpretation of the Region's legislation, without prejudice to the powers of the Kingdom's Supreme Court or Constitutional Council.
24. Laws, regulations and court rulings issued by the bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be consistent with the Region's autonomy Statute and with the Kingdom's Constitution.
25. The Region's populations shall enjoy all the guarantees afforded by the Moroccan Constitution in the area of human rights as they are universally recognized.
26. An Economic and Social Council shall be set up in the Sahara autonomous Region. It shall comprise representatives from economic, social, professional and community groups, as well as highly qualified figures.

III. Approval and implementation procedure for the autonomy statute

27. The Region's autonomy statute shall be the subject of negotiations and shall be submitted to the populations concerned in a free referendum. This referendum will constitute a free exercise, by these populations, of their right to self-determination, as per the provisions of international legality, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.
28. To this end, the parties pledge to work jointly and in good faith to foster this political solution and secure its approval by the Sahara populations.
29. Moreover, the Moroccan Constitution shall be amended and the autonomy Statute incorporated into it, in order to guarantee its sustainability and reflect its special place in the country's national juridical architecture.
30. The Kingdom of Morocco shall take all the necessary steps to ensure full integration, into the nation's fabric, of persons to be repatriated. This will be done in a manner which preserves their dignity and guarantees their security and the protection of their property.
31. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco shall, in particular, declare a blanket amnesty, precluding any legal proceedings, arrest, detention, imprisonment or intimidation of any kind, based on facts covered by this amnesty.
32. Once the parties have agreed on the proposed autonomy, a Transitional Council composed of their representatives shall assist with repatriation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed elements who are outside the territory, as well as with any other action aimed at securing the approval and implementation of the present Statute, including elections.
33. Just like the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco firmly believes today that the solution to the Sahara dispute can only come from negotiations. Accordingly, the proposal it is submitting to the United Nations constitutes a real opportunity for initiating negotiations with a view to reaching a final solution to this dispute, in keeping with international legality, and on the basis of arrangements which are consistent with the goals and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
34. In this respect, Morocco pledges to negotiate in good faith and in a constructive, open spirit to reach a final, mutually acceptable political solution to the dispute plaguing the region. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco is prepared to make a positive contribution to creating an environment of trust which would contribute to the successful outcome of this initiative.
35. The Kingdom of Morocco hopes the other parties will appreciate the significance and scope of this proposal, realize its merit, and make a positive and constructive contribution to it. The Kingdom of Morocco is of the view that the momentum created by this initiative offers a historic chance to resolve this issue once and for all.

US Policy on the Western Sahara

Presidential

- Since 1999, Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have supported a compromise formula based on autonomy for the Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty, with the details to be negotiated between Morocco, the Polisario Front, and the Polisario's Algerian backers. Since 2007, when Morocco unveiled its compromise autonomy plan, the plan has been widely supported in Washington and deemed, "serious, realistic, and credible," by officials in the Administration.

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/03/158895.htm>

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197711.htm>

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/22/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-kingdom-morocco>

http://moroccoonthemove.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/mit_intlreview_us_policy_wsahara043010.pdf

- In a Joint Statement issued on November 22, 2013 following a meeting between President Obama and King Mohammed VI, the US reiterated that Morocco's autonomy plan is "serious, realistic, and credible." The two leaders also affirmed, "their shared commitment to the improvement of the lives of the people of the Western Sahara and agreed to work together to continue to protect and promote human rights in the territory."

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/22/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-kingdom-morocco>

Congress

- On June 24, 2014, The House Committee on Appropriations approved an FY2015 Appropriations Bill that explicitly directed that existing development assistance to Morocco "shall also be made available for any region or territory administered by Morocco, including the Western Sahara." The law, if fully approved by Congress and signed by the President as part of the FY2015 Appropriations Bill, should bolster Morocco's efforts to improve social and economic conditions in the Southern Provinces.

<http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-113hr-sc-ap-fy2015-stateforop-subcommitteedraft.pdf>

- On January 17, 2014, President Obama signed into law the FY2014 Appropriations Bill that explicitly directed that existing development assistance to Morocco "should also be available for assistance for the territory of the Western Sahara." The law, P.L. 113-76, approved by Congress and signed by the President as part of the FY2014 Appropriations Bill, should bolster Morocco's efforts to improve social and economic conditions in the Southern Provinces.

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr3547eah/pdf/BILLS-113hr3547eah.pdf>

<http://moroccoonthemove.com/2014/01/17/following-moroccan-kings-white-house-visit-congress-mandates-funding-development-projects-western-sahara/#sthash.11w9BGPK.3M1sFMnU.dpbs>

- The law also requires that the State Department (in consultation with USAID) submit a report describing how aid will support development and democratic reform in the country, and also detailing US efforts to "resolve the longstanding dispute over the Western Sahara, based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty." This report could help advance positive efforts towards what US officials have called "the only feasible solution" for resolving the Western Sahara, and hopefully will signal more active support and renewed determination on the part of the United States for resolving this issue based on the "serious, realistic, and credible" compromise put forward by Morocco.

<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr185&dbname=113&>

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Western%20Sahara%20SPV5884.pdf>

- In December 2011, Congress reiterated the urgency of putting tangible actions behind US policy supporting Moroccan autonomy in the Western Sahara by inserting such language in the 2012 Omnibus Spending Report. The language, which states that US program assistance to Morocco may be used in “all regions and territories administered by Morocco,” authorizes the extension of US economic and social development assistance to the Western Sahara as a means of resolving the conflict. It further notes that Congress “remains concerned with resolving the dispute over the Western Sahara” that for decades has been an obstacle to cooperation, stability, and security in the region, and urges the State Department “to prioritize a negotiated settlement” to the dispute based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. Speaking in the Congressional Record, then-House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) underscored the urgency of the matter, noting that “the US must continue to seek a fair, just, and enduring solution to the Western Sahara in order to promote regional integration and protect US security interests in the region.”
<http://moroccoonthemove.com/2011/12/23/congress-president-approve-extending-us-aid-for-morocco-reforms-to-w-sahara-advance-us-policy-backing-moroccan-autonomy-solution/#sthash.VEt2Ygp3.dpbs>
- In March 2010, 54 members of the United States Senate affirmed their support for Morocco’s autonomy plan in a letter addressed to then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Out of concern for growing instability in North Africa, the letter urged Secretary Clinton to “make the resolution of the Western Sahara stalemate a U.S. foreign policy priority for North Africa,” and called for “more sustained American attention to one of the region’s most pressing political issues.” The letter voiced strong support for the US policy backing a solution to the conflict based on “broad autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty” and called the Moroccan compromise autonomy proposal “serious and credible.” The letter noted that it has been the “bipartisan US policy” of three successive Administrations (Clinton, Bush, and Obama) “to support a resolution of this conflict based on this formula.”
<http://www.moroccanamericanpolicy.org/SenateLetter.pdf>
- On the eve of the April 2009 MINURSO renewal, 233 members of the United States House of Representatives sent a letter to President Obama reaffirming their support for Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal. The letter called for strong US backing for Morocco’s compromise solution to end the 30-year Western Sahara conflict, which would clear a path for greater regional cooperation to meet growing security and economic challenges.
<http://www.moroccanamericanpolicy.org/CongressionalLetter.pdf>
- The 2009 letter from the House of Representatives built on another letter from 2007 signed by 173 Members of the House (including the bipartisan House Leadership, Chairman Tom Lantos and Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen) reiterating Congressional support for the Moroccan plan, and a letter from Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and other important former policy makers.
http://www.moroccanamericanpolicy.com/documents/MACP_Press_Release_060707_001.pdf
http://www.moroccanamericanpolicy.com/documents/173_sig_letter.pdf

The Administration

- During her remarks at the Opening Plenary of the US-Morocco Strategic Dialogue in September 2012, then-Secretary Clinton praised Morocco as a leader and model in the region and reaffirmed Morocco's autonomy initiative to resolve the Western Sahara conflict as "serious, realistic, and credible." Reiterating that US policy has remained constant, Clinton underscored the continuity of US policy on the supporting a solution for Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197711.htm>
- On March 23, 2011, at a joint press briefing with then-Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri, Secretary Clinton reiterated US policy on the Western Sahara, stating that the Moroccan autonomy plan is, "serious, realistic, and credible [and] a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations of the people in Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity."
- During a trip to Morocco on November 3, 2009, Secretary Clinton confirmed US policy on the Western Sahara - that autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only realistic solution for ending the more than 30-year dispute, noting during her remarks with then-Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri, "It is important for me to reaffirm, here in Morocco, that there has been no change in our policy." In a subsequent interview, Secretary Clinton continued, "It is a plan, as you know, that was started under the Clinton Administration. It was reaffirmed under the Bush Administration and remains the policy of the United States under the Obama Administration."
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/11/131354.htm>
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/11/131229.htm>
- In June 2008, then-White House Press Secretary Dana Perino elucidated this policy. She noted, "Yes, the President sent a letter to King Mohammed. It reiterated the U.S. position, first announced in the UN Security Council, that autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution for the Western Sahara dispute and our support for substantive negotiations on this matter within the U.N.-led framework."
- Perino was referring to an April 2008 decision by UN Security Council members to unanimously opt for "realism" rather than prolonging the stalemate. The US played a significant role in this sea change, noting in its statement issued by then-Deputy Permanent US Representative to the United Nations Alejandro Wolff after the UN Security Council vote that, "For our part, we agree with (UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy) Mr. Van Walsum's assessment that an independent Sahrawi state is not a realistic option for resolving the conflict and that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. In our view, the focus of future negotiation rounds should therefore be on designing a mutually acceptable autonomy regime that is consistent with the aspirations of the people of the Western Sahara."
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Western%20Sahara%20SPV5884.pdf>
- Peter Van Walsum was the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy and the UN mediator for the first four rounds of negotiations. In his assessment, he called for compromise and realism in on-going negotiations and concluded that "an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal." He called the four rounds of talks a failure and urged the Security Council to

pursue the only realistic compromise political solution to the conflict: autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS246402+28-Aug-2008+PRN20080828>

<http://moroccoonthemove.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/vanwalsumreportapril20081.pdf>

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